Engaging North Korea II: Evidence from the Clinton Administration

Though highly redacted, this background paper provides a detailed overview of the course of efforts, dating back to the Bush I administration, to engage North Korea in productive talks geared towards reducing Pyongyang's military threat and establishing a new political settlement on the Korean peninsula, including the subject of the paper, the Four Power Talks on Korea. As the paper recounts, and the documents posted in an earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book illustrated, the Bush I administration saw a flurry of actions that created hope for a resolution of tensions on the peninsula. These included the North-South talks leading to the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, and the Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula. The latter sought to build on President Bush's September 27, 1991, decision to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from the field. Both developments occurred in December 1991 and took effect in early 1992.

But the promise of these agreements was not met, and by the end of 1992 "the process had run its course" amid growing recriminations. The DPRK's nuclear weapons program had led to a crisis in 1993-1994 which raised the specter of war on the peninsula. That crisis was resolved by the 1994 Framework Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea to halt the latter's nuclear program in exchange for shipments of heavy fuel oil and construction of light water reactors to provide power. North-South relations grew more strained after Kim Il Sung died in 1994, with North Korea intent on keeping Seoul out of the nuclear Framework Agreement and continuing to focus on developing bilateral relations with Washington, both of which unnerved Seoul. Still, Pyongyang also continued to reference the 1992 accords as the basis for renewed engagement with South Korea as part of a wider peace settlement. Against this background, in April 1996 Presidents Clinton and Kim Dae Jung proposed Four Party talks between the U.S., South and North Korea, and China. This led to preliminary discussions in the first half of 1997, which laid the basis for a preparatory meeting involving all four sides in New York in August 1997.

The Four Party talks, according to the document, were starting at a "time of rapid change in the relative prosperity and power of the two sides and uncertainties of the North's decline." The seemingly steady economic decline of North Korea raised the risk "for the first time that the DPRK might collapse, with either a dangerous military spasm or a flood of starving refugees, or move toward peaceful unification..." (The concern during the late 1990s over North Korea's economic situation is the topic of an earlier EBB. In light of this uncertainty, the U.S. approach to the talks had to be "flexible enough to encompass a wide range of options, including a collapse of the North, and extended period of 'muddling through,' or even - although this seems less likely - the adoption of meaningful reforms which would give the DPRK regime renewed vitality."

The U.S. interests and role in the talks were clear: the talks would provide a "mechanism to help manage tensions on the peninsula by engaging the North in dialogue on fundamental issues," and a process that could assist the U.S. in "shaping events if the North moves toward collapse, promoting a 'soft landing' if that appears feasible, or (if the DPRK proves to have staying power) establishing a peace structure that promises greater long-term stability on the peninsula." The U.S. role was critical as the only party with "sufficient influence" with all the parties to advance the talks, and with Seoul and Pyongyang recognizing they need the U.S. as a facilitator. Seeking neither to be a mediator nor to take a central role in the talks, the U.S. goal was for South Korea to take a leading role.

The paper's discussion of the positions anticipated from the other three parties suffers from redactions (complete in the case of China), but some key points regarding the two Korean governments are notable. Seoul saw the talks as a means to enhance its security, and strongly believed core decisions could only be made by the two Korean governments. The U.S. saw North Korea as coming to the talks from a position of relative insecurity - for several reasons: they had lost the ability to play off China and Russia, they were in an economic "tailspin," Kim Il Sung had died, and the country faced serious food shortages. Despite this, and regardless of Pyongyang's ultimate goals, "the negotiations will be difficult and slow at best," with experience suggesting that any talks "will be tedious and subject to constant tensions," and that the U.S. and its negotiating partners should "be prepared for the long haul and keep expectations low."

The building blocks of any agreement would have to include the legal aspects of a Peace Treaty, political agreements, military confidence-building steps, and economic elements, including trade, investment, sanctions and humanitarian aid. While bilateral U.S.-North Korean issues were also involved because of the 1994 Framework Agreement, the U.S. approach would keep these two areas clearly separate so as to avoid any North Korean effort to renegotiate the 1994 agreement in the Four Party talks. Critical goals for the U.S. and South Korea would include securing a concrete reduction of the military threat posed by North Korea, a goal which would come up against North Korea's anticipated push to maximize economic benefits while minimizing military concessions.

