The Clinton White House and Climate Change: Model for Biden?

This cable reports on the results of the Kyoto climate change conference (COP-3) and provides details on the complex diplomacy and difficult compromises that surrounded the final negotiations leading to adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on December 11. It also sets the stage for the diplomatic and domestic political challenges facing the Clinton administration over the next three years as it sought to implement and build on the Kyoto Protocol. While the U.S. believed the agreement would produce substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries and “harness the forces of the global marketplace to protect the environment,” and had succeeded in ensuring the protocol included many U.S. proposals, it had been unable to overcome the significant opposition to include binding explicit targets for reducing developing country emissions, a key goal of the U.S.

The cable also summarizes the important contribution made by Vice President Al Gore, Jr. to the success of the conference and the negotiations over key issues surrounding the commitments to be made by developed countries, including the target levels and flexibility measures such as emissions trading to assist in meeting emission targets. In the final analysis, the U.S. felt it had secured recognition of climate change as a “front-burner” issue for the 21st century and laid the basis through the ambitious commitments made by developed countries to pursue mechanisms for securing developing country participation. This had required difficult diplomacy, as seen in the U.S success in “fracturing the G-77 and China group” on regional and common interest lines, though the “vigor” of the fight waged by China, India, and OPEC members against emissions trading, and factions within the EU made it difficult to work with them.

Looking ahead, the U.S. now had to develop a “diplomatic game plan” for the follow-on negotiations, as well as a political plan to demonstrate to the American public the importance of the Kyoto Protocol to lay the basis for its ratification. It was crucial to tie ratification to a satisfactory emissions trading system and “meaningful participation” by key developing countries. “The former is essential to make our commitments affordable, the latter to have any chance of winning Senate confirmation.”

In this memorandum, Jeff Seabright and David Gardiner, both on the White House Climate Change Task Force, lay out for Ballentine, who served as chairman of the Task Force and deputy assistant to Clinton for environmental initiatives, the proposed strategic goals and resource needs for the Climate Change Task Force through the end of the Clinton administration, with detailed recommendations for the rest of 1999. Ballentine had taken over as chair of the Task Force following Stern’s move to Treasury, where he became counselor to Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. Seabright and Gardiner recommended focusing on a basket of goals in the near term, including legislative proposals; deliverables such as developing an executive order on transport alternate fuels; substantive results on industry discussions; and targeting new outreach efforts to state and local governments.

Long-term, the administration should focus on achieving ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and securing legislation to implement agreements reached at the next COP, which required increased public awareness and concern for the threats posed by climate change, and belief that Clinton’s proposed solutions would be effective, affordable and equitable; growing engagement by business leaders, state and local governments and opinion makers; and real progress in pushing the administration’s policies, programs and legislation, which would provide economic as well as climate benefits. The rest of the memorandum provides details on how this mid- and long-term campaign should be waged, with specific activities, events and dates.

This memorandum from Jeff Seabright, Executive Director of the White House Climate Change Task Force, to Dan Sakura, the chief of staff and senior policy advisor to the Council on Environmental Quality to the Chief of Staff for the CEQ, builds on the previous draft action plan for the White House Climate Change Task Force to provide more details on the timeline, activities and deliverables, and to lay out specific resource needs, identifying which officials should be responsible for oversight of the key interrelated domestic and diplomatic efforts. Among these officials was the memorandum’s author, Jeff Seabright, formerly with USAID, who would continue to manage the Task Force’s day-to-day operations and provide oversight for all the key areas as executive director. David Gardiner, the EPA assistant administrator for policy, would serve as counselor, providing strategic and policy advice on domestic and international climate change activities, including senior level coordination. Janet Anderson, formerly special assistant to the secretary of energy, would handle industry liaison, while Julie Anderson came from the EPA to handle legislative and congressional affairs, which had been her focus there.

