· c··- UCRL-50249 SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NTH COUNTRY EXPERIMENT-l 'x7- f t4cr Title Unclassified Edited by W J Frank 1 ·larch 1967 __ - DIS f-Ri Bl ff--t0N4--# r ITLD _ A TOM IC VEA PON DAT A CATEGORY SIGMA Uf IVERSITY 1ST R£VIEW-OA Tl u - - - -'AUTHORITY - · - NAME · 2ND REVIEW• AUTHOfUTY f4AM£ • ' of l CALIFORNlA - --- -- l - ' ' · 1 -•-· t -- -c-- - '• f t - · ·- •J · _·· _ 1- l l- • _ ·-- · • - Ill'- - • ·•-1 · - • ' ' - · Jo - ··- ••• - - -·- --· 2 - ' - - _ This document - ontains § 1 _pages This is copy_ _of Series La -vrr re n o e Ra d l a t l o n La bo ra to ry UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIVERMORE UCRL-'50249 SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NTH COUNTRY EXPERIMENT Title Unclassified Edited by W J Frank March 1967 -- DlS f-R-f BtJrtON L-IMlUD _ 9TOD U@ Wiiil O P@U e2H in eA I EWR f faM ft 1 RESTRICTED DATA • xcluded from Automatic ing and Declassification -j11- · sJJ4i M _ 1 ·· _z •• • • - • - ' ' - - - A - -- ' _ ·-· •· -·-- ' - --- ·-·•-·· _ '9 ·coNTENTS Page No Preface -W J Frank V The Nth· Country Fission Weapo 1 Design - D A Dobson D N Pipkorn and R W Selden Basic Concepts 1 IL Early Design 4 III Bomb Physics 9 IV The Final Design 9 I v VI VII Test 13 The Continuing Program 13 Conclusions 15 Critique of the th Country Weapon Design - F S Eby and L S Germain 20 Appendix A The Operating Rules for the N h Country Project A J Hudgins 25 Appendix B Biographical ketches 27 Appendix C A Brief Chronology of the Experiment 29 Appendix D Security Aspects of the Experiment - D A Dobson and R W Selden Appendix E A Selected Bibliography 30 40 Appendix F High Explosive Detonator and X-Unit Technology - 44 E James Appendix G • Hydrodynamics Technology - M L Wilkins 47 _Appendix H Neutronics Technology - W C Grayso 49 Appendix I Yield Calculations -W C Grayson 50 Appendix J Initiators - R L Remillard 52 Appendix K Weapon Materials Technology - R A James 53 Appendix L Weapon Facility and Fabrication Costs - C R Henry 54 ···5ECRKI - -· ·-· - -·11 • -•f' ' - · -·-- aa ' PREFACE W J FRANK This report summarizes the LRL Nth Country Experiment It contains a descrip- tion of the f_inal design omitting the physics justification a critique of its performance by two LRL physicists and a series of short articles on the technology available in the unclassified literature Appendices F thru L The full physics descriptiorfand history of the Nth Country design completed by the three Nth Country physicists on December 14 1966 has been published separately UCRL-50239 The correspondence between the Nth Country designers and the LRL support committee is published in UCRL-50248 Two major technical problems face a nation wishing to acquire a small stockpile of nuclear weapons The first concerns the manufacture of the source material - prob- r ably with a plutonium production reactor required to design D E a nuclear weapon The second problem concerns the effort ' if f h I -------- -- - •·----· LRL started its Nth· Country Experiment in May 1964 to see if a few capable physicists unfamiliar with nuclear weapons and with access only to the unclassified technology could produce a credible weapon design They were to receive such unclassified computer and technical support as might be required The duration of the Experiment was to be one year since the physicists who agreed to work half-time on the Experiment D A Dobson and D N Pipkorn were post-graduate students at the Laboratory on a one-year appointment They were subsequently appointed for a second year and in March 1965 R V Selden an LRL Army Research Associate joined the design team The designers' backgrounds and a brief chronology of the Experiment are given in Appendices B and C There was only one contact A J Hudgins to provide good security control and • avoid contact with Laboratory personnel familiar with weapon design Some security aspects of the Experi_ment as experienced by the designers themselves are described in Appendix D All technical questions were handled via written documents coordinated by W J Frank The day-to- ' aY ·pi-·oblems ·and progress of the design were kept in 35 · - classified notebooks by the physicists are given in Appendix A The operating rules for the th Country Project Several comments can be made about the manner in which the Experiment was conducted It proceeded on a relatively low-key basis in all only three man-years of effort were spent over the two-and-a-half year period of the Experiment While the three designers had technical support they were not allowed to interact or iscuss their ideas with these people except through written documents they thus lacked the vital feedback process of explaining and defending their work in the context of a larger group of interested equally talented but differently oriented technical staff members r-- ----- The Experiment was formally ended on April 10 1967 f -- ---- - J·-------··-·· ·------- ··----- ___ _____ --- ---- --- Ash tr- ff - ·-·E i - t is now underway the de- signers were given the ·results of the test and asked several questions about their current design its possible extensions and alternative design approaches A report will be issued later describing these postshot activities I would summarize the conclusions of the Exoeriment in two statements _ DaC b J 12 Appendix T considers ·the costs of building and running a small weapon laboratory and production facility These data plus a typical estimate for a plutonium production reacto_r give a third conclusion __ yo1 b Cj • ' ' · ' 'I ' • · 1 '7 I ------ -- A ----_ THE NTH COUNTRY FISSION WEAPON DESIGN D A DOBSON D N PIPKORN AND R W SELDEN December 14 1966 I BASIC CONCEPTS The basic concept of how a bomb works preliminary design considerations and our first complete design were significant stages in the evolution of our understanding about nuclear explosives We present the basic concepts as we understood them early in the Experiment and not from our current knowledge 1 A nuclear fission explosion results when a supercritical mass of fissile material is assembled and held together long enough for the chain reaction to take place 2 Critical mass numbers are readily available from the literature Paxton Los Alamos Critical-Mass Data and Paxton Critical Dimensions of Systems l 235 C on t a1n1ng p u 239 and U233 Fissile material Bare sphere u 235 93 53 d u 238 6 5Vc j233 a- phase Pu 239 density 19 8 g cc 6 phase Pu 239 density 15 6 g cc a Critical mass kg Sphere surrounded by 4-cm-thick U reflector 48 0 26 0 14 5 8 5 9 5 6 2 15 5 8 0 acontaining 1 wt 7 gallium Yo£ b C • 4 mel'or tii- c·h i - - tion to take place can be estimated The neutron multiplication time a- 1 is the mean time neutron s nds in a supercritical a fissile assembly before producing a fissi 2 l L-····· - • · · ·- • c··-- 'S# ··- ·•·· 5 '· J The uranium in the example above is both a neutron reflector and an inertial material This is the so-called tamper surroundins r t hi fii sile r rtre a ' thPv arP nonularlv describe i nere are two genera tecnmques ror assembling a supercritical mass described in the literature the gun method where subcritical masses are shot together and the implosion method where a subcritical mass is made supercritical by compression ____ f 9E _gu_n_ -121bly suppo e_thaf' he t1ssile hemispheres become critical and the time they meet ' -----· - For an implosion