This meeting between Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering and ROK Vice Foreign Minister Sun Youn Yun to exchange views in preparation for President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington in June, was held against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis, which had rocked South Korea and other East Asian economies, and Seoul's ongoing efforts, supported by the U.S., to reengage North Korea in productive talks to ease tensions on the peninsula through the venue of North/South talks being held in Beijing.

The scheduled meeting in Beijing on April 11, the first in nearly four years, had been spurred by North Korea's desire to obtain fertilizer from Seoul, but South Korea wanted to use the talks as an opportunity to widen the dialogue to other issues, such as the exchange of special envoys and reuniting separated families. The DPRK had also responded favorably to Kim Dae Jung's pledge to separate politics and economics. Vice Minister Sun assured Pickering that Seoul would continue to consult with the U.S. on the North/South dialogue, noting that the South Korean government recognized there was a "delicate balance" between the Four Power Talks and the bilateral North/South dialogue, in which the latter could be used to reinforce the Geneva process.

The second round of four-power talks in Geneva involving the U.S., South Korea, North Korea and China, had been held a few weeks earlier, and Seoul felt these had been useful if for no other reason than it kept Pyongyang engaged in discussions. Pickering was not so sanguine about the recent Geneva meeting, noting that the U.S. had low expectations heading into it, which North Korea met by using its "typical methods, being obstreperous, applying pressure, and then relenting in the end."

Pickering also stressed that there were concerns about the slow pace in carrying out the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) program of building a light-water reactor for North Korea under the terms of the 1994 agreement and the related commitment to provide Pyongyang with heavy fuel oil. The DPRK's recent complaints about these delays likely reflected paranoia, but were also deleterious, if not threatening, to U.S. and South Korean interests. As Pickering warned, "If Pyongyang senses we will betray our commitments to them, they will look for a reason to betray their commitments to us." Pickering and Sun agreed that their two governments must find answers as soon as possible, for they could "not allow something that took so long to put together to get off track now."

This paper, possibly prepared for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth's upcoming visit to Seoul (see Document 4 below) assesses the state of play regarding North Korea's internal situation, the North/South dialogue, Four Party talks and KEDO. North Korea's situation was seen as bleak, with the economy in a tailspin since 1990 and grinding to a halt in many sectors. The ongoing food shortage, by some estimates resulting in the death of nearly one million people over the previous three years, was rooted in structural defects not subject to quick fixes. Absent the needed reforms Pyongyang seemed unwilling to make, only outside aid from the US. South Korea, Japan and international bodies could ease the situation. The risk was that a 'starving North Korea" could become unstable and create a "dangerously chaotic situation." Politically, Kim Jong Il had yet to assume the title of head of state, give a public speech or meet with foreign leaders.

The two parallel lines of engagement with North Korea were seen by the paper's author as complementary and mutually reinforcing, a view that South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung also held. The food crisis led North Korea to propose vice ministerial-level talks in Beijing, the first high-level talks since 1994, to discuss acquiring fertilizer from South Korea, though no agreement on such talks had been reached because North Korea remained unwilling to address South Korean concerns, such as the reunion of divided families. Still, Seoul felt that North Korea's readiness to meet reflected a positive reaction to Kim Dae Jung's more forward-leaning policy towards North Korea. While the North/South dialogue worked to improve the general tone of relations and provide much needed economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea, the Four Party talks could lead to progress on confidence-building steps and reducing tensions.

KEDO, on the other hand, faced a financial crisis, primarily for supplying heavy fuel oil to North Korea, but also for financing the light-water reactor project. For reasons that include domestic politics, Japan and South Korea refused to help with the heavy oil fuel issue and current commitments to the light-water reactor would end in the fall. Without progress on these matters, North Korea, which was already protesting the lack of progress on the reactors, might take steps involving the nuclear freeze that would start a "vicious cycle" leading to a new security crisis.

