1 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Director or Central Intelligence 6 2 d National Intelligence Estimate India-Pakistan Prospects for War in the 1990s ___l_ 6 2 ___J 900 i' IE 37 3 6 2 d 546-546 i i G i 51R·l' Dih t O l l i 11 QDDi 5TAFF Z i iiC Di55i M1M11ul'II i- Gui i Oi-iB I_ ______ This National Intelligence Estimate rqraenu the views ofth Director of Central Intelligence with the uMu and a ssistanu of the US I nteUigence Commllnity NTE91-17 Octol er 191 J i ·• CopJ• Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 J ·· - 1 l r Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 LJ Director of ence NIE9 3-37 India-Pakistan Prospects for War in the 1990s I I 6 2 d Prq ared unrkr tl e tnupica ofBn a O RiaW National Intdligau e 01 ku for Nmr East tuUl So '11 Asia National lntdligu 12 Coundl I I 6 2 c Octobtr 1993 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 1 -- 6 2 d Figure I India-Pakistan - - Province•level boundary Pakistan state or union territory boundary On lia u »J'IIIDmc Wrl 0 l00M40 Chin a Burma India •_ Arabian Sea Bay of • l Sri 1 Lanka' ' ___ Maldives INDIAN OCEAN Unclassified ii Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Bengal J Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 I 6 2 c Key Judgments We rate the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan in this decade as about 1 in 5 Our intelligence indicates that leaders on both sides want to avoid war because they fear that it could escalate to the nuclear level a valid concern in our judgment 1 3 3 b 1 6 2 d • India has no strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan Pakistan has lost previous engagements and its leaders probably believe another war could destroy the military or even the state • Both sides believe the economic costs of another war would be exorbitant Both have economic reform programs want to constrain military spending and fear a conflict would result in a cutoff of public and private foreign capital 6 2 d • Both countries have dcmons t ra ted an ability to keep crises from spiralling out of control 6 2 d The likely deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and the development of nuclear warheads before the end of the decade will increase bilateral tensions Eventually this probably will provide a more credible deterrent especially for Pakistan 6 2 d I Powers with interests in the region want stability and are pushing the two sides to avoid war Russia no longer has a strategic reason to back India against Pakistan China does not want instability nearby to distract it from domestic issues Support for either side by Middle Eastern states is unlikely to be pivotal I I The Risk of War by Miscalculation Will Continue Although neither side wants war the two rivals could stumble into it Domestic political factors will ca use animosity between India and Pakistan to persist throughout the decade Both governments are likely to remain unwilling to risk a domestic backlash by compromising on 3 3 b 1 6 2 d ill NIE 93-37 October 1993 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 d Key Assumptions 3 3 b 6 2 d • Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad - - - - - i They generally will remain centrist democratic and secular in orientation but the Pakistani Army will continue to play a role beyond its constitutional mandate I • India's military and economic advantages over Pakistan will increase over time • But India is not likely to acquire a decisive conventional or strategic military advantage 6 2 d 6 2 d such core issues as Kashmir or the possession of nuclear weapons Opposition parties will try to gain electoral advantage by perpetuating the rivalry Communal violence in India will grow further poisoning relations with PakistanJ I _______________ __ Compounding matters __ ach supports militants and secessionists in the other The '---- two sides have created confidence-building measures CBMs l but these are weak and might become irrelevant in a crisis 3 3 b 6 2 d 6 2 _ _ _ __ _ Possession of Muslim-majority Kashmir is fundamental to the self image of each nation-it has been a battlefield in all previous conflicts About 350 000 Indian troops are fighting an insurgency that appears to have no end These forces can prevent Kashmir's succession or its acquisition by Pakistan but are unlikely to defeat the insurgents □ 6 2_ 3 3 b 6 2 d we think nuclear deterrence could break down in a crisis Either - - ---1 military could develop hair-trigger responses that would escalate quickly to the nuclear level and the time available to national leaders and external powers to defuse tensions would rapidly compress I - 6 2 Implications for the United States India and Pakistan likely will seek US assistance in reducing the risk of inadvertent war They are not impervious to US and Western pressure 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d · 1 _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ iv Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 - - -6 2 d • 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 Both sides will resist pressure that affects such core security issues as nuclear weapons '-------c --------- ------ ---- --- 6 2 d • Bach views US relations with the other as a