This e-mail forwards a memorandum from Gardiner and Seabright to George Frampton, chair of the Council on Environmental Quality following Kathleen McGinty’s departure, and Climate Change Task Force Chairman Ballentine that provides recommendations on rethinking the administration’s climate policy and possible changes in diplomatic and domestic policies. The spur for this reassessment was Vice President Gore’s upcoming meeting with environmental leaders and the COP-5 climate conference in Bonn. The memorandum discusses three possible approaches to revising U.S. climate change policies and the pros and cons of each: staying the course; reenergizing and refocusing attention on domestic climate actions; or focusing on pushing additional changes to the Kyoto Protocol to enhance its prospects for ratification. As the discussion makes clear, there were countervailing domestic and diplomatic forces on most key issues, as industry continued to fear and oppose Kyoto while environmental groups felt the administration had not gone far enough and the challenge of securing developing country participation remained daunting.

Gardiner and Seabright recommend pursuing the second and third options simultaneously, as this would garner support in the environmental community for stronger domestic actions while moves internationally to create a safety valve or cost ceiling as part of the compliance mechanisms for cutting greenhouse emissions would be welcomed by industry. Handwritten notes on the memorandum, author unknown, outline a possible fourth option centered on a trade- and market-based plan to promote sustainable energy technologies, which could be pressed independently of Kyoto but linked to the Protocol later.

In this memorandum to Clinton’s Chief of Staff John Podesta, Climate Change Task Force Chairman Ballentine seeks Podesta’s views on what Ballentine argues should be the administration’s climate change priorities for the remainder of 2000. These would extend beyond the necessary work preparing for the COP-6 climate conference and climate change related budget and tax proposals. Ballentine also wants to know if they should solicit the views of Clinton and Gore. A handwritten note at the top of the memo, presumably by Podesta, indicates he has starred his choices, which he wants to discuss. Among these starred items are: working to ensure maximum completion or progress on existing major initiatives, such as federal energy management and bio-energy; promoting an international energy market, clean energy exports and development; moving the U.S. economy to one based on advanced fuels, such as hydrogen; and taking a much more political and aggressive approach in challenging Congress over climate change issues, such as the budget.

This e-mail to Vice President Gore forwards a memorandum from Eli G. Attie, Gore’s chief speechwriter (copied to Gore’s Chief of Staff Ron Klain, Kathleen McGinty, the chair of Clinton’s Council on Environmental Quality, Todd Stern, coordinator of Clinton’s climate change initiatives, and Gene Sperling, director of the National Economic Council) laying out the preliminary recommendations for Gore’s public role in the administration’s communications and strategic plan to push its global warming policies to the U.S. public. The goals of the domestic campaign were to prevent a “fatal PR blitz” from undermining public and Senate support, killing the treaty “in the cradle”: keep “criticism of treaty specifics from overtaking broad public support,” stressing that the administration wants to take positive steps even if the treaty fails to garner the needed support or if developing countries don’t take on commitments; to stress the administration’s goals will simultaneously “protect the environment, make America more energy-efficient and strengthen the economy;” and to show that “we are on the moderate, reasonable, responsible side” of the issue.

In pursuit of these goals, Gore’s role should focus on the most positive, optimistic, pro-growth elements of the overall message. He should also focus on constituency-building, engaging with the broad support seen in the business community, labor and environmental groups, and the public for the administration’s approach and the protocol. This would include outreach with CEO’s, Senate and House members, and would emphasize Gore’s longtime leadership on environmental issues.

This memorandum from Todd Stern, likely to John Podesta, the White House deputy chief of staff for operations, illustrates the administration politics Stern had to navigate as he worked to build the organization to guide U.S climate change policy. It lays out Stern’s disagreement with the role he believes that Kathleen McGinty envisions for him in the administration’s climate change campaign. As Stern sees it, McGinty wants him to be in charge of communications, outreach, and congressional relations, and to have no role in supervising or coordinating the policy or diplomatic side. Stern was “frankly not interested in that kind of role,” as the policy and diplomatic sides were the key elements of interest to him. Stern understood why McGinty had problems with a non-CEQ person involved in climate change , a key vice-presidential and environmental policy issue, but he realized it would take some work to get her to buy-in to the role he wanted. As the documents below attest, Stern managed to secure this buy-in.