This cable sends the State Department's "road maps" to guide Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth in his meetings with South Korea and other governments. The first section of the cable provides the "Korea Road Map." Roth's primary goal in Seoul was to size up President Kim Dae Jung's new foreign policy team and prepare for Kim's upcoming state visit to Washington, D.C. The foreign policy discussions should focus on North Korea, obtaining a full debriefing on the state of the North/South dialogue, next steps in the four party process, the urgent need to resolve the KEDO funding crisis (unexpected delays had hindered the solicitation of financing for the light-water reactors promised to North Korea under the 1994 Framework Agreement), and North Korea's food shortages.

Roth, according to the cable, would need to press Foreign Minister Park Chung Soo on KEDO, noting that the U.S. had put forward a fair proposal to resolve the funding issues for both the LWR and heavy fuel oil deliveries. Roth needed to make similar points to South Korean national security advisor Lim Dong Won, stressing again the "urgent" need to resolve KEDO's funding problems in light of recent North Korean threats about implementing the 1994 agreement and the security risk these threats carried. In his meeting with President Kim Dae Jung, Roth, beyond praising Kim for his handling of the Asian financial crisis and moves to enact economic reforms, also should underscore the strong U.S. support for Kim's "bold steps" seeking to restart the bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang. He should further restate the need for Washington and Seoul to work together to resolve KEDO's financial crisis, as "a breakdown of the agreed framework could precipitate another security crisis on the peninsula." Roth also needed to note that the U.S. and South Korea needed to be prepared to respond quickly if the food situation in North Korea worsened in order "to avoid a chaotic and dangerous situation in the North."

This cable surveys the full range of bilateral U.S.-South Korean issues facing Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her upcoming visit to Seoul on May 1-2. The section of the cable of most relevance deals with "Nordpolitik, Four Party and North-South Dialogue, and KEDO Funding Crises" (PDF pp. 5-7) Against the backdrop of deadlocking four power talks in Geneva, Seoul began to lay out a "sweeping new policy" of engagement with North Korea that bore a clear resemblance to West Germany's cooperative economic and social policies towards East Germany prior to German reunification. Kim Dae Jung, a known admirer of Willy Brandt, was focused on lifting limits on South Korean business investment in the DPRK as well as on travel by senior citizens and divided families. But the U.S. felt these steps, while useful, should not be the only line of approach to North Korea. As seen in the recent Four Power plenary talks in Geneva and the unsuccessful North/South talks in Beijing, "it is important to engage Pyongyang simultaneously through several channels, as at least one is certain to be blocked at any given time."

As noted in other documents found here, State advised Secretary Albright that she should discuss with Kim and his advisors in some detail KEDO's continuing financial problems which threatened a major crisis with North Korea. Left unresolved, the delays in LWR construction and heavy fuel oil deliveries risked "fueling hard-line arguments in Pyongyang that the DPRK was deceived by the U.S., and that the nuclear program should be restarted." Under Secretary Pickering during his recent visit to Seoul (see Document 2 above) had presented a U.S. plan to seek up to $50 million dollars starting in FY 2000 to fund safety-related systems for the LWR, with Seoul making a one-time contribution of $14 million to help retire KEDO's heavy fuel oil-related debt. ROK officials had expressed serious doubts about gaining National Assembly approval for such a step, given the country's current financial problems and existing commitment to fund 70% of the LWR, so this approach required further discussions.

On a related point, the fact that Secretary Albright was coming to Seoul directly from meetings with Chinese officials in Beijing would offer an excellent opportunity to compare notes with Seoul on China's approach to North Korea, given Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao would visit Seoul a few days before Albright's arrival. Key points here would be the role Washington and Seoul saw Beijing playing in Korean peninsula affairs, and encouraging China's maturation into a responsible major player in regional and global affairs.

One fascinating part of the "road map" concerned Kim Dae Jung's ideas about the future direction and nature of U.S.-South Korea relations should North/South reunification actually occur. Kim had spoken about the need for a continued U.S. security role in Northeast Asia even after reunification, and beyond that, for a broader regional security structure, eventually including all the major regional powers.

This memorandum briefs Secretary of State Albright on key North Korean policy issues in preparation for her meeting with the South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young during an upcoming APEC conference. Among the key policy issues Secretary Albright needed to discuss with her South Korean counterpart was the suspected construction of an underground nuclear facility, implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, the recent missile launch over Japan, the Four Party talks, and the appointment of William Perry as the North Korea policy coordinator. Continued U.S.-South Korea coordination on North Korea would be vital at what the memorandum called a critical time.