assembly suppose that -- --- --- It appears that the implosion method can be made to give faster assem• bly times than the gun method ' ·--r ·• ' · - c·- ----- - - SJ•JIRKBli a 7 The most important feature of the assembly times calculated in subsection 6 above is that they are more than 10 limes the total fission chain reaction lime This means that it is essential for the fissile material to be neutron free during the assembly or the reaction will take place prematurely If the fissile material is neutron free then it is necessary to turn on neutrons to initiate the chain reaction at the desired time the so-called initiator • This is the role of ·-1 1 t l CS A U '- I ·4_ • ' -- ••·•·· 7 - • -· ·'ll _- -· '·• II EARLY DESIGN A PRELIMINARY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS· ' Early in the Experiment it was decided that a choice had to be made about a fissile material and a method of assembly because of the time and effort it would take to develop more than one type of explosive This section outlines the important consider- ations which influenced our decision as to how to proceed and describes those features of the e -- plosive which were recognized at the time the decision was made Fissile l faterial Considerations Economic and Political Considerations - u 233 wai eliminated because of the prohibitive cost of production thorium breeder reactor u 235 and Pu 239 cost about the same to manufacture but we were informed by the Nth Country Treasury Department that only one or the other could be produced has a long range economic advantage ove u 235 The production of Pu 239 because it requires the development of reactor technology Physics Considerations - Pu 23 9 has the advantage of a lower critical mass and a low density phase phase with a greater compressibility both of which lead to a shorter chain reaction time u235 has the advantage of a low neutron background whil the Pu 240 impurity produced in the Pu 239 has a relatively high spontaneous fission rate ivtethod of Assembly Considerations The gun method appeared easier to accomplish because it involved familiar tech· · ·rn P u 239 ru l e ou t t h e use o f no I ogy Tl1e 1ong assem bly t 1mes an d tl1e Pu 24 0 impurity plutonium with this method The implosion method appeared more difficult because of its unfamiliar technology but it seemed to have a greater potential for future development and more effi i nc y bcc iu e the 1n 5 implosion bombs gave greater yields The development of lhe implosion m thocl i cemcd to be a more sophisticated challenging and hence appealing prc hlcm • ✓ ·-c-·---- -- Preliminary Decisions It was decided to design a spheri- cally symmetric plutonium implosion explosive which would be compressed by a spherically converging detonation wave Figure l shows our concept of this explosive The features of this drawing are · J r t E 'l I B THE INFLUENCE OF LITERATURE A number of articles and books give some aspects of the basic concepts pf bomb design in a variety of contexts We refer to these oublications as the eeneral bomb literature __ _ _ Dot IJ JI I '· I· • S - #- · c··- •·· 6·- •• • • • • ' -- · -· •• · - • ··- ·-· -· ·• •· •• C THE EARLY DESIGN This section ·is an historically accurate description of our first complete plutonium implosion design which had evolved by December 1965 Explosive Lenses - - I ··J Detonators - Tamper · The tamper was Yvc -· The core wa Lb The following neutronics cal- culations were performed to establish 1 ' The critical mas_ _ oLa thP C lrP n r mPf Prc • S1ti R@ FJf · 1- 2 __ __ _ For the ta per nd c so c-ifiedab ve 1 --- - · · _ • ------Initiator _ he i_ l t at £ as designed to produc ·· J --- ·--·· D ASSESSMENT Three Phases of the Experiment The evolution of our knowledge of nuclear explosives during the Experiment seems to fall naturally into three principal levels of _understanding Thus the course of the Experiment is divided into three phases each representing the attainment of a principal level of understanding The phases are not completely distinct in time Phase I - Phase I represents our understanding of the basic concepts and the design considerations described in Section A This level of nderstanding was achieved by Davidon et al · Davidon Hohenemser and Kalkstein 11 The Nth Country Problem 11 Phase II - Phase II was the extension of the basic concepts to a more quantitative form by making neutronics calculations involving rudimentary compression numbers and engineering converging wave lenses detonators and an initiator Quantitative values for core mass and hole size tamper thickness and explosive thickness were chosen The Early Design described in Section C represents Phase II Phase III - Phase III was the extension of Phase II which involved doing meaningful implosion and iterative fission expansion calculations on plutonium-implosion designs derived from the Early Design The sections on the Final Design and Test and the Continuing Progra were a result of our Phase III level of understanding ' $8 - Assessment of Early-Design It is useful at this point to evaluate tltie t arly D ri6n in l'rlt Y1g n c 1 o 'r -• t 'lflt knowledge It should be pointed out that if a Phase lJ cl Hllgn l'i d 6oen 11 1 l11ni Ut14 final design it might not have been exactly the Earty Design We believe thlit the Early Design is representative of our Phase II understanding There were no sound reasons for changing any of the para tn et e cs- € 1 j ' I J I 2 Phase III provides the understanding necessary to make this assessment • III BOMB PHYSICS ' This section of UCRL-50239 has been omitted It discusses in detail°the implo- sion process the neutronics before and after initiation the expansion of the core as I fission proceeds I - --- - • ·-··· · IV THE FINAL DESIGN Th __ F_i al Design describes a A DESIGN The Final Desil _n is a spherical implosion desie n with a • These were 1ncorporateo 1n tms report on JViarcn 1 Hltfl - alter the re 5orl1 had been written and the Final Design submitted but before the Experiment had formally ended and this report published · · ·· · · 11c1 u co #EBB g I p •-· • ' IC'- T e iroportant specifications and the basis for the choice of the specifications are discussed below The design drawings are contained in UCRL-50239 Detonators and Lenses The detonators and lenses are essentially those described i the Early Design There are two minor changes in the lens design 1 The test of the Early Design lens ·- J showed that the shock wavei b Fig 2 A cross-section sketch of the Final Design comp 8 interface then obeys the equation ' J oe 'p 2 The baratol - - The Comp B obeys the equation 0 up to the top of the lens where the shell is modified to accept the de onator The detonator simultaneity requirement and explosive tolerances have been specified so that the total timing error that can bef ·· Do _b 3 • · _· 'I •· •• - • - c··- d·C - - 1' yot 1 3' Tamper - · - ·_ _ _ -----•• 0-w • · --- • ·- J The core is The assembled device is calculated to be This value is to be checked by measurement • J 1 ilt WA ½ A' ril •• •' ' 2- a • Initiator The polonium-be_ Y lium initiator is • · J • §e _ - a- - ' _ V TEST _This section of the report UCRL-50239 describes the diagnostics measurements to be made before and during a test of the Final Design VI THE CONTINUING PROGRAM The development of _a nuclear explosive is an evolutionary process future investigation have been