zero-sum game Positive steps toward one side likely will be misinterpreted by the other as a tilt • 3 3 b 1 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ 3 3 b 6 _J 2 d Both sides probabl would consider US assistance in CBM verification 3 3 b 1 6 2 d What Could Change Our Forecast Our estimate of the relatively low probability of war would change in the unlikely event that India achieved a dramatic military advantage or if either country underwent radical political change • If India's conventional military superiority grew rapidly Pakistan probably would rely increasingly on its nuclear deterrent 3 3 b 1 • 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d V Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 -1 6 2 d Scope Note This Estimate complements National Intelligence Estimate 92-31 three volumes The Indo-Pak istani Military Rivalry In that Estimate we addressed trends in military power and capabilities and posited potential conflict outcomes This Estimate assesses the lilcelihood that the two sides would go to war and under what circumstances It addresses these questions • What is the likelihood of another Inda-Pakistani conflict erupting by the year 2000 • Will nuclear deterrence be a stabilizing factor' 6 2 d • To what extent will external actors-particularly the United States-be able -to prevent war and reduce the chances for miscalculation I vii JVIE 93-31 Octobu I 993 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 1 __ _____ 6 2 d Discussion An Enduring Rivalry 6 2 d India and Pakistan are locked in a visceral rivalry that is not likely to moderate appreciably through the end of the decade After achieving independence in 1947 India and Pakistan fought three major wars-in 1947 1965 and 1971 since then two border crises-in 1987 and 1990-raised tensions to alarming levels Each country regards the other as a military and subversive threat Pakistan designs its defense and foreign policy strategies primarily to counter that threat while India also takes China into consideration I I Domestic political considerations will reinforce the rivalry 3 3 b 1 6 2 d • - - - - - in both countries are not likely to risk domestic political backlash by offering accommodations on core issues such as Kashmir or nuclear weapons • Opposition parties in both countries will seek electoral advantage by perpetuating the rivalry and pressuring the government to act tough • Communal violence in lndia -which almost certainly will worsen-will continue to poison relations with Pakistan and promote the political fortunes of extremists in both countries Resurgent Hindu nationalism led by the Bharatiya Janata Party BJP will further strain New Delhi's ability to keep the communal peace and nor6 2 d malize relations with Pakistan I I Potential Flashpoints Kashmir Kashmir-a battlefield in all previous conflicts-will remain a dangerous unresolved issue Possession of this Muslimmajority territory is fundamental to the selfimage of each nation Pakistan as a selfproclaimed homeland for South Asian Muslims and India as a united secular democracy with a large Muslim minority Neither government is likely to deviate from its well-established position that independence for Kashmir is out of the question • Pakistan sees Kashmir as an issue of selfdetermination and human rights It backs 40-year-old UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite that allows Kashmiris to choose between India and Pakistan Islamabad will seek every opportunity to internationalize the dispute including pleas to Washington to convene a Camp David-like process • New Delhi counters that Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union and regards bilateral or international arbitration as unacceptable India will vigorously oppose a US or UN role in settling the dispute The crux of the problem according to New Delhi is Pakistan's political and military assistance to Kashmiri and other anti-Indian militants • The 1972 Simla Accord committed both sides to resolving disputes peacefully Although the Accord is not likely to be shelved each side accuses the other of violating key provisions 6 2 d l Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 I I Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Indian security personnel are fighting an insurgency that appears to have no end Firing incidents along the Line of Control are common particularly in the spring when militants begin their seasonal infiltrations across the Line of Control I 6 2 d In our judgment Indian security forces can prevent Kashmir's secession or its acquisition by Pakistan but these forces will not be able to defeat the insurgency in this decade Kashmiri militants have the staying power to tie down substantial numbers of Indian secucity personnel I 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d I secession of Kashmir and has a receptive audience there India has supported ethnic separatists in Pakistan but the effort has been comparatively small India has no desire to annex Pakistani territory Both sides will be wary that extremist attacks could invite military retaliation or US sanetions Consequently the provision of arms and trai ing will be carefully circumscribed Because however the clients could independently