U.S.-Iran Relations: 40 Years of Antagonism, Distrust, and Frustration Reflected in New Volume of Declassified Documents

As the New Year begins, the Carter administration finds itself at a critical moment of decision on whether the Shah should stay or go. The White House has faced huge pressure from Republicans, notably long-time backers of the Shah like Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller, to solidify US support for him. This top-level, uncensored memcon offers an unusually clear picture of who supports which approach within the administration.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and CIA Director Stansfield Turner make the argument for removing the Shah. Their belief is that reinforcing the Shah’s decision to leave the country would give newly appointed Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar a greater chance of success. However, as Vice President Walter Mondale points out, this would come at a significant political cost. On the other side is Brzezinski, who strongly advocates backing the Shah to the hilt. To Brzezinski, the implications of abandoning the Shah would have far-reaching consequences for the United States, including encouraging the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region and elsewhere.

The group agrees to send a special envoy, General Robert Huyser, who has personal experience in Iran, to work with the Iranian military, determine their outlook, and recommend courses of action. Carter comes to trust his reporting over Sullivan’s. Huyser’s month in-country becomes grist for rumors of a coup. Khomeini believes the US goal is to keep him out of power while the Shah’s supporters conclude the opposite – that Carter wants to use the military to prepare the ground for Khomeini’s return. Khomeini’s suspicions are closer to the mark, according to Pentagon records, as Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown lead the argument for Iran’s generals to take military action to prevent either a Khomeini or Communist Tudeh government. But as often happened, the president and his advisors after long discussions could not reach consensus and events took their course. Interestingly, much of the debate was over practical questions like the reliability of Iranian commanders and troops, and the unpredictability of events, rather than the ethics of mounting a coup.

The question of whether Carter abandoned the Shah or did what he could to preserve American interests remains one of the many issues analysts and critics of US policy continue to quarrel over.

The longest conventional war of the twentieth century, the Iran–Iraq War exacts an immense toll from both sides. The World War I–like trench combat of the frontlines soon falls into a stalemate. Child soldiers, human waves, and chemical weapons attacks become commonplace. New fronts open up and the horrors of war are inflicted on civilians and foreigners in attempts by both combatants – though more often initiated by Iraq – to make the war untenable for the other. The War of the Cities features missile attacks on civilian targets in both countries, while the Tanker War threatens to bring Persian Gulf oil shipping to a near standstill.

Within Iran, calls to end the war grow stronger as Khomeini repeatedly turns down peace talks with Saddam. Khomeini’s heir apparent, Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, represents one of these “pragmatic” dissenting voices. In his candid and revealing letters to Khomeini, the widely respected Montazeri asks that the Supreme Leader consider the ever-growing cost of the conflict. He points to the self-destructive zealousness and cronyism rampant among IRGC commanders as a key cause for the continuation of the war, and bemoans the lack of “an authority to investigate the errors and weaknesses” of Iran’s military structure and the “thousands of youths which are being lost cheaply due to negligence.”

While it is tempting to leap at these comments and see Montazeri as condemning Khomeini and the IRGC, it is also important to understand the nuances at play. Montazeri is a true revolutionary who would be labeled a “radical” in some of his other beliefs. The IRGC’s influence is certainly a concern for some in the regime, but there is never really a question among those in the power structure about the legitimacy of Iran’s mission in the war or in the revolution. For these individuals, it is rarely a question of “why” but merely “how.”

After the fiasco in Tehran [see Document 23 in Worlds Apart], the US side explores a new inroad to the Iranians. Their main interlocutor turns out to be Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani’s nephew, Ali Bahramani. Though apparently still in his twenties, he looks far more like the real deal than Ghorbanifar and the “first channel.”

These transcribed excerpts come from rare tape recordings made by the American side and offer a highly unusual glimpse of how the secret negotiations unfolded. The discussions underscore, among other things, American desperation to have the hostages returned safely, and the curt tone reflects their impatience after months of largely inconclusive talks. Neither side wants to have the arms sales become public knowledge. North and his colleagues are anxious for them not to be tied directly to the hostages but instead to loftier political goals. Sprinkled throughout are references to moving past the hostages to engage with bigger policy issues, but it will never be known if that was a genuine aspiration. Even without a clear picture of Iranian intentions, the Americans’ deceptions, coupled with Ghorbanifar’s monumental earlier lies and the contempt for the Iranians evident in their reports to superiors, show little commitment to building trust.