a continuous part of the Experirnent Ideas for These ideas both affect and are affected by whatever current work is being done and new ideas for future work are constantly generated An important part of our understanding of nuclear explosives is involved in our ideas for future investigation both in the extent to which a particular idea has been developed and in our judgment about the importance and difficulty of the investigation The purpose of the Experiment was not to establish a long range development program and we have not attempted to do this A real Nth Country would establish a program perhaps they would only build five copies of ur Final Design which would strongly influence_ the nature of the investigations pursued Establishment of this pro- gram would be influenced by judgments of the designers about feasible future developments Four general applications of future investigations which could serve as objec- tives in the Nth Country's nuclear explosive development program are 1 Light compact low yield tactical weapons 2 High yield fission weapons 3 Thermonuclear explosives ' Peaceful applications 4 ye · A ide range of ideas is discussed in this section ranging from det ailed pro- posals fg r r 9 1 -- i u_r yield calcul_ 1 -' _ · _ explosive • idea _the design of a thermonuclear We have attempted to assess the difficulty and importance of pursuing each The importance in most cases has to be decided in terms of a long range level- opment program General nondirected research into areas such as explosives hydro dynamics metallurgy and nuclear physics is not included fsfflitl Although such research is - ____ -y •-· _ • •· an essential part of a comprehensive long range program for a country desiring to be at the forefront of new advances as they are made an th Country could be content to use results as they become available and allow othe1·s to bear nearly all the expense of maintaining research programs pc t -· IIt The remainder of this section of UCRL-50239 has been omitted rom this report included po sible improvements fission weapon designs and the desig of thermonuclear explosives J ·-- 1nr • --- VIL CONCLUSIONS We hope that the Rth Country Experiment is useful in assessing the difficulty for an Nth Country to _develop a nuclear explosives capability clearly outside the scope of our part of the Experiment Such an assessment is This section contains a dis- cussion of some nontechnical aspects and some comments on the results which we believe are an essential part of the Experiment and should be considered in extending the results to an Nth Country It is inevitable that the Experiment will be compared with the early years at Los Alamos opments We are not in a position to make any valid comparison of the technical develThe people at Los Alamos had advantages of manpower and experience including the presence of some of the world's outstanding physicists and the motivational climate in which they worked We had the advantages of knowing that a bomb could be built and of having access to a large quantity of literature on shock waves explosives nuclear physics and reactor technology which has been published since 1945 A FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROGRESS OF THE EXPERIMENT The course of the Experiment f lls naturally into two time periods The Early Period was the first year and a half May 1964-December 1965 Phases I and II were completed during this period The Late Period was the last year 1966 Phase III was completed the Final Design established and several drafts of the Nth Country Report written including the one submitted in UCRL-50239 _during this period The goal of the Experiment was to design a credible nuclear explosive but the time and the state of development at which the Experiment would end was left up to the experimenters see Appendix A It was assumed by the experimenters that a test v ould be the end of the Experiment rather than a step in the development • 'I A total of three 'man-years has been spent on the Experiment divided as follows 1 Early Period Dobson I 4 time Pipkorn 1 2 time Selden full time for last half year 2 Late Period Dobson 1 2 time Selden full time ' 'II •• _ ' '' • ' ' • • The informal structure and part time nature of the experiment resulted in a lack of continuity during the Early Period The periods of maximum effort were put in when the committee wanted to sec the notebooks We tended to work individually resulting in some duplication of effort In the Late Period continuity was provided also we worked together Since the Experiment was carried Ut inside a nuclear explosive design laboratory it was necessary to insure that we received no classified information including any hints about our technical progress from anyone involved in the Experiment Aside from documents generated within the Experiment we have never been exposed to any classified information See Appendix D In line with security requirements all our communications with the committee have been in writing Such communications were essential since the committee simu- lated the support groups who would have carried out experiments and some computations in the Nth Country Written communication provides a complete record of information exchange but has some serious disadvantages incomplete and some degree of misunderstanding results Expression is inevitably A great deal of time is con- sumed deciding on the wording of requests and answers and trying to interpret them Other aspects o communication peculiar to this experiment result from the fact that our support groups are actually Laboratory senior staff members In the Early Period we were overly conscious of our lack of knowledge and were 1 reluctant to appear more foolish than necessary This resulted in postponement of some requests and the omission of others 2 In the Late Period we spent a good deal of time preparing requests which presented enough information about our understanding of what was being requested so that a suitable reply could be obtained The transition from Phase II to Phase II of the Experiment occurred during the fall of _196 At that time we felt that the completion of certain calculations was essen- tial but we did not know that this would lead us to a completely new level of understanding Recall that the phases were identified much later during the writi g of this report o decision was made to embark on a new or different course of action and none of us ever proposed submitting a f inal design based on our understanding at that time There were several factors influencing the course of the Experiment during the transition period • We fell that the design submitted had to work since the challenge was to design a - c 1·ediblc explosive ' • _ sismr ·_ ·· • Our confidence in our ability to understand implosio p l' • We believed that we could make satisfactory calculations in be able to submit a final design 11 a month or two 11 to If we had known how long it would really take to attain our current understanding we would have submitted a Phase II design There were several factors which affected the duration of the Late Period We felt increasingly concerned about drawing the Experiment to a close but we c ontinued to greatly underestimate the time required to finish the Experiment to our satisfaction throughout the Late Period J _ c One consequence was that in ordRr tn try to finish sooner