This memorandum for Bowles, Clinton’s chief of staff, and Podesta (who would move into that role later in the year) lays out Todd Stern’s recommended organization for guiding the White House’s climate change effort. Reflecting Stern’s earlier memorandum (see Document 3 above), he would be the “overall CEO,” coordinating the program while working with a core group serving as a Board of Directors or Steering Committee. This core group would include Kathleen McGinty, Gene Sperling, James Steinberg (deputy national security advisor), and John Podesta, as well as Ron Klain, “if he wishes.” This group would coordinate five principal areas of activity: diplomatic, domestic policy/implementation, outreach, communications, and congressional. Stern would be the point person for all these areas, insuring the administration was ”moving forward appropriately on all fronts,” though on some specific issues the National Economic Council or Council on Environmental Quality would take the lead. The teams for each principal area would be drawn from White House offices or other agencies, and Stern would have the authority to task this staff with specific assignments.

The rest of the memorandum discusses how each principal area should be handled, including the key goals and issue focus for each and proposed lead officials. Stern would be closely involved, chairing in many cases weekly meetings of the lead officials. He recognized that there were a number of White House offices with equities in this issue – CEQ, NEC, NSC, OVP, OSTP – and the proposed organizational model would not limit their activity. However, the premise of this model would be to insure that offices (and agencies) are acting in a coordinated manner rather than independently.

Here Todd Stern lays out how the administration’s climate change issue should be organized and staffed in the final two years of Clinton’s term. The undeniable reality facing this effort was that the key open issues of the Kyoto Protocol would not be resolved until late 2000, meaning submission to the Senate for ratification could not occur until 2001 at the earliest, though success on this point even by 2002 would be a “major achievement.” So, the goal should be to carry out a still-significant effort to lay the groundwork for possible ratification after Clinton leaves office. The primary areas of strategic engagement remained largely what Stern discussed in his early 1998 memorandum (see Document 4 above): diplomatic, domestic policy, congressional relations, outreach to business, labor and NGOs, and communications to spread the message that it is essential to take action, that the administration’s approach is sound, and that the issue remains a priority.

Beyond the two timing factors noted earlier, staffing decisions also needed to be guided by the fact there was a substantial constituency interest in the issues, and that climate change may well be a political issue in the 2000 election. To work these areas, Stern recommends that the White House Task Force be retained, though possibly scaled back, to focus on industry consultation and outreach, as well as public education. White House staff should handle diplomatic and domestic policy, with the NEC and CEQ more engaged on the latter area. Stern recommends that there remain a high-level White House coordinator, with him continuing to carry out this role until he moves to another position (which he would do in 1999). This was needed because “climate change is still an unusually cross-cutting issue with large domestic and international components, and a lot of agency players . . . [and] there is some advantage in having an ‘honest broker’ in charge who isn’t on either the economic or the environmental side of the issue.” Roger Ballentine impressed Stern as someone on Clinton’s staff who could do a good job in this role.

In this memorandum Stern expands on his analysis of the task facing the administration’s climate change efforts over the next two years, which should have the goal of laying the groundwork for securing ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001-2002. On the diplomatic front, the key issues to be resolved include rules for the Protocol’s free-market provisions; more detailed development of the provisions regarding carbon absorbing sinks; compliance provisions; and developing country participation. The first three looked to be resolved at the sixth Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in late 2000, but developing nations remained the toughest issue; failure to make progress here would complicate Senate ratification. On the domestic front, the mission should be to push as hard and effectively as possible to spur R&D into energy efficiency and renewable energy, and the dissemination of energy-saving products; Stern provides examples for this effort.

