DS 5130X THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON MINUTES NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING Date Wednesday July 23 1975 Time 4 50 to 5 45 p m Place Cabinet Room The White House Subject Panama Canal Negotiations Principals The President Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S Brown Director of Central Intelligence William Colby Other Attendees State Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker Defense Deputy Secretary William Clements WH Donald Rwnsfeld NSC Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft Stephen Low ' XGDS3 B DECLAS Date Impossible to Determine BY AUTH - Dr Henry A Kissinger Q ' QffiDS ORIG1NAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION DECLASSlFlEO • e o 12958 See With PORTIONS EXEMPTED 3 lt E O 12esa Se - f_ bl oJ ' f · l $98 --3 f J 1 tv5r 4 -'k cf'l'i 1 • s 2 'i q · l t _ NARA Date PHO fOC'OPY OM GERALD fORD LIBRARY - - - ' -- I ' J _ · • • 4 • •- 1 t f ' _ 4 J f -· 7· - 1 2 - t i1 President Henry would you outline the options as you see them Kissinger As things now stand negotiations are stalled and everyone is getting itchy We have not been able to let Bunker go back to Panama since March because he has exhausted his negotiating instructions Unless we give him new instructions the stalemate continues Torrijos is under increasing pressure to take more vigorous action against us The other Latins are getting into the act As I pointed out to you this morning you have a personal letter from the President of Costa Rica who said he and the Presidents of Colombia and Venezuela together with Torrijos would march arm-in-arm into the Canal Zone as a symbol of Latin American solidarity if it is necessary It is not difficult to foresee that unless we begin the negotiations again there will be increasing unrest and eventually all Latin Americans will join in and we will have a cause celebre on our hands As I see it you have three strategic options to choose from first to pronounce that we have reached an impasse and see no point to continuing the negotiations second tell Bunker to resume negotiations within the limits of his existing instructions this would lead simply to stalemate We can sweeten each of these two options by giving a little more flexibility on lands and waters and duration-that would have the advantage of making the situation more tolerable but it would have the disadvantage of giving away things which we will need to bargain with later on The third option would be to return Bunker to the negotiations with new negotiating instructions We would have to consider the political situation here in the United States in the first place there is a strong feeling in the Congress against a treaty and second there is probably a feeling in the country in opposition to a treaty Wherever I go I get unfriendly questions on the Panama Canal We can handle the negotiations in such a way that the political considerations are mitigated Discussion was interrupted for a few minutes while the President went out of the ro·o m The question is if you want a treaty can we conduct negotiations in such a way that they do not come to a - · FO fb ' XGDS c JI 3 conclusion before the end of 1976 I think we can do so We have to make some progress but not necessarily conclude an agreement We can get an understanding with Panama that we reach certain conceptual agreements on various items but no final agreement Our negotiations would continue and progress during 1976 but they would not be concluded It will not be easy to do but we think we can If you want to go that route it would be a mistake to give away anything just to keep the lid on things The instructions have to be changed As they now stand Bunker is required to negotiate 50 years for both operation and defense We recommend a substantial reduction for operations to 25 years and defense to 45 then as a fallback to go not lower than 40 years for defense and 20 years for operation We're not insisting on exact details The questions are first _ do you want a treaty and do you want the negotiations to go forward Second will you agree to change the instructions Then third what is the minimum beyond which we should not go President It is my feeling that yes we want a treaty if it is something we have bargained for which will protect our rights We don't want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess I've looked over the papers you sent me including suggestions from the Defense Department Jim do you have anything to add to this Schlesinger The important question you have to answer is do you want a treaty In my judgment we would give away 85 percent of what is most 'important to us in giving away sovereignty We will be out of the Canal in 15 years whether we get 40 or 35 years I duration Our experience in the Philippines is an example In 1947 we got base rights for 99 years That was reduced to 55 years in 1966 and now they may let us remain as their guests That is the reality I sympathize with Ellsworth If we want a treaty we have to be willing to give up a little more The question is do you want a treaty President You say we don 1t want a treaty -7 l '- • I ' · _1- PHO