we did not request -· nd ended up sp nding considerably more time satisfying our- _b _lj selves tnat our estimates were _adequate I J I bJ_ yoE I l Preparing this comprehensive report of our understanding of nuclear explosives has taken about four months or half a man year during the last half of the Late Period This time cannot be entirely subtracted from the time necessary to arrive at the Final Design ho vever because the clarification of ideas associated with report writing has improved our understanding of nuclear explosives There is a sense in which submitting our Final Design was more difficult than it would be to prepare a fin al design for a test in which we were participating 'ould r eceive feedback during construction and preparation of the test and have the option of making changes based on this information • b O We · · ·- --· ' r B SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENT We could have designed a u 235 gun explosive Such a design would have been submitted as a final design much sooner than our implosion design There are two main r asons ··· J Ye£ p U 2 A test of the u235 gun mentioned above would likely play a similar role to a te t of the Early Desif n I I It is not surprising that China has progressed so rapidly and we believe they mat test a thermonu½lear explosive· within about a year if the news reports about their tests are accurate sfflSlE1 - -1 % · _ - - - From our present understanding of nuclear explosives we believe that our F'inal Design is credible without a test but we see no way to design a credible thermonuclear explosive without testing However our position on thermonudear design is very similar to our position on fission design in the Early Period so it is possible that further study of the thermonuclear problem would change our outlook • r-- a a iia _ _ _ __ _ _ __ - - _ CRITIQUE OF THE NTH COUNTRY WEAPON DESIGN F S EBY AND L S GERMAIN 1 The analysis of the Nth Country weapon lens system in this section was writtPn ' about an early version of the Final Design ·-· ·· J Yur bf-✓3 I '-· • · i - · - ' ' ' •' -g ' ' -- -- ' c· - E -SmEkllt l'°'- · z 21- ·- J fiAs the reader wii discover below the oeia11ea LKL design ca1cu1at1ons using codes unavailable to the Nth Country physicists disagree with both of these numbers 4 • 'I The LRL calculations on the th Country Weapon followed the usual sequence - y uz -· _____ - ' - - ------· ---·· 5 az - ----- It was impossible for us to detail the Nth Country predictions from the data given in the sections on Final Design and Test of the Nth Countl·v ExnPrimPnt renort ·· J ·1 I I hey give no estimate 01 the magnitude of the latter effect_ on final yield and in fact I C • do not really cite reasons for their belief I that alpha decreases too rapidly I They correctly observe that they -1 have very little firm information about I the criti ality of their system 01 I I In fight of this extreme sensitivity it would seem that confidence in the expected yield · is unwarranted 6 Another point which would appear to call for_ o e_rvatism in the prediction of the _ OE yiel of the test device is J J - ------ ----------------------------------- st 3- ·- J 7 __summary -- he 12 _ ntry jgners - i ed ' -- ---------- • __ ix · 1 ' _authors do not give any detailed reas ns for the discrepancv • ···- -· - _ ' 9 There are two areas in which the direction of the_Nth Country program may well have been modified by the tastes of the experimenters On page 7 of UCRL-50239 it would seem that one of the reasons for undertaking the study of an implosion system is that it is a more sophisticated challenging and hence appealing problem While this value judgment is certainly a logical one for a scientist to make the administration of the Nth Country may be less concerned with a scientifically appealing problem and more concern d with quick results Also on page 7 the statement is made ithe production of Pu 39 has a long range economic advantage over u 235 because it requires the development of reactor technology While this is certainly true it is doubtful that the weapon scientists would be called upon to make decisions concerning the overall economy of the nation Thus it may be that they have directed themselves to plutonium implosion systems for reasons which are not completely valid in the context of the study_ • •1 p a APPENDIX A THE OPERATING RULES FOR THE NTH COUNTRY PROJECT A J HUDGINS Editor's note The following set of rules was given to the experimenters in memorandum form at the beginning of the Bth Country Experiment 1 The purpose of the so-called Nth Country Experiment is to find out if a credible nuclear explo sive can be designed with a modest effort by a few well trained people without contact with classified information The goal of the participants should be to design an explosive with a militarily significant yield A working context for the experiment might be that the participants have been asked to design a nuclear explosive which if built in small numbers would give a small nation a significant effect on their foreign relations 2 An informal committee has been chosen to monitor this experiment In order to provide maximum assurance that the committee does not in fact perturb the experiment in a casual or unrecorded manner all communications regarding the substance of the experiment will be in writing The men doing the experiment are expected to avoid conscientiously any contact with classified information in order to maintain the integrity of the primary assumption They may request further guidance or specific information from the committee through A J Hudgins 3 The experimenters are expected to use any means available to obtain as much unclassified information as they believe to be pertinent The experiment will have to h conducted in such a way· that all sources of unclassified information can be explicitly identified It is important that as much as possibie of the progress of the experiment be put in writing 4 Secretarial help will be available It is not expected that the experimenters do all of the routine work involved in the design themselves Help in computation or in other mechanics such as information search should be requested only through the committee a specific request detailing the result desired In each case there must be In other words the experimenters must state the problem an d their boundary conditions for its solution The committee will see to it that the best re'sponse possible is obtained in a timely fashion 5 • Even though this experiment will be based upon the use of information from unclassified sources the Atomic Energy Act and AEC Regulations require that any design efforts related to nuclear explosives be given proper security protection This re- quires that the work books and any elaboration or deduction fron unclassified st mff ' # • -4jl'- ·a· informalion he c Jassificd properly and that all such information be protected in accord with the Laboratory Security Manual 6 For the purpose's of this experiment it should be assu med explicitly that any material may be fabricalcd in any shape The purpose of this assumption is to remove fabri- cation and procurement problems from the area of the experiment I ·1 I -· • · APPENDIX B BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES DAVID A DOBSON David A Dobson was born in 1937 in Oakland California and attended elementary and high