conduct · hly destabilizing terrorist operations l 3 3 b 6 2 d 6 21 Communal Incidents The 1947 partition of New Delhi will continue efforts begun last spring to establish a dialogue with Kashmiris with the goal of ultimately holding state elections New Delhi hopes that divisions among the militants and war weariness among Kashmiris will work in its favor These efforts to restart the political process in the war-torn state probably will falter because Kashmiri moderates have been weakened by New Delhi's tough security policies and because Kashmiri hardliners are intransigent The militants arc divided over whether Kashmir should become independent or merge with Pakistan and a unwilling to settle for less the Subcontinent along Hindu-Muslim lines did not resolve the communal question but broadened it into a diplomatic and military problem Communal violence in India and its repercussions in Pakistan will poison bilateral relations and promote the political fortunes of extremists in both countries Over time the cumulative impact of this violence probably will increase levels of tension in the Subcontinent Examples of this trend include destruction of a mosque temple in Ayodhya by Hindu radicals in 1992 and the standoff between Indian security forces and Kashmiri militants in the Hazratbal shrine in October 1993 I I Pakistan uses the Kashmir issue as a foreign policy bludgeon against India Whenever discontent in Jammu and Kashmir erupts Islamabad highlights the problem and demands international action favorable to Pakistan's interests in the dispute j elieve Hindu nationalists led 3 3 b 1 by the BJP will not form a national govern- 6 2 d ment this decade largely because it lacks appeal in many parts of the country Nevertheless the BJP's divisive campaign of championing the rights of the Hindu majority-over 80 percent of India's populationwill continue to inflame communal passions and erode the secular ideal in India Although India's national survival likely will I Internal Meddling New Delhi and Islamabad are unlikely to stop supporting secessionist and other militants in each other's territory Pakistan has had a more aggressive campaign than has India Pakistan wants the 2 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 d Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Fis•rr l India and Pakistan hiwt a 10111 lifsrory Qf swpport- i opposition tlt nls in each olhrr's terrilory Kashmirl mil- 6 2 d ilonts who ad '1lt mtrttr with Pakistan 1tait an onli• Indian NIiiy top Palct iton Army troops boltom conduct lnttrMI l«Mrlly op rarlons in trowbled Sindli Provlncc i 3 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d not be in jeopardy resurgent Hindu nationalism will further strain New Delhi's ability to keep the communal peace and normalize relations with Pakistan I I • _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Pakistani military leaders probably believe that another conflict with India could well destroy the Pakistan military if not the state But War Is Probably Not on the Horizon Despite these flashpoints overall we rate the possibility of war between India and Pakistan as about 1 in 5 • Leaders on each side will fear the other's nuclear weapons potential and thus will be cautious about risking a contli_ auxmld l 6 2 d escalate to the nuclear level I key Indian and Pakistani leaders are deeply concerned that a fourth war cannot be kept limited I I • The likely deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and development of nuclear warheads before the end of the decade will increase bilateral tensions but should in the long run provide a more credible deterrent particularly for Pakistan • Military leaders will exercise caution because they know they cannot achieve victory at an acceptable cost Both militaries will remain ill-equipped for war Budget constraints supply disruptions and the burden of internal security duties will continue to undermine readiness • India outnumbers Pakistan in almost every category of military capability-a disparity not likely to change in this decade India however has no overriding strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan • Indian and Pakistani leaders perceive the economic costs and dislocations of another war-conventionalLclcat --- A Cxorbitant For example during the 1990 Kasb Jiiir crisis indicates the potential economic costs of war weighed very heavily on the minds of Indian leaders 6 2 • India and Pakistan have demonstrated in past crises an ability to pull back from the brink and to develop red lines0 they will not cross • The international community worried about a nuclear conflict in the Subcontinent will pressure both sides to step back from confrontation I 6 2 Both countries have launched broad economic reform programs that are likely to continue to constrain military spending Political leaders of both are sensitive to the concerns of international financial institutions about the size of their military budgets Both believe a regional conflict would provoke a cutoff of public and private foreign capital I I 6 2 I War Through Miscalculation The lessons of previous Inda-Pakistani crises suggest several conditions that cow Q ntribute to a conflict see annex B 4 