fOC'OPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRAR'r · 4 Schlesinger I've tried to stay out of this but I'm reluctant to give up sovereignty Kissinger Then none of these things we're talking about makes any difference Schlesinger I tried to indicate that The flexibility you're seeking here is a moot point because the length you stay in the Canal will be determined by what the Panama Government decides to do ten years from now It will not be something we can protect President Bill what 1s your view Clements I don 1 t feel as strongly as Jim He is consistent in his desire not to give up sovereignty The world we live in today is not the world of Teddy Roosevelt those circumstances just don 1t exist today If we want to maintain our relationships with South America and they are important we need to have a more enlightened view than that of trying to maintain our sovereignty over the Panama Canal If we work at it and the Army will do so if we give them the right framework to work in we can maintain the right relationship If we go down there and apply ourselves and make it worth their while give them a stake in keeping the Canal going then I think we can look forward to long tenure and the betterment of our position in Latin America President Then you feel we can achieve the two objectives--of keeping an explosion from occurring in Panama and the situation under control here in the United States If we can agree on terms to protect our interests we can proceed to an understanding • Clements Yes sir It won't be easy and it1s complex and will require your help You'll have to inject yourself in a moderating sense you '11 have to say 11These things are happening 'Under my direction n President If we show good faith and they act in a sophisticated way we can achieve our purposes We have a problem with the Americans in that area I have been involved · _ i f I i · L f C GOS ' PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD fORD LIB - S 5 for a long time in this question from back in 1953 and 1954 They have a sinecure down there which they don' t want to give up I'm not going to let them dictate American policy There is a long history of Americans who have a good life down there But they are not going to decide this Bill has indicated a reasonable approach and it coincides with Henry 1s view Can i t be handled Ellsworth Bunker _Yes we will need to reach some conceptual agreements by President The spring of 1 76 Bunker I think by January of 1976 when they have the anniversary of the riots But there won' t be any treaty writing We can complete the agreement in late 1976 early 1977 • sign it in December of 1976 or January of 1977 Torrijos would go along He understands our problems President George what are your views Brown The Chiefs are agreed with the Clements paper which was sent to you We need 40 years-plus on defense Personally I agree with Jim We are committed and you can't be half-pregnant We are committed through proposals that have been made earlier Everyone who has communicated with us about this is dead-set against it but we're already started down the road and we can't back out now President Do you think 45 and 25 years is defensible Brown Yes and the Chiefs do too We 1ve looked at lands and waters this morning with Bill Clements and I looked at it again this afternoon this is key and we need to be forthcoming The management of defense at the turn of the century required lands that we don't need now But we don't want to give any more than th Ambassador has already been authorized Bunker But the Panamanians have turned that down Kissinger Have you offered them everything that the Chiefs have authorized you to XGDS PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBRAR l • I l r· _ 11 - 6 ·-- ' ' · - ·i tfit1 Bunker I have offered everything and have been turned down Kissinger I have a suggestion would it be possible after you have made a decision that you want to go ahead with this to see whether State and Defense can sit down to write up where they agree and where they disagree and come to you for the decision with pro's and con's I have never studied this thing really On duration I agree with Jim-once you decide you want a treaty of a determinate length a few years one way or another don 1 t make much difference On lands and waters I have not studied this· myself and I couldn't give you an opinion on whom I support I don 1 t know the State or the Defense position State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs and the CIA could get together in a week and have ready for you on your return the issues in the negotiations If there is agreement we can submit it to you by paper If we disagree then we can have another meeting Clements 11 d like to make one comment Our attitude is as important as anything else There's a lot of cosmetics in a thing like this • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -----············································ President You · said it the way I feel and better Clements There are a lot of things we can do down there to assist Ellsworth Brown It's not the way the U S citizens are treated but the Panamanian employees Their schooling is different their · treatment their pay the facilities available