school in Alameda California He received a B S degree in chemistry 1959 and a PhD in physics 1964 from the University of California Berkeley California Dobson worked in experimental atomic physics his thesis was entitled The· Beta-Decay Asymmetry and Nuclear Magnetic Moment of Ne 19 See UCRL-11169 Lawrence Radiation Laboratory Berkeley California 1963 In 1964 he came to LRL Livermore on a post-doctoral research appointment and became a regular staff member in 1966 In addition to participating in the th Country Experiment Dobson has continued his work on beta-decay experiments DAVID N PIPKORN David N Pipkorn was born in 1936 in Milwaukee Wisconsin and attended elementary school in Thiensville Wisconsin and high school in Shorewood Wisconsin He received a B S E degree in electrical engineering 1958 from Princeton University and M S 1960 and PhD 1964 degrees in physics from the University of Illinois Urbana Illinois Pipkorn worked in experimental solid state physks and his thesis was entitled Mossbauer Effect in Iron Under Very High Pressure He came to LRL Livermore in See Phys Rev 135 Al604 1964 1964 on a two year post-doctoral resear h appointment and became a regular staff member in 1966 In addition to participating in the th Country Expc riment he has continued to do research on the Mossbauer effect ROBERT W SELDEN • ' Robert W Selden was born in 1936 in Phoenix Arizona and attended elementary and high school there Claremont California He received a B A degree in physics 1958 from Pomona College Selden received M S 1960 and PhD l 9'64 degrees in physics - ' Crom the University of Wisconsin Madison Wisconsin where he was an Edward John Noble Foundation Fellow for four years He worked in experimental low temperature physics with liquid helium and his thesis was entitled He-II Film Transfer Rates Under Various Conditions See Phys Rev 138 Al363 and Al371 1965 He was commis- sioned a 2nd Lt in the U S Army Reserve in 1958 from the ROTC at Pomona College • He began a three-year lour of active duty in 1964 as a 1st Lt in the U S Army Ordnance Corps at Aberdeen Proving Ground Maryland Selden was assigned to LRL Livermore as an Arm Research Associate and promoted to Captain in 1965 time on the Nth Country Experiment since March 1965 • i@ REl - • - 7 · ' - He has worked full ' § § -2 _ -·- - APPENDIX C A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE EXPERIMENT Apr 1964 The ground rules are formulated for the Experiment May 1964 D Dobson and D Pipkorn are selected as participants they begin working half-time on the Experiment The deci_sion is made to desie-n a_ olutonium Dec 1964 imnloc - n PYnlo ivP__ _ Feb 1965 Mar 1965 R Selden becomes the third participant May 1965 The first HE lens design test is proposed Jul 1965 The first initiator experiment is proposed Oct 1965 Nov 1965 1 ne second HE lens design is tested hypothetically and adopted with small changes Dec 1965 yoG Dec I 965 Jan 1966 Jan 1966 The first imolosion desiirn is documentPrl _J i _ l Feb 1966 j Apr 1966 - Apr 1966 1 he lirst v ' rsion of the final design is produced Jun 1966 The first outline of the final report is completed Sep 1966 The second April 1966 design is submitted as final Dec 1966 The complete draft of final report is submitted Mar 1967 The final pre shot corrections are made to the design and report Apr 1967 The tape-recorded discussions are completed Apr 1967 The 'th ·country device is tested hypothetically • - r7e• - APPENDIX D SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE EXPERIMENT As part of the documentation of__the th Co ntry_Experiment before thP ir nP d1m_ was tested the Design Physicist I STATE OF KNOWLEDGE BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT 1 DD My wife worked at LRL from 1-957 to 1961 as a Laboratory Techni- cian in Chemistry I can think of only two things having a possible influence on the Experiment that I learned because she worked here First since the chemists worked late in the night during a test series I was aware that they were analyzing bomb debris I recall having the idea that sometimes they added materials to these tests oeliberately to tell something from the isotopes produced but I had no idea of what isotopes were used or what they learned I also was aware that her group made large quantities of elements above plutonium in the periodic table and studied their properties but I still have no idea of the quantities produced - whether they are in milligrams or kilograms 2 DD With regard to my knowledge of the areas of physics pertinentto this experiment I have never taken or attended regularly a course in nuclear physics or hydrodynamics I have picked up quite a bit of nuclear physics studying on my own in connection with my thesis research but only in the areas of beta decay and the structure of light nuclei I was aware that shock waves existed and that they were nonlinear as compared to sound waves but I had never heard of the Hugoniot equqtions I had heard about the application of shock waves to the study of equations of state at a one-hour lecture probably 10 or 11 _year s ago given by Professor Jura of ·the Chemistry Department Berkeley I understood the general idea that fission involved the breaking up of a large nucleus into a couple of fragments with neutrons and gammas being given off I had seen an exhibit with a model of a chain reaction made up of mouse tr'aps and ping- pong balls ·· J I was aware that the basic idea of a fission explosive was to throw together enough fissile material to have a super-critical mass and that there were two ways to do this either shooting two pieces together with a gun o_r putting explosives all around some material and blowing it together from all sides I was aware that both uranium and plutonium had been used in bombs but I was not familiar with heavy isotopes and did not know which isotope numbers were relevant I had not seen the pictures in Life Magazine showing the external appearance of the first U S bombs I have never at any time thought seriously about how a_b5 m i nJ ght J u ui_l_t_ _I_a_m not s y bee - - o_w__i_ _ - 5_inte_r s t_ l j YI 3 RS Most of my time before coming to LRL was spent going to school I went to Pomona College and then to the University of Wisconsin where my thesis research wa 5 in experimental low-temperature physics on the superfluid properties of liquid helium While at Wisconsin I took a one-semester course in experimental nuclear physics taught by Professor Henry Barshall who had been at Los Alamos during the War A small part of this course was concerned with nuclear fission and a small par_t of this dealt with criticality and reactors He 9evoted part of one hour to some 11Lansing Lamont type reminiscences about Los Alamos - how it was to be at Los Alamos and the kind of things that happened there He mentioned the gun-type assembly and the require- ment of a super-critical mass but not in any detailed way After leaving Wisconsin I went on active duty in the Army to fulfill my ROTC commitment and was assigned to Aberdeen Proving Ground and the Ordnance Officer's basic training course Par-t of the course was a three-bour presentation on the effects of nuclear weapons such topics as radiation blast waves radioactivity and the fact that nuclear artillery existed This • presentation was primarily to make Army Officers aware that nuclear weapons existed and that their effects