These meetings also illustrate the scope of American wishful thinking and their ignorance about Iranian politics. (Less can be gleaned about the Iranian side here.) Rafsanjani’s nephew offers valuable insights into how decisions are made – for instance the reference to the “shareholder” system and the specific roles of Khomeini and Rafsanjani. Contradicting a basic premise of the US operation to engage with moderates, Bahramani explains that while there are “moderate” and “radical” elements within the leadership, they do not act unilaterally on foreign policy. Worse, it eventually dawns on the Americans that the new channel is more or less the same as the old channel, which was made up of not just hardliners but might even have included an individual who was behind the latest American kidnapping. CIA expert George Cave admitted later: “that really blew our minds.”

Finally, Bahramani reveals a stunning development: reports of the secret deals have been circulating in Tehran thanks to opponents of cooperation with the United States. Within days, the story will make world headlines and grind to a halt the strangest bilateral discourse of the post-revolution period.

After his initial outreach to President Rafsanjani, Bush is still exploring ways to approach Iran and determine whether overtures from Tehran’s leadership can be trusted. In this conversation with Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor enthusiastically recounts his meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati concerning Iraq following the US invasion several months earlier. Some of the Iranian’s statements surprise Kohl and Bush, coming off as more collegial than expected. The president asks for Kohl’s opinion of Velayati, “Is he a good man?” Kohl responds, “He is a man of quality, and a real Iranian.”

Years later, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian, would relate that Rafsanjani had a deliberate strategy to reach out to the West during the 1990s, focusing on the Germans as a kind of “pilot” case. Here, Kohl clearly recognizes that interest in improving ties and Bush seems to grasp it, too. But other factors ultimately intervene. One is the continued linking of Iran to assassinations of Iranian exiles and other terrorist events, which makes engaging with Tehran politically problematic. (Astonishingly, according to Mousavian, some Iranian officials cannot understand why the Americans are upset since the assassinations are not taking place in the USA but in Europe. Yet, the Europeans show none of the same outrage, leading some in Tehran to conclude that the Americans are exaggerating their concern![1])

Another intervening factor appears to be a simple misreading of intentions – or possibly a failure of imagination. Long after these events, a former senior diplomat under Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, responded to Mousavian that he had no idea about any such initiative by Rafsanjani and that the State Department routinely dismissed German approaches on Iran in the 1990s because they assumed the Germans were playing games with Iran and that the broader European approach – dubbed “critical dialogue” – was just an attempt to undermine American policy.[2]

Much as Lebanon was in the 1980s, Iraq becomes a proxy battleground between the USA and Iran in the 2000s. At first, indirect cooperation is the order of the day. After all, the US-led invasion handed the Islamic Republic a gift by toppling longtime enemy Saddam Hussein and marginalizing the Sunni elite, which opened up political space for the Shiite majority, and both sides share an interest in curbing terrorism and violent insurgencies. Within a year, however, the US military sours on developments as Iran increasingly buttresses Shia elements and engages in other forms of “interference,” as Donald Rumsfeld asserts later, purportedly to establish “hegemony in the region.”[3] For their part, Iranians point to growing fears of American military encirclement and their right to expand long-standing ties to their Iraqi co-religionists.

This document provides a US military assessment of one of the main Shia groups in the country, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Though established in Iran in 1982 during the Iran–Iraq War, SCIRI gains popularity in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein through its humanitarian efforts in Shia-dominated regions and paramilitary victories by its militant wing, the Badr Organization. The US Central Command, which is running the occupation, keeps close watch on all political and military organizations in the country. This analysis points with unease to SCIRI’s growing popularity and influence but also hints at the complexities behind Shiite power dynamics, noting the frictions with the rival Sadr Bureau and suspicions by ordinary citizens that these groups may be the subject of outside manipulation. Although the source of that manipulation is redacted, the four-letter word is almost certainly Iran.