to them President Exactly--the same job but different pay I know from my experience on the committees that they can be very vocal and have a disproportionate influence from their numbers Somewhat like the Greeks Kissinger Much greater Schlesinger There are only 17 000 Zonians President It's the Zonians who go on from one generation to another XGDS 'l -1 - v' PHOTOCOPY FROM GERALD fORD LIBR - ' ' __ •M '• - - • · _ -' · - -1j - r- I T J f f l XGDS 7 Kissinger My mail is 100 percent against a treaty President I think it1 s similar in the White House This is a delicate problem It has to be handled with skill Going back to 1954 when I think payment for the Canal was about $456 000 and President Eisenhower increased it to several million there was a hullabaloo That was first modification of the treaty Bunker I believe there were amendments in 1936 and 1954 President There was a real hullabaloo raised then objections c·a me from the Zonians Schlesinger No one else really cares about the financial transactions President We all agree this is a very sensitive subject Jim has a different view but I am sure we agree that this is very sensitive It is incumbent on us with the sensitivity that this problem has that we keep our differences if any to an absolute minimum and certainly avoid public differences Any discussion of what we talk about here could be misinterpreted Since we all understand it is mandatory we keep it to the eight or nine who are here and we work with Ellsworth Schlesinger There is a former Secretary of the Army who has some very strong views--I'd like to make three points first you may want to talk to Bo Callaway your campaign manager about this he has some very strong views and he is supposed to be supporting you Second a point of intelligence I don 1 t agree with the general tendency of the intelligen_C _e__ analyses of the Latins' attitudes on this •••••••••••••••• Most of the • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Third - -· ' J ·----------·•·•·-e LA- • --- - - -- on the matter of duration whether it's 40 or 35 years we are creating a phantasm in that once they control operations then• they can stop the Canal Defense would be moot I 1d like to ask the Committee to see if 30 years for each would not make more sense Under those circumstances we might have rights but couldn't keep the Canal open XGDS PHOfOC'OPY FROM GERALD FORD LIBR AR'i ___ -- __ __ · ·-· _ 8 ' ' · · Colby ' J j • 'j · - ff - Kissinger On the intelligence point I agree with you Jim when you are talking about Ecuador Peru and Chile which are directly affected by this But there are many other Latin Americans--in the Caribbean and elsewhere--who are chiefly concerned about the political is sues and are not so directly involved • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -• • - - -• • • • • • • i • • • • • • • • • • • • ············································· ••••••••••••••••••••••r • -- - --- - • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I' Schlesinger I agree that on the surface there is no support for the U 5 but under the surface there is much more Colby Whatever deaI we work out 40 or 30 years someone will come around in ten years to raise the issue again The relationship between us is the 'important thing Kissinger I agree that when you give up sovereignty you move into a new era The question is whether you can hold on to it at an acceptable cost I think we probably could' maintain our sovereignty if we wanted to but not at an acceptable cost It would become a major propaganda point it would engulf even the· moderates and our friends People like the Brazilians at these conferences support the Panamanians totally In six years another President will face the same problem again I agree with the dangers which Jim has outlined but it would be a little· more· manageable if we could get ahead of the curve Schlesinger You are in a difficult position once President Johnson decided to· modernize our relationship To go back on that is difficult The position of President Nixon was tougher than the one in 1967 Kissinger Even the position of Nixon didn't go to the heart of Jim's point It was tougher than LBJ's but 40 or 60 years are not ultimately the question as long as there is a limit President As I remember Bob Anderson talking to me in 1966 and 1967- what we talked about was· more forthcoming than what we are talking about now Schlesinger The present position is quite a bit tougher -· - - · -·· ·· ' _ _ - - · - - -• ·---·- ---_ _· - · · - - _ · _· --' - • - • -· - - - - • -f1-- - 4 - __ - ' - - · • 1 • • • •• I l 1 t XGDS 9 -- · i ' · · ··- ··1 - i J Kissinger It's one of the liabilities we're working under if you add the ten years which have elapsed--our position automatically becomes more difficult Schlesinger Mr President I think you're facing three choices you can acquiesce you can recant or you can procrastinate Clements Opportunity is another choice President We want to be sure that the method we select is the right one Kissinger They should get together We won't do anything until they - - get toget ier--·_ _____ •••••••••• •••••••• -01 1 l - - -·-------- - - - - --·-------- - XGDS PHOfOCOPY FROM GERALD fORD LIBRAR ·