were quite different from those of conventional explosives tee hnical details were given about themselves · ' the weapons · · - ••· - No •- • u•• • ' •• 4 HS ' II _ · • ec -- •· • - • • There is an interesting story in connection with my application for an assignment as a Research Associate at LRL by Glenn Werth I was intcrvie ved in Washington D C I was aware of course that I knew very little about nuclear physics so I tried very hard to come up with every bit of information I could on the subject Dr Werth was not concerned about how little I knew about nuclear physics and nuclear weapons and I felt at the time that there was something_ very stran1 e about the interview It wasn't until later here at LRL when I learned about the Experiment that I realized what had been going on 5 existed RS With regard to explosive design I was aware that nuclear weapons I understood the nature of the fission process and I knew that u235 and Pu 239 were fissile materials I had a general idea of criticality in terms of sustaining a chain reaction in a reactor including the advantages of reflecting escaping neutrons back into the fissile material I also knew that the fission cross section was higher for thermal neutrons I ' an explosion - · · - 2 1 -- I knew of the gun-method of ass em bli ne- a c rit ica 1 rn i88 to nrociur P --- - should add that never seriously considered how a bomb would be designed other than these considera- tions which I have just stated I was not aware of the implosion method of assembly at all as far as I can remember The only thing I knew about shock-waves was that they existed as everyone who has felt an earthquake or heard thunder knows I knew abso- lutely nothing about explosives except than that TNT was the name of an explosive 6 RS Perhaps the most important factor involving the knowledge that I had before starting with Jhe Experiment is that I believed that de·siP-ninP' a nllclear exnlosive - · b l DD That applied to me too 7 RS Dave Pipkorn told me that he also had no exp rience directly related to nuclear explosive design before going into the Experiment II THE EFFECTS OF VISITING LRL 11 OPEN HOUSE 11 EVENTS 8 DD All three of us on several occasions have visited the open houses at LIU which are not open to people who are not employees or members of employee's '' ' • r • ' I - r ··- -· s1 r·· - -- - there was any furniture in it At the 1964 Open House I v sited buildings 102 and 114 but they were pretty austere I also went out to Site 300 and saw a test pad for shock wave experiments and the Helac x-ray machine They were interesting machines but didn't give me hints as to how things might be done At the 1966 Open House I saw the lasers in Building 154 and also the Labs in 174B but again I didn't get any ideas from anything that I saw there This perhaps speaks pretty well for the people who clas- sify things 9 RS Dave Pipkorn has told me that he went to the Laboratory Open House and Site 300 Open House in 1964 but he also didn't learn anything that was really useful to our project 10 RS I went to the Site 300 Open House in May 1966 and did not see any- thing that I had not already believed had to be there I did see the exolosives rn irhinP shonl At the September 1966 Open House I visited my office the Computer Building the Chemistry Building and the Plowshare exhibit By the time I went to both of these open houses our knowledge was advanced enough so that any hints would have to be rather specific and have to do with physics to be really useful This geQeral background information about what kind of research is going on what kind of technology and capability there is etc is interesting but not very useful to the desi 6 1i itself This kind of information would be available to anyone interested in pursuing it carefully and certainly·a real Nth Country would likely do a much better job of finding out what is going on at Livermore than we did 11 RS In December 1965 we all attended the family lecture series talk on i i e Laboratory weapons program by Carl Haussmann th_at could be used on the project He certainly didn't say anything In fact he announced early in his talk that he was goi 1g to try not to say anything that might be useful to any Nth Country that might be listening Here are some comments I 'rote in my notebook about this lecture attended the weapons lecture by Carl Haussmann we The talk itself did not give us any- thing useful to the project but it was interestine to know somethinP of the WP nnni i vi - tems developed at LRL l J Ot • j J J ' --------·I -· ·····••·••·····-·- --- - ··- ·····-· L Looking at the _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ warhead has really gotten our curiosity up about how such a dev_ice could be designed This is a challenging problem that deserves some thought Ill LRL BUILDINGS VISITING DURING THE EXPERIMENT 12 op One of the questions that might naturally be asked of us is What buildings have you been in within the simply to list them 11 Q11 cleared area The best way to answer this Js My offices were in Bu_ilding 152 at first and are now in 155 I went to Building 109 on two occasions to pick up some prints of my apparatus but at np time did I see any pink paper I went t_o Building 110 on one occasion to see Stew Bloom's set up at the van de Graaff Accelerator when it was set up down there I have simply gone into or walked through to deal with one par-ticular person or something that had to do with my E Division experiments - Buildings 101 111 120 122 151 161 the mailroom only and Trailer 33 I have been to Building 112 on numerous occasions but only to Dr Hudgins' office and the library I have been in the Mech Engr Library in Building 170 Once I returned a gaussmeter that I had borrowed to Building 173A I have made three trips to the Glass Shop Building 114A regarding the repair of some apparatus In i ·larch or April 1966 I talked to the hydroform die operator in Building 114A about making parts for my LPTR irradiation capsule · In Septe ber 1966 I went to the Sheet Metal Shop Building 140B to have the iid welded on my reactor capsule I can say certainly that at no time in these shop areas that we are talking about did I s e or hear anything that even remotely suggested anything applicable to the Experiment 13 RS When Dave Pipkorn was still working actively on the Experiment he visited the following Buildings 101 102 to visit Harold Stromberg he saw more at the Open House than he observed then 110 - the van de Graaff part 111 112 the sheet metal rack outside 114 120 151 152 155 161 162 170 to the libraries and to visit people about germanium dete_ctors and coincidence circuits and 173B He said-he never got any hints useful to the Experiment 14 RS I have walked through or been briefly in Buildings 101 111 120 122 151 _ 161 Trailer 105 Trailer 112 Building 112 to the library Hudgins' office and Harlan Zodtner's office the 170 Elec Engr Library on two occasions and Building 155 where my office is 'l ··- · ··- -- IV POSSIBLE SECURITY LEAKS INSIDE THE LABORATORY 15 RS There is some classified material aro·und Building 155 it is usually always locked up and we are always very careful about not seeing it On several occa- sions I saw that people did have classified documents but I never saw anything more than that these documents were classified In other w rds they had the word Secret or were marked with red There was