7 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON XGDS MINUTES NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING Date PAR T II OF III Thursday May 15 1975 Time 4 30 to 5 30 p m Place Cabinet Room The White House Subject Panama Canal Negotiations Principals The President The Vice President Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S Brown Director of Central Intelligence William Colby Other Attendees State Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker Defense Deputy Secretary William Clements WH Donald Rumsfeld Robert Hartmann NSC Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft Stephen Low XGDS - 3 B DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine BY AUTH - Dr Henry A Kissinger T 5nwE c I a o XGDS 8 President Bill can you give us a briefing on the Panama Canal Colby Intelligence briefing attached President Thank you Can you give us any indication of the land that is involved Colby One of the major issues involved is the fact that you can only land in Panama at points which are subject to U S control This is a matter of great concern to the Panamanians The rest is a matter of degree But the fact that they do not have direct access to Panama bothers them President Henry can you layout the options as you see them Kissinger Mr President one of my problems with this issue is that Ellsworth won't tell me what he's doing So I think it would be better to ask him first And then I will add my cOInments President Mr Ambassador would you please discuss this Bunker Mr President we think that a treaty is within reach But to get it we need flexibility on two issues duration and lands and waters I have no doubt that failure in these negotiations would entail unacceptable risks including negative effects beyond Panama which would disrupt our relations with Latin America lead to world condemnation and hamper the operation of the waterway If we get into a situation involving confrontation we would turn what is now a basically free country radically to the Left While we could undoubtedlY maintain our control we would deprive ourselves of what we have gained so far and undermine any future possibility of a reasonable agreement We are trying to get a treaty which is acceptable both to Pan'ama and to the Congress and at the same time protect our basic security and interests I believe we can achieve a balance of the various interests and if we do so the treaty would be acceptable to both Panama and Congress We look at this as involving a balance of many components - the long-term protection of our security interests including the right to act t Tab D fORD ' E XGDS ' c ' c a ' o b - -----------­ XGDS 9 unilaterally in defense of the Canal the consent of the host country maintenance of our bases satisfactory conditions for Canal personnel duration and post-treaty security arrangements Panama has already agreed to give us all the defense rights we want including a good Status of Forces Agreement We want a balance between adequate control over the operation of the Canal sufficient military presence long but not too long duration and a reasonable assurance of post-treaty defense arrangements With this' balance we can obtain a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and more real security than we have today However we need negotiating flexibility relaxation on treaty duration 'to between 20 and 50 years President AssUme a treaty of 25 to 50 years -- what happens after that expires Bunker Panama will have control of the Canal We will jointly guarantee its neutrality and' access for ships of all nations What we would like to have is flexibili ty particularly as between duration for operation and defense Defense has agreed with us on a period of duration for operation purposes but feels we should have 50 years on defense Torrijos has made it clear 50 years is unacceptable We want flexibility so we can bargain as between duration for operation and duration for defense 25 years for operation 50 for defense if we can get it though I am certain we cannot Something in-between is what is necessary And then a lands and waters proposal which is sufficient to permit agreement The present one is not saleable to Panama Pr esident I am not sure I understand what you mean by 'operation ' Bunker The administration of the Canal President Once a treaty is signed and approved how would operation go Kissinger For X number of years we would run it After the treaty expires it would go to Panama President And our defense rights would go - VE XGDS E I 1 'I I II · 'i I I 10 Kissinger The original concept was of duration for both operation and defense for a 50-year period Now we are proposing to split the two We would be willing to settle for a shorter period for operational control if we could get a longer one for defense I have to add that in 1967 we offered them 33 years President For both operation and defense Kissinger I XGDS Yes Now if we could get 25 years for operation we would be still better off than we would have been in 1967 We would probably have no great difficulty in getting them to accept 25 years for operation duration For defense they will not accept 50 years We have not yet explored this with them as we have not been authorized to So we don't know how much more than 25 but less than 50 they would accept How much longer for defense than operation has not been explored It would be less than 50 but more than 25 This is the area in which the negotiations would have to takt place if you decide to permit greater flexibility The land uses matter can't be explored here We don't have any proposal to make but something is possible It seems to me the basic issues are the following first whether you are willing to go along with the concept of separating operation from defense The agencies all agree on this approach Though not on the numbers--what is going to happen in 40 years is so hard to predict Two if you are willing to go that route then what is the minimum we can accept Three if you don't want a treaty now you have to decide