With Congress, the goal must be to build a base of support for addressing climate change and ratifying the Protocol, assuming the open diplomatic issues are successfully resolved. This means expanding significantly the core of members on the Hill who understand action on climate change is an essential insurance policy, based on available science, and that the administration’s approach is sound and balanced. One tool in this effort could be occasional breakfasts or lunches hosted by Vice President Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright or Energy Secretary Bill Richardson to educate those who remain undecided. Communications should focus on pushing the message to the public and opinion makers about why the administration’s approach is necessary, effective, and affordable, and can bring economic benefits. Outreach would continue to build support and counter opposition as work continues on building the political coalition essential to securing ratification.

This memorandum summarizes the agreement between Under Secretary for Global Affairs Loy and Stern about the management and coordination of the administration’s climate change diplomacy, which they say requires a strategic approach following a more rational plan and close cooperation between the White House and State Department. The organization and staffing ranges from high-level strategic oversight to working-level coordination that insures all the agencies involved pursue their specific activities in line with overall White House policies. The top-level guidance would come from the continuing meetings of the Oversight Group chaired by Stern to secure timely resolution of major political and policy issues, and how the president and vice president should be involved. Officials directly responsible for the formulation of diplomacy strategy, on which State would continue its lead role, would meet, usually weekly; beyond Loy, who would chair this group, and Stern, regular members would include Rafe Pomerance (deputy assistant secretary of state for environment and development) Melinda Kimble (acting assistant secretary for oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs) and David Sandalow (NSC senior director for environmental affairs), meeting in the Small Group with others as needed. Stern would be responsible for keeping State informed on domestic policy and strategy. Ad hoc strategy sessions would take place to expand the scope of participants as needed. An Assistant Secretaries’ group would meet every 4-6 weeks to disseminate information about Small Group decisions, share the results of climate-related diplomacy and coordinate international activities. State would chair the inclusive staff-level Inter-Agency Working Group, which would focus on development of technical policies and coordinate activities related to the Framework Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. Another group would focus on legislative strategy to secure support on the Hill, with another focus area being outreach to interest groups, trying to engage these in the policy process.

The discussion of U.S. diplomatic strategy recorded in this email provides a good example of how the organization laid out in the previous document worked in practice. Though not identified as such, the participants and topics suggest this was a meeting of the Inter-Agency Working Group. The purpose of the meeting was to identify U.S. diplomatic goals on emissions trading and Clean Development Mechanisms as called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Both were tools to help meet GHG reduction targets taken on by the Annex I industrialized nations and to assist developing countries in pursuing more sustainable economic development and eventually agreeing to their own emission reduction commitments under the Protocol. As Todd Stern summarized the problems before them, the U.S. could not just continue to repeat its past talking points and expect any progress in the climate change negotiations. What ensues is a very detailed and technical discussion of how these two tools should be structured and the challenges establishing them presented, not just internationally but also in terms of garnering support from U.S. business.

This memorandum records a discussion similar to that summarized above, this time focusing on the critical and vexing problem of securing “meaningful participation” by developing countries in the GHG emissions reduction program at the center of the Kyoto Protocol. Without such participation, it would be very difficult if not impossible to secure congressional ratification of the Protocol, given the unanimous adoption in July 1997 of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which said the U.S. should not sign any climate treaty that did not mandate developing country commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gases. The problem, as Todd Stern saw it, was the likelihood it would take up to four years to secure such participation, i.e., beyond the end of the Clinton presidency, so the question was what could the U.S. do over the next two years to make any progress? As the discussion reveals, there are multiple technical details regarding possible differences among developing nations regarding their ability and willingness to take on such commitments, the political room for maneuver with Congress on the issue of economic costs and ways to pursue emissions reductions – which are the real goal – that address this concern without a long and possibly unproductive debate over targets as the only index of meaningful participation.