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 J 3 3 b ° 6 2 d _ Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Divergent Negotiating Perceptions milestones notwithstanding Indian and Pakistani diplomats bring to the negotiating table assumptions about their adversary that will hinder-if not doom-diplomatic progress Overcoming these divergent perceptions will pose a serious challenge to the United States or other potential intermediaries 3 3 b 1 Since achieving independence in 1947 India and Pakistan have negotiated regularly to reduce tensions and resolve contentious issues Noticeable successes include the 1962 Indus River Waters Treaty the 1972 Simla Accord and the 1990 agreement covering military exercises in border areas These diplomatic _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _6_2 d 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Intelligence failures could prove disastrous Pakistani war plans call for preemptive strikes against Indian forces if Pakistani 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 5 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 lnditin and Pakistani Views on Nllclear Weapons 6 2 d For both sides nuclear weapons confer status in a world that otherwise is generally indifferent to the Subcontinent's intramural disputes Both India and Pakistan maintain a public position af ambiguity concerning nuclear weapons though neither doubts the other's nuclear capability see annex A Each shoulders significant diplomatic and economic costs by developing a nuclear capability suggesting that both have calculated the political andr erhal military value a these weapons equalizer with rival China India though mindful al the high costs af a nuclear exchange probably believes it could absorb a limited nuclear strike ram Pakistan and then could retaliate I 6 2 Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India I 6 2 J I 3 3 b · 6 2 d India views nuclear weapons primarily as the coin of international power and prestige deterrence against Pakistan retaliation against a Pakistani first strike should deterrence Jail and-once it has ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads long distances-a strategic leaders are convinced an all-out attack is imminent because Pakistan lacks the strategic depth to absorb such an attack If India's military leaders were convinced-rightly or wrongly-that Pakistani units were preparing another conventional assault on Kashmir they probably would order armored strike units into wartime positions in Punjab and Raj sth That in tum o ld rompt Pakistam countermoves l - - - I Furthermore existing crisis reduction mechanisms may not be enough Confidencebuilding measures CBMs -such as the military communications hotline between New Delhi and Islamabad-have contributed to the lndo-Pakistani dialogue but might prove irrelevant in a fast-moving crisis I 6 2 Several events could trigger an escalating confrontation for example • A protracted surge of violence in Indian Kashmir that threatened New Delhi's grip on the state • Large-scale military exercises in border areas eSPecially if one or both sides deliberately evaded prior notification requirements 6 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 1 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 1 become nuclear The time available to - national leaders and external powers to de- · fuse tensions would compress quickly In these circumstances _C _ _ _ _ _ _____ and coalition governments on either side could seek to take advantage of the situation for partisan political purposes j I 6 2 d Existing Indo-Pakistani CBMs Five major CBM agreements have been signed since 1990 Although they are steps in the right direction we believe these agreements are insui icient None have adequate verification mechanisms and compliance by both sides is spotty External Factors • Hotline between Directors-General al Military Operations December 1990 India and Pakistan probably will not have to grapple with a hostile external security environment No major power threatens either of them although India perceives a long-term threat from China external powers are not likely to have a strategic interest in widening the Inda-Pakistani rivalry or risking another war in the region and we doubt that a foreign power could fan separatist flames that would Balkanize the Subcontinent d 62 • No Attack on Nuclear Facilities January 1991 • Advance Notification Qf Maneuvers Exercises and Troop Movements April 1991 • Nonviolation ofAirspace April 1991 6 2 d I • Prohibition of Chemical Weapons August 1992 I I • A spectacular terrorist outrage that one 3 3 b 1 side believed the other directed or abetted • An Indian military cross-border action for example to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism 6 2 d · • Protracted Hindu-Muslim carnage that spilled across the border -I I Our greatest concern is a breakdown of nuclear deterrence during a crisis In addition to the danger of premature attack either military could develop hair-trigger responses that ensure crisis escalation thereby increasing the risk that the conflict would 6 2 d µtner ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- ---- --- -' powers will prefer stability in the region • China wants