whether there are some unilateral steps we can take which ease the situation for Panama--steps which give up some of the lands but do not change the relationship It is my strong impression from the OAS sessions which have just been taking place in which I talked to most of the Latin ministers that we will get no help from them but on the contrary they will not hesitate to contribute to our problems On the other hand I have been i ' I I I i E XGDS i i I 11 hammered by Thurmond and Buckley on this and am fully aware of the problems raised from that side If you decide to go for a treaty then you have the problem of Congress It is possible however that if a treaty were negotiated and signed you could hold up ratification until 1977 Torrijos would go along with that Of course the Congress will scream when a treaty is signed even before ratification Internationally failure to conclude a treaty is going to get us into a cause celebre with harassment demonstratio s bombing of embassies The next Administration will face the issue again with less receptivity and poorer chances to get a reasonable agreement On the other hand if we do it now we will face a major domestic uproar President Going so far as bombs here Kissinger No not literally--just political No one here is for it Those who are against it are ex tremely vocal Frankly I can't convince myself that the difference between 40 and 50 years is that i portant If you decide not to go ahead with the negotiations we have to decide how to do it with a minimum of damage There will be an uproar in Panama with riots and harassment It will become an armed camp and will spread rapidly to the Western Hemisphere It will become an OAS issue around which they will all unite Then it will spread into the international organizations It is just a question of how long you want to take From the foreign policy point of view I favor going ahead However domestically I've already encountered enough opponents to know what a barrier exists President I've been told that 37 Senators have signed some document that they would disapprove of a treaty ecretary From the foreign policy point of view we're better off signing a treaty and not submitting it to the Senate That would give us two years XGDS XGDS 12 President I have a question I am told that inasmuch as we would be giving up U S territory both the Senate and the House would need to act on this the Senate on the treaty and the House on the land Of course in the House a simple majority is sufficient but two-thirds are needed in the Senate Bunker Thirty-seven Senators signed the Thurmond resolution Our analysis in the State Department indicates that perhaps 20 are soft opponents and might be persuadable 1-7 are intransigent and not susceptible of being wo over As of now the Canal has a constituency while the treaty has none That is because we have done nothing yet We have made no broad effort on the Hill or with the public Consultation with the Congress and public education would be essential in getting a treaty passed President What do you think about this Jim Schlesinger The details of the Defense position have been discussed in the earlier meetings I would like to give you my personal observations I guess I may be classified as an opponent of the treaty It seems to me one of the biggest mistakes the United States has made since 1945 was not to acquire sovereign base rights in a number of places around the world like the Philippines and elsewhere in the Far East The Panama Canal Zone represents one of these sovereign base areas Defense agreed to the Eight Principles signed last year which sacrifieed sovereign land areas It was a generous offer on the part of the U S giving them land and sovereignty What Ambassador Bunker refers to as flexibility is no less than a further reduction in what we're asking for an erosion in our position of substantial magnitude It seems to me we're engaged in reducing our requirements to what we think Torrijos will accept When I was DCI the analysis was different We recognize that there will be harassment and attacks The question is whether the price is worth defending a set of principles on our part Worldwide reactions are likely to be mixed When the U S shows z o u ' -- 13 strength and determination it receives respect When it recedes from its position it whets appetites I was reluctant to see the position your predecessor President Johnson took in 1967 That eroded your position President Were those the negotiations Bob Anderson conducted Schlesinger Yes we have had eight years since then one solution would be to try to protect our position for another eight years That might give us the greatest period of time advantage Henry put the problem in terms of a conflict between domestic and international interests I think it's more complex than that The international effect will be varied--the Brazilians and some of the others respect us when we take a strong stand--there will be different attitudes While the international implications are mixed the domestic are unmixed in my mind the question is whet er or not the U S is capable of standing up to the harassment which Torrijos is quite capable of 'mounting President In your judgment would the harassment be of such degree that it could render the Canal inoperable Schlesinger I think not The SNIE I produced some years ago concluded that their reaction would depend on their assessment of the American position If they were persuaded the U S was flexible then they would be tough if they thought the American position was tough they would be more reasonable They will take advantage of the situation depending on how firm the U S is prepared to be If we are tough in the Canal they will yield In recent years the U S has not shown a great deal of this quality Kissinger What do we want to stand up for the Eight Principles for They give no time limit and no 9 guidance in this issue - ' t l Schlesinger I understood it was 50 years Kissinger That is in the presidential instructions but not in the principles The