an interesting discovery in Building 155 in the Summer of 1965 which isn't classified but which we will record in the spirit of recording everything C i __y'Oc Marv Williamson whose off 9 _Y _l _s_Jµ§t d Q W Q J h e _hall f r o m JJ s1_kP nt n __ interesting paperweight on his desk I i bVJi We still have no· 'I I idea of what it really is because we don't want to ask It was probably becau-se we found it here in the Laboratory that we were led to speculate about it in the first place 16 'I _v- - bi _ _J • •• II 11 _ We have been asked where-we got the word • tamper and the svm hn 1 a - for tl e_ neutron multiplication constant -· - I 1 17 DD The other class· of interactions within the laboratory were conversa- tions with people It is interesting to note that none of this information which we will · describe would be considered a possible leak if it had been obtained outside the laboratory from somebody we knew to be ignorant of weapon design It is because we know that the people in the Laboratory do have such knowledge that we considere the implications of what they said The first one occurred_to me back Hans Mark why the Astron Building was as big as it is in 1963 One day I asked He told me that it used to con- tain a high current deuteron Linac which didn't mean anything to me at the time Later 'it led me to speculate that maybe they tried to make fissile materials at one time using d n reactions - something like maybe Np 236 for example_ but it looks like it didn't turn out too well • 18 DD The second time was just after I got an office in Building 152 and 'as beginning to work on the Nth Country Experiment I was talking to Lou Eccles and he said to me - Well now that you are over here you are going to lE ar n how nuclear explosives work I tried to -put him off by saying 11 V _' ell I guess so eventually He -- ·-· - - ·if' 4 1• - •--· replied Well the most surprising thing that I have foun about thermonuclear weapons was the importance of radiation At this point I cut him off very rapidly and left This wasn't really a serious leak because books like Glasstone tell us that radiation is an important part of fusiori reactions 19 DD One day Floyd Stoutamore told me that they had been running electron beams in the van de Graaff accelerator I asked him why they_ were d_ ing that - some- thing that J have since learned not to do around here • ' ever tn1s didn't -- really tell US any 111ng since we Know llnlUlll uc uu nuo 10 u t u 111 fusion weapons UCRL-7870 Characteristics of Nuclear Explosives 20 DD One night when I was working down at the LPTR an L Division Physicist told me that he was working on Compton detectors for high-flux gamma ray measurements This suggested to me a somewhat different idea than I had before as to how you might measure the gamma flux f 1 · RS·· In th -Fall o°f 1965 Charlie owma gave an E Divisio Seminar on 242 some Vork that he had been doing at the Linear Accelerator on Am We became l_ · aware of it when there was some commotion and Doris Hine the department secretary rushed around collecting all of these notices because they were apparently distributed before they were declassified This c_learly indi ted to us that Am 242 was important J to the Laboratory At he time that this ccurred we already had been looking at a '-' - 'c and had an idea of what kinds of higher opes would be useful and would - -right kind of properties for fissionable materials - 22 i RS Tn 1 lf ov 1q_ mhPn our fi •c t cPt nf n Tc- f the- r - 1 _ ···-- 23 HS In July 1966 I was working at my desk with a large pile of printouts rr --thc l fark III c afc uiation lying arotrnd - J eny - Wesoio ki loo ked into th - oifice • • iEYFf A • ••• • • '• I _ - -- - -· -- J ' ••'' ' • · '1 pt saw all of thoi e printouts and asked if I was writing a new code l answered 11 Why • not I Jike to write codes b l 24 RS Also in July 1966 John Anderson came into Jack McClure and Bert Pohl's office which is next door to mine and began describing a new problem or something that they were going to be working on I heard some drawing on the blackboard and the word detonation and decided that I had better get out of here Later that day I stopped by John's office and told him about the nature of the project that we were working on that is that we were designing a nuclear explosive without any access to classified literature and added that if he were going to discus classified things next door particularly how a bomb is built that I would appreciate some warning' He readily agreed to cooperate with us nd said that if I had listened to his discussion earlier I would probably have been disqualified from the Experiment 25 DD One evening Lou Eccles had kept a classified document out to read after the secretary had gone home He asked us to lock it up in our repository it was enclosed in a manila envelope _ We did lock it up overnight - but we don't have any idea what the document was about V TWO INCIDENTS OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY 26 RS There were two outside sources of information which were not classified but which did influence the E xoeriment • ···· · 1 not learn anything that we were not already aware of The really important result of _floE · b · pernaps 1t gave me confidence that it might also be possible to be a success- ful impostor as a bomb designer DD I was certainly much encouraged by the greater level of confidence in our understanding of hydrodynamics that Bob brought back and passed on to me 27 RS The other out i 9 Jncident occurred in July 1966 It was of considerably less magnitude than · -----· and again did not involve any classified information I was invlted to give a talk on liquid helium at a summer science program at Thatcher School Ojai California It turned out that Richard Feynman visited the program and gave a lecture while I was there One evening I had the privilege of discussing liquid helium and my thesis experiment with him During the course of this discussion I asked him about Lansing Lamont's book The Day of Trinity He said that he had actually been interviewed and he felt that Lamont had done a rather good job of relating the spirit of what he had said that the book was well done He generally thought Later at an informal gathering with several others Dr Feynman was asked about the early days at •Los Alamos He reminisced about his encounters with the security people giving us a short course on the theory of safecracking and recalled the early Los Alamos computer a room full of girls with desk1 - - • • - calculators c t - I i I I I l I • ⇒ r _ • · · 1 VI A POSS IBLE SECURITY LEAK IN THE LITERATURE 28 --✓ • • _ l_- · •• APPENDIX E A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ·· J • - - ' -- i i ·- J i 1 l ' - - _ __ FA • • _ · - '- • ' JR ···• - -··-- -·- - ·· - ---- _ - J i I f f I I I I I • -- · I - • • • •• • ' J ol b ' • J s 11 PL I I· I -14- APPENDIX F HIGH EXPLOSIVE DETONATOR AND X-UNIT TECHNOLOGY E JAMES I JR 1 The Nth Country design uses 2 The technology required to produce TNT castings and lensing systems is well known By the end of World War II many countries not actually engaged directly in combat Sweden and Switzerland for examole were selline advanced munition This is still true I 3 J cJt 5 • b C1 - _ SFUBffllf · -ft - 6 ·· J - --- - 7 The technology of bursting bridgewires and X-units required to a tivate burstincr •' bridge ire detonators