At the same time that the APEC meeting would be taking place, Ambassador Kartman would be leading a delegation to Pyongyang to pursue talks aimed at resolving concerns regarding the suspect underground construction. Albright needed to stress to Hong that progress on that issue and on missiles was "absolutely essential" to the continued viability of the Framework Agreement, not to mention continued political support for the agreement in Congress, which had to approve future funding for implementing the agreement, but also reassure him that the U.S. was well aware of the risks of confrontation with the DPRK. Another missile launch would likely lead to the collapse of political support for the agreement in the U.S. and Japan.

Finally, the third plenary session of the Four Party Talks in Geneva was scheduled for October. Here, the primary U.S. goal was to create momentum for the talks through creation of two working groups, as agreed by the U.S. and North Korea in recent bilateral talks, on replacing the 1953 Armistice and tension reduction. Against this progress was North Korea's continued insistence on a bilateral U.S.-DPRK peace treaty and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, as well as concerns about North Korea's missile program and the "very real prospect" of a regional missile race.

Thanks to the Blue House press spokesman, a nearly complete transcript was released of a meeting in early December 1998 between President Kim Dae Jung and William Perry, who had rejoined the Clinton administration as special coordinator for North Korean affairs to prepare a report with policy recommendations for Clinton. Joining Perry were Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, State Department Counselor Wendy Sherman, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nonproliferation Ashton Carter, while President Kim's secretary for foreign affairs and national security Lim Dong Won also took part. The meeting took place against the backdrop of President Clinton's visit to Seoul on November 20-22, during which Clinton had sought to rebut reports of rifts between the two countries over North Korea policy. Seoul was Perry's first stop on a trip that would include Japan and China, and focused on hearing these countries' views on how engagement with North Korea could be pursued in the face of provocative actions by Pyongyang.

As Kim saw it, North Korea was at a crossroads where it could either choose the path of military provocations and risk war, or pursue reform and greater openness. There were signs of both approaches in North Korea's recent actions, with its missile program and suspected underground nuclear sites set against its cooperation in the four-party talks and bilateral talks with South Korea on peninsular peace and stability, as well as steps to promote business linkages between the two Koreas. There were also signs that the North Korean regime was moving cautiously to explore economic reform that resembled the early stages of a socialist market economy. Kim believed that North Korea was acting tough not because it was tough but because its economic difficulties were expressed as threats when it interacted with other countries. What mattered most, Kim argued, was that no country in the world would support North Korea if it chose to attack South Korea. This was particularly true of China, whose leaders, based on Kim's talks with Chinese leaders including President Jiang, were opposed to war and supported reconciliation and detente on the Korean peninsula because these were in line with Chinese interests.

Kim stressed that the U.S. and South Korea must stand firm together and work to involve Russia and especially China to engage North Korea with a policy that combined the incentive of improved relations, including economic ties and humanitarian assistance, if North Korea cooperated to address security issues, with a tough security policy that made it clear Pyongyang would not profit from provocative actions, including its military programs. This dual policy of stiff penalties for provocations and incentives for cooperation had led to success in U.S. diplomacy in two key cases - the opening to China and the end of the Cold War, Kim argued.

Turning to North Korea's missile program and suspected nuclear weapons program, Kim believed Pyongyang was four to five years away from building nuclear weapons, if that was their goal. Before imposing sanctions, the U.S. should carry out the nuclear inspections that North Korea was subject to under the 1994 framework agreement. With respect to missiles, including North Korea's efforts to sell missile technology to Middle East nations, the U.S. needed to pursue direct talks to address these issues.

Finally, the discussion touched on two points regarding the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea that was resolved by the 1994 Framework Agreement. Kim told Perry that during the crisis he visited the U.S. where he met with Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, who spearheaded the negotiations with North Korea. Later, during remarks at the National Press Club, Kim strongly pushed the idea that former President Jimmy Carter should visit North Korea to work with Kim Il Sung on a resolution of the crisis. According to Kim the South Korean government at the time had opposed this idea, fearing Kim Il