principles just speak of an adequate period of time We have all agreed on proposing 25 years for operation the issue is whether or not to insist on 50 for defense with an XGDS I tl 1 fOlio 14 extension into the post-treaty period My recommendation would be to shave our demands on matters like operation if it could add to defense I do not share the view that some of the Latins will support us I have just finished talking to all of them and am convinced that none will support us The question is is this a good issue on which to try to face-down the Latins It might be if it were only Torrijos we have to face-down but this is the whole Hemisphere Colby lam convinced that we are facing in the next 15 years increasing tension between the North and South which will take on racial characteristics They would be unified against us Clements I donlt think there is any problem about Defense and State coming to some reasonable solution working out the details is easy Kissinger I agree Clements This is no problem The post-treaty conditions are a little more difficult We could set them out further in some reasonable and understandable form So far as harassment in the Canal Zone goes this can be contained without severe action In order to do that we will have to make some minor concessions We can move forward with the lesser issues and keep the negotiations going make some of the accommodations they want but keep the treaty out of the political arena Joe Doaks in Paducah is excited about the Panama Canal He considers this part of his business and will become very emotional about it I know 11m supposed to be a non-partisan career official but I can tell you this will be one hell of an issue domestically in 1976 I think we can avoid it by making some accommodations working out the details and holding everything as it is for 18 months and still save to a reasonable degree the international conditions President Would these adjustments fit under a subsequent treaty i' ' 1 '- f ' '-- ' ' I T E'-'L E XGDS ¥ '- --- - - ' -l 15 Kissinger I agree with Bill that we could come to an agreement with Defense on all points in a treaty and we would gain internationally From the foreign policy point of view this is just not a good issue to face people down with With regard to his recommendation that we protract the negotiations so as not to sign for 18 months we'll have to take a look to see if it's possible ­ Clements Bo Callaway and the Army assure me this can be done We'll have to do f ome selling but there are a lot of things that we can do and we feel very positive about it President l've had some experience with the Panama Canal going back as early as 1951 when I was a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee that had jurisdiction over the Panama Canal At that time I had the temerity to look at the sinecures that some of the civilian employees of the Canal had acquired such as rents which I think were $15 a month and • a raft of other gratuities that few other people working for the Federal Government received I objected and sought to decrease these benefits I was met with an onslaught from a highly organized group which I hadn't anticipated Previous to that the Carrier on which I served went through the Canal A Navy Canal pilot whom I met took me back to the other side and we stayed out late having what I remember were called rrblue moons II The ship was going to San Diego the next morning At about 2 00 a m I asked whether we shouldn't start back He said rrNever mind 1'11 fly you in the morning rr And so we went to sleep at about 2 00 and at 5 00 took off in a single engine plane we went through the worst rainstorm I ever saw I got on the gangplank of the ship just as it was beginning to go up If I had missed it I would have been AWOL But that is the most highly organized group of American employees I know They have a vested interest in the status quo This is a group that gives the public the impression of what we should be doing down there We are not going to decide this issue on those grounds They ought to know it The Army gets its information from them and they infect it with their views But they Ire not going to decide this T XGDS 16 Clements Bo Callaway and the Army have been handling this very effectively They have been attempting to bring about a reduction in these benefits President Do they still get a 20 to 25 % wage differential Clements I think they get some The Army and Bo want to do things right They want to bring the Panamanians into the operation and do some other things that should have happened long ago President This group of Americans' go from one generation to another Some of them have been there for three generations Kissinger These concessions could take two forms--first they could help save our lives on the treaty second if the Panamanians perceive them as a substitute for a treaty we will have difficulty We will have to look into the possibility of whether we can drag the negotiations out until after the elections For that kind of thing we can probably gett some Latin American support from people like the Brazilians Schlesinger What Bo Callaway is talking about is a number of atmospherics He is the most ardent advocate of the Eight Principles and the existing presidential g idance Kissinger The Eight Principles are just platitudes deliberately designed to be satisfactory to both sides They give no guidance on this SchleSinger The Army is prepared to accept them Bo and the others firmly adhere to this position It's our position that the little flexibility they're asking would reduce the period to 30 or 25 years and soon it gets down to the point which we just can't tolerate--20 years for instance Kissinger No that's not the case we're trying to separate operational rights from defense rights For operational rights we're willing to accept down to 20 years for defense rights not 50 but more than 25 something like 30 or 40--my own estimate is we should get 40 or even 45--that means defense by Americans We haven't f-OR c' li ti '-I---SSNS lR B