The lack of transparency of Iran’s nuclear program and evidence of official deception about it have long been worries for the West. That is what makes relatively unguarded discussions like this from future President Hassan Rouhani so valuable and intriguing. Rouhani is still serving as secretary to the Supreme National Security Council (a post he has held since 1989) and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator. In the audience is President Khatami who is about to be replaced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In these remarks to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, Rouhani admits Iran has conducted secret tests and not reported some of its activities to the IAEA. The reason, he says, is pressure from the United States. “My basic discussion with the three European ministers was that if we presented a full picture of our nuclear program, according to the regulations, what would the Americans do, given that the Americans insist on taking us to the UN Security Council? If they were going to promise to resist the American pressure, we thought, we would cooperate. But if they were not going to resist, then we would choose a different path.”

Among other points of interest, Rouhani acknowledges that “the IAEA was fully informed about most of the cases we thought were unknown to them,” thanks in part to reports provided by Russia and China but also to information found in a dissertation and a scientific paper written by Iranian scholars that the IAEA inadvertently stumbled upon. He also asserts that Iranian authorities themselves had no idea about high levels of uranium contamination at certain facilities until the inspectors arrived.

Barack Obama comes into the presidency with an unusually clear goal in mind for Iran. “To the Muslim world,” he intones at his inauguration on January 20, 2009, “we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” Then, in an indirect call to the Islamic Republic, he adds: “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

Days later, the new secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, receives this note from Under Secretary William Burns which puts forward a package of ideas that will come to animate the new administration’s approach. Burns opens: “our basic goal should be to seek a long-term basis for coexisting with Iranian influence while limiting Iranian excesses, to change Iran’s behavior but not its regime.” This is a crucial divergence from previous administrations, which, while never adopting it as official policy, often threatened regime change. Burns reminds Clinton of some of the main threats, or opportunities, that will influence US policy: Iran’s nuclear program, its support for terrorist groups, and its involvement in the politics of neighbors Iraq and Afghanistan.

Anticipating an arduous process, Burns recommends several specific steps, including participating in the P5+1 process on the nuclear issue, which Obama does several months later, and taking the “opportunity following the inauguration to set a new tone with Iran, and then … carefully test the waters … and set in motion preliminary contacts with the authoritative Iranian representatives.” Obama takes the first steps along this path two months later on the Iranian New Year.

After the setbacks of 2009 – the crackdown on the Green Movement and Tehran’s reneging on the Tehran Research Reactor deal – the Obama administration moves away from talks and toward bulked up sanctions. For the next three years, the US–Iran relationship regresses into yet another stalemate. But the White House has not abandoned engagement entirely and under the surface there is much more going on.

In July 2009, three American backpackers are apprehended by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near the Iran–Iraq border. Over the next two years, through the offices of the Sultan of Oman, who has built a reputation as a conciliator in broader Arab–Iranian disputes, secret negotiations take place for their release. The Omanis’ success in September 2011 removes a source of tension between Washington and Tehran and, importantly, boosts the Sultan’s credibility as a trusted intermediary. During the fall, the Americans and Iranians exchange signals that they are again ready to talk, using the Omanis as mediators. None of this is apparent to the outside world, where the usual litany of bad news – from an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington to the downing of a CIA drone inside Iran – seems to represent a steady downturn in relations.

This letter from Sultan Qaboos to Ayatollah Khamenei, according to Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s foreign minister at the time, is the first concrete sign for Tehran that the Americans “really want to enter a serious dialogue.” Salehi receives the letter from a go-between sent by the Omanis, then forwards it to the Supreme Leader’s aide, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati (whom the German chancellor praised to President Bush two decades earlier [Document 29]), who then delivers it to Khamenei. According to Salehi’s account, he is the one who provided the “Iranian points” to Oman. Salehi writes later that Khamenei was skeptical, as always, about American intentions, but willing to take a risk because Oman was involved. The letter appears, with minor cosmetic edits, as reproduced in Salehi’s memoir; its authenticity is presumed to be likely though it has not been possible to confirm it with US officials.