to improve relations with India especially now that security links between New Delhi and Moscow have weakened Seeking stability along its southern borders China will continue to mend ties to India retain strong ties to Pakistan and urge both neighbors to resolve their differences peacefully • Like Beijing Moscow does not want instability nearby to distract it from domestic reforms Russia will maintain closer ties to 7 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 I Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 India than to Pakistan But Moscow has no strategic reason to support New Delhi unless Pakistan cooperates closely with Islamic extremists in Central Asia bargain basement prices from such traditional suppliers as Russia and China Niche marketers-Israel for example--will find increased demand for their more affordable upgrade services and are likely to provide them to India I • Middle Eastern Islamic states provided no significant support to Pakistan during pre3 3 b 1 vious wars with India and are unlikely to 6 2 d do so in the futureJ I 6 21 What Would Change Our Assessment Most other Isliimic states will giv lipsemce to Pakistan's position on Kashmir but will not risk mortgaging their relationship with India • Tehran probably has agreed to provide Islamabad with logistic support such as ammunition and safehaven for aircraft and naval assets in the event of an IndaPakistani war Iran however is trying to improve ties to India and probably would demand a significant quid pro quo before · extending further aid to a Pakistani war effor 6 2 d I Nonetheless extra-regional powers will retain a measure of military influence in the region by providing or denying military hardware including spare parts The two South Asian adversaries will continue to be viewed as potential arms purchasers even though neither will have the financial resources to make large-scale military purchases as both did in the 1980s Both will seek to strengthen existing military supply relationships and develop new sources of weaponry overhaul and upgrade services Most hard currency arms producers will not give Islamabad or New Delhi concessionary prices or favorable payment terms Some weaponry however I may be obtained at Our estimate of the relatively low probability of war assumes that governments in New Delhi and Islamabad will remain centrist and generally democratic and secular in orientation for the·remainder of the decade A dramatic shift in the military balance or radical political change would increase the probability for military brinkmanship and war Several scenarios could fundamentally alter our estimate for the prospects for war and we assess their impact below ·I I A Dramatic Shift in the lndo-Pakistani Military Balance The Indian and Pakistani economies probably will not expand sufficiently by the year 2000 to allow either side significantly to modernize its armed forces Defense budgets will be hard pressed to keep up with inflation and funds for procuring foreign weapans will be tight Moreover neither side will have the industrial capability to produce sophisticated weapons of sufficient quantity and quality to alter the military balance I I Nevertheless if India's economy grew considerably faster than we anticipate New Delhi could elect to acquire greater mobility for its infantry and artillery forces and a better logistic capability These improvements would provide Indian military planners with a higher probability of success in a 8 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 21 6 21 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 war with Pakistan and would increase the temptation to launch an attack during a crisis j j emphasize defense preparedness and staunchly J eserve India's nuclear options I Rapid Indian military improvements would strain Pakistan's ability to remain competitive Islamabad would feel even more threatened by India's growing military edge and would rely more heavily on nuclear deterrence As a last resort a desperate government in Islamabad also might consider an extreme measure such as openly deploying nuclear weapons L J We do not foresee circumstances under which Pakistan could tip the conventional military balance in its favor ·I I 6 2 d The prospects for war would increase in the unlikely event a radical BJP government came to power Such a government-perhaps swept to power on the heels of an Indian economic collapse-would be more likely than the secular Congress I to blunder into a conflict with Pakistan Moreover BJP radicals almost certainly would polarize Indian society and cause significantly more communal violence that would damage relations with Pakistan Deep distrust would increase the r tential fr military reprisals by either side 6 2 d But if one side achieved esulj_2Y _QUld An lslamist Regime in Islamabad A radical Islamic government in Pakistan also is highly unlikely this decade Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami received less than 5 percent of the vote in recent national elections but these parties will continue to exert political influence out of proportion to their popular support Under certain extreme conditions-for instance economic collapse and or a military dictator joining with