is also known in the unclass ilied literatur ·- In these papers the subtleties of the circ it parameters are discussed in detail· · yoli • p lJj 8 ' - - ·- - 9 - • - APPENDIX G HYDRODYNAMICS TECHNOLOGY M L WILKINS 1 - Two aspects of hydrodynamic tech_nology are of i - rest to_tbe Nth Country prob- ------- ----- 1em the ability to compute the material motions and shocks during the implosion and explosion phases and the equations of state for the various materials used in the explosiy1 i 2 • - · - -· - SJsti ffliE-_- - -- ' re ----·-- - - pis 4 • • I 5 _ The e911 iti0n-of-state data for hie-h exolosives· have always been in the open literature 8 • APPENDIX H NEUTRONICS TECHNOLOGY W C GRAYSON l 1 n t I · 7- - I APPENDIX I YIELD CALCULATIONS W C GRAYSON -- · neutronics techn ques with radiation transport Such a 11 burn code 11 j_c _11i 11 11lv most c _orri_pl_ x cal llli Ji_of' required for earl ' J 'Jth Country designs 2 I 3 4 5 6 • --·- - The calculation of the yield of a nuclear explosiv e combines hydrodynamics and 1 iha I j · J I • • ·•··- -i- APPENDIX J JNITIATORS R L RE Ml LLARD 1 The concept of mixing an alpha emitter with beryllium to form a neutron source seems relativelv obvious 2 • • 't · -r- APPENDIX K WEAPON MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY R A JAMES 1 Three materials in the Nth Country design plutonium uranium and polonium are often considered to require special knowledge or experience outside standard ·- - -· ---··-- ·· ---- ' metallurgical and engineering practice --- 2 ' A team of chemical engineers would have no trouble designing and running a successf l plant usin any one of these processes roughly 10-20 engineers are needed during the design and building a id only a handful for supervising the running 3 The preparation of plutonium metal by several methods has also been described The crystal structure and physical constants of the various allotropic modifications of plutonium metal have also appeared very extensively in the literature Investi- gations of plutonium alloys and interrnetallic compounds are also in the open literature 4 Xeither uranium nor polonium are newcomers to th metallurgical scene many properties of uranium have been known for almost a century and the Curies did the basic studies on polonium • iQliiW$107 -• 9 APPENDIX L ' WEAPON FACILITY AND FABRICATION COSTS C R HENRY 1 The Nth Country weapon designed by Dobson Pipkorn and Selden requires laboratory support facilities and a weapon produ_cti m complex which includes explosive plants component fabrication shops and a diagnostic bunker This appendix fu'r- nishes an estimate of the capital and operating costs of a weapon facility designed to produce 5-10 weapons per year Any equipment materials or components which can be purchased on the world market were a_ssumed to be bought so that they do not require plant investment No estimate has been made of the time required to build such facilities - only of the time required to build the first and successive weapons 2 • The reactor and its associated fuel processing plant were considered separately Since power as well as plutonium production might be the reason for building this · facility the actual cost and utility to an Nth Country may vary widely A minimal estimate is -given as an example with no allowance for any power production return Since the cost of all the plutonium and most of the uranium is attributable to the plutonium production facility we have for simplicity assumed that all the special materials plutonium polonium and uranium costs are included in this estimate E b P 4 yJe- The wP nnn r Pi -is 1n npri onn l rPnn rp i 1 ihor torv nffi 'P h11ilrHna tn hn11c p about 5 b 1 6 The weapon production complex consists of about 10 buildings on 30-40 acres '· iurrounded by a security fen e The diagnostics bunker and HE storage magazines are located in a separate remote site To achieve minimum cost this relatively • small complex was assumed to be within an existing ordnance facility utility installation costs would then include only the fenced-in area All buildings are minimum Butler-type construction The buildings and their arrangement are workable and safe but do not necessarily follow U S and LRL safety practices in detail The shielded operations have wooden glove boxes where possible rather than durable but very costly stainless steel 400 operating and technical personnel The complex requires a staff of about Since plutonium production is expected to be the pacing process this weapon facility would usually operate only one shift ·-· per day -- ·- J R 'bJC ·yoE b I 7 • ' _ ' · ·§ ---r tu The manpower estimate was bas d partly on the act that ' t ' 8 The major expense of the Nth Country weapon is the production of the plutonium - -· •• • • • • • - •• - -· ' ---- A 200-megawatt reactor is needed to produce about 50 kg of plutonium a year in addition uranium and plutonium processing plants are required A typical estimat for such a facility is $60M 1 The operating costs year would include both the salaries of several hundred people and fuel costs 100 tons of uranium and would run on the order of $10M 1 This estimate is based on the cost of several power reactors described in Nucleonics and a Savannah River Plant document on the production of plutonium The Savannah River report 1964 gives $30-45M for a 40 MW reactor and $95-135M for a 400 MW reactor Nucleonics 1965-1966 quotes the following 11 turnkey11 costs for power reactors without fuel facilities 1 MW electrical requires about 3 MW thermal MTR Japan 50 MW thermal $20M MZFR Germany 200 MW thermal $40M AKB Germany 100 MW electrical $55M CANDU Pakistan 135 MW electrical $60M • ---- · DISTRIBUTION Series A Copy No 1-61 LR L Internal Distribution External Distribution Chairman G T Seaborg General Manager R E Hollingsworth Commissioner J T Ramey Commissioner S M Nabrit Commissioner G F Tape Commissioner W E Johnson U S Atomic Energy Commission Washington D C • 62 63 64 65 '66 67 A M Labowitz Special Assistant for Disarmament Office of the General Manager U S Atomic Energy Commission Washington D C 68 J S Foster Director of Defense Research and Engineering Department of Defense Washington D C 69 A S Fisher Special Assistant to the Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington D C 70 D F Hornig Special Assistant to the President The White House Office Vashington D C 71 J T Conway Executive Director Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Washington D C 72 Brig Gen E B Giller Uirector ot Military Application Atomic Energy Commission Headquarters Washington D C 73-75 E C Shute U S Atomic Energy Commission San Francisco Operations Office Berkeley California 76 N E Bradbury Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Los Alam as New Mexico 77 - I ' Copy No External Distribution Cont•d 78-83 J A Hornbeck Sandia Corporation Albuquerque New i lexico 84 L P Gise U S Atomic Energy Commission Albuquerque Operations_ Office Albuquerque New Mexico B SERIES C 3-10-88 COPY NO 1-4 of 4 R E BATZEL L-1 SERIES D COPY NO 10-13-88 PHILIP COYLE L-1 OFF-SITE REQUEST 1 of 1 8 12 93 Los Alamos National Laboratory Attn Jack Carter Reports Library Greg Buntain M-1 Mail Station 5000 P O Box 1663 Los Alamos NM 87545 FOR OFF-SITE REQUEST 2 15 94 Dianne C Gropper Technical Library 7141 MS-089 Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque New Mexico JW rt