E XGDS fP of C rIl a 11 _ _ _or i -io ' ' ' 17 tried shaving the other treaty rights to get more on defense rights I Clements And some post-treaty rights Kissinger In any circumstances the defense control will extend well beyond the year 2000 President Are you saying that if the treaty is signed our sovereign rights will extend through the year 2000 Kissinger Until 2000 we operate the Canal and until say 40 years that is until the year 2015 we have the unilateral right to defend the Canal Then there is the problem of the post-treaty rights which we've not been prepared to discuss My understanding is that sovereignty would lapse with the signing of the agreement and be phased out over a three-year period The operational part is less important than defense President Then there are really three points Sovereignty is phased out in 3 years operation would be 25 and defense rights 40 to 45 i • The Vice President enters '- ' Rumsfe1d I've been doing some talking up on the Hill and I I find there is a great deal of distrust and concern and leaking of documents to the Hill by the people in the Zone I would caution against any new treaty concession being made to the Panamanians The conservatives would join with the liberals on this Kissinger This is a totally separate issue There is a story on the Hill that we are negotiating some unilateral accommodations This is sheer nonsense We have told them that We should save these unilateral concessions for the treaty where we get something in return There is a strong constituency in Panama and there is not at home We don't think this is a matter of deep concern among the American people but there is a violent concern among some Congressmen that have active supporters opposing this treaty XGDS fOR ' UJ--­ ' - ­ 18 Schlesinger Is it a matter of physical harassment Rumsfeld No--political Some of our good friends in the Congress feel very strongly about this issue If we antagonize them on this then the ability of the President to deal with other matters of high priority like Turkey will be diminished The point is that this so angers people on the Hill that we lose their support This will affect the attitude of these people with regard to other issues It would be just like sending up a nomination for Abe Fortas There is a strong feeling not among many but a significant group Bunker and the others should work with these people Kissinger There is no way we can persuade some of these people Vice President lam a politician and I know a little about pursuing our national interests and the treatm nt of people I understand these people that Don talks about--they have to understand the world in which we live This is a big issue in Latin America like the expropriation of oil in Mexico was in 1939 It's symbolic of freedom from the United States and the restoration of dignity This is terribly important for our relations in the Western Hemisphere I would like to talk to some of these people I may be able to help Colby The pressure will grow from Latin America There is a tendency to compare it with the base at Guantanamo The situation is going to get more and more tense President What is the time schedule as you see it Bunker If we can get the flexibility we need and without it we can't get a treaty then we can move along and probably get something by August or September There has been no treaty drafting as yet Ingersoll We have done no selling on the Hill because we didn't know our position and couldn't explain it This problem is not going to go away It's going to get worse r 1r-LvE XGDS 19 _-_r President We ought to get further information on the proposal of the specific things which Bo Callaway is talking about When we see those specifics we can look at how much can be done unilaterally and how soon They should be put together soon let me look to see what impact they would have and after that we'll take a look at what we can do Kissinger The fundamental problem is to assure that we maintain the negotiating position If Torrijos perceives that we've abandoned it in some way he wouldn't want to play that game and we would be in for a confrontation If we used these unilateral steps to protect our negotiations for 18 months we might be all right and some of the more sophisticated Latins like the Brazilians might help But if we say there will be no new treaty then there will be an uproar I've never discussed this with the Vice President so I can aSSure you there's been no collusion We would have a real uproar volunteers demons ations violence and we would be dragged into every international forum This is no issue to face the world on It looks like 'pure colonialism Schlesinger The palliatives will help us only as far as postponement is concerned Sooner or later we're going to run into these problems You must face the prospect of harassment Clements Bo Callaway and the Joint Chiefs and all of us are together on this There is no problem We want to move forward We're not advocating the status quo We understand that a treaty is inevitable the problem is timing K Issmger We'll have to draw up a list and then make our best assessment of the situation if we are to protect the negotiations President Let's find out what the alleged goodies are and the impact of this kind of thing Vice President Do you know Torrij os He's a very interesting guy I think at some point if you had him up here and had an hour with him you could give him your personal attention It would have a big impact E XGDS 20 Rumsfeld Get him with Kissinger Right now he's working on Ellsworth on this island of theirs President We ought to expose him to myoId friend Dan Flood Kissinger We'd complete the negotiations the next day Vice President You know his mother's a communist and his father's a communist and his sisters and brothers are communists but he's a real tough guy He's crazy about the U S military He's got a real concept of dignity President Let's get the materials and facts and then we can make an asses'sment of where we stand TbR LSEe - XGDS - -------- --- - ---- - -