militants-an Islamist government could be formed I I 6 2 d A Hindu Nationalist Gcwernment in New Delhi The BJP now India's largest opposition party is 'unlikely to have sufficient support to win the next national election that must be held by 1996 Later in the decade however BJP fortunes may improve as the party expands its political base beyond the Hindu heartland Although the moderate wing of the party probably would predominate as it did when BJP leaders held ministerial portfolios in a coalition government in the 1970s a BJP government would blame Palcistan for India's domestic turmoil A radical government almost certainly would establish an Islamic system of government based on its interpretation of shariah law and Islamic values Such a regime would champion the cause of India's Muslims-some 12 percent of the Indian population-particularly when communal riots erupt It also would promote the liberation of Kashmir by openly arming and training anti-Indian mili3 3 b 1 We think the nuclear_ri alJY willJ e_r_elative stable 6 2 d 1 - - - - - - - - J - - - - the be destabilizing 3 3 b 1 6 2 d tantsJ ------- 9 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 d Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 I 6 2 d 3 3 b 6 2 d Thr ai tlon al Ay hya sparkiiT wilisprra com - - u-nal -o -s -i n- lndla and drr 1• sharp protuu from Pakistan c _J If such a regime came to power 3 3 b 1 At a minimum New 6 2 d '----------' Delhi would step up military preparedness along the western border The political appeal of the BJP would grow in India as BJP leaders capitalized on heightened antiMuslim sentiments C J 6 2 d A combination of change in the military balance and an extremist government in either capital would significantly increase the prospects for war in our judgment 10 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 r - 1- - - - 6 2 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 What If There Is Another Coup in Pakistan Another Army seizure ofpower in Pakistan would immediately set back relations with India Alter an initial period of mistrust however New Delhi would accustom itself to dealing with a military regime that in our estimation would want to avoid war As in the past a military government probably would be cautious but willing to negotiate with India I I 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 -_- - - - - - - - - - - - - I --- ----- -----1 r _· 6 2 d Both parties will continue to discuss nonproliferation policies with the United States However their objective will be to avoid US sanctions while cultivating Washi s_ _ support for their own_positions_ _ b 33 1 6 2 d Implications for the United States 3 3 b 1 6 2 d India and Pakistan arc likely to seek US assistance in advancing their competing agendas and reducin the risk of inadvertent war c - - - _ _ _ _ _ ___ 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d' • Both countries will resist pressure that affects such core security issues as Kashmir and nuclear weapQns • Each views US relations with the other country as a zero-sum game and overestimates US influence Measures applied to one country will be perceived as a tilt toward the other 3 3 b 1 6 2 d •1 _____________ __ _ Yet the two countries are not impervious to US pressure 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d 3 3 b 6 6 2 d • 6 2 d 11 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 The Kashmir Conundrum 6 2 d 6 2 d International diplomatic engagement in the Kashmir dispute could take two forms a definitive resolution af the problem or a more limited goal al reducing tensions A solution is highly unlikely because neither India nor Pakistan is willing to give up its claims I I threat from India Islamabad also would request that the United States and the international community underwrite a Kashmir initiative with massive doses af economic aid I I India will resist proposals that are not skewed in its favor and will demand recognition af its sovereignty claims New Delhi is likely to see expressions of concern over Kashmir as an endorsement af Pakistan's campaign to reopen the Kashmir question to international arbitration India will oppose all such df'orts 1 I 6 2 d 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d Pakistan will try to involve the United States and the international community by highlighting Indian human rights violations and exaggerating the military Confidence-Building Measures 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d Both sides probably will consider longstanding US offers to assist in CBM verification and will look to '- - - - - ' Washington to help defuse crises that threaten to overwhelm existing CBM arrangements Modest CBM advances will be possible but progress will be slow and fitful CBMs that have discernible benefits-improved communications for use during crises for example-will have the best chance of success Efforts to improve verification and compliance with CBMs already in force-for instance the 1991 agreement on preventing airspace violations--also may be productive I I 3 3 b 1 6 2 d - - - - - - - - - - - For domestic political reasons both sides will resist caving in to Western-particularly USnonproliferation pressures I I Barring radical shifts in strategic thinking or public opinion neither side is likely to foreclose its nuclear options by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty • Islamabad would demand ironclad security guarantees against a conventional Indian attack 12 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 1 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 - - - - - - - - -3 3 b 6 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d • New Delhi would want China to participate in the arms control process and drastically to reduce if not dismantle its nuclear arsenal Moreover New Delhi probably would seek US assurances that Washington would not rearm Pakistan if Pressler sanctions were lifted I I International efforts to discourage both sides from deploying ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear payloads also will face strong resistance I I 3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d In times of regional crisis the United States can hel the two rivals back awa '-'f ro - m --- conflict for exam le could r a ss is t-- in - de fu si n ' - 'te· n s io n s· _____ _ _3 3 b 1 3 3 b 6 6 2 d Altering Levels of US Engagement in the Region Concerted US engagement in Indo-Pakistani peacebuilding initiatives is not likely to resolve the core disputes that define the rivalry and threaten regional peace Each side would suspect that Washington had tilted in favor of the other - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -6 2 d J 6 2 d C 7 13 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Annex A 15 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 16 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 The Crises of 1987 and 1990 3 3 b 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 6 2 d 6 2 d The Indo-Pakistani crises of 1987 and 1990 were symptomatic of the deep suspicions each side harbors about the other's intentions In early 1987 India's BRASS TACKS military exercises precipitated a high-stakes e of mill brinkmanship 1p omatic intervention y Pakistan's martial law ruler defused tensions and allowed both sides to step back from the brink Two years later Pakistan staged its own major exercise Strike of the Believers I - - - - - - - - - - - --v 2 d _J important lesson learned by both sides from the 1987 experience was the need for rapid communication between military commanders By the time of the second crisis a hotline had been installed and was used frequently r---1 - I 6 2 Several factors appeared to have played a role in defusing the 1990 crisis Leaders in both countries wanted to avoid war and recognized that the cost of a conventional conflict would be unacceptably high They made concerted efforts to get this message tn third parties especially Washington Tim 3 b 1 US diplomatic intervention he ed resolve3 3 b 6 I The 1990 crisis stemmed from India's deployment of additional troops to Kashmir The Pakistan Army's subsequent preparations for a major summer training exercise-probably intended to send a message to New Delhi-and Indian assessments of unusually large Pakistani force deployments in late April caused alarm in New Delhi India then deployed armored artillery and infantry units closer to the border - Jhc atandoff I 6 2 d In our judgment tlie threat o nuclear strikes also played an imp0rtant role in preventing 6 2 d war I I 3 3 b 1 6 2 d 17 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 I Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 3 3 b 1 6 2 d Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Aside from the low-level conflicts in the north stimulated by mutual subversion the continent has long been in a guarded truce This is the consequence of mutual nuclear deterrence and a conviction among more reasonable leaders on both sides that a conflict would probably not solve anything There are no obvious indications that this situation will change in the short to medium term But factors in the equation are changing • • 6 2 Pakistan's economic woes make it questionable whether its military budget can be sustained at the level needed to keep it militarily competitive with India which is much bigger and richer and economically more robust This paper will attempt to identify circumstances or developments that might destabilize this truce and greatly increase the chance of conflict It will suggest triggers of such developments and indicators that they might be occurring Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 6 2 d J National Security Information 6 2 d Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Informadon amiable as of 28 October 1993 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency The Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State The Director of Intelligence Department of Energy also participating The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Anny The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence Headquarters Marine Corps The Office of Intelligence Suppart Department of the Treasury 6 2 d 6 2 d This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board f-- 1-- All material on this pa1c is Unclassified Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved for Release 2025 02 13 C06852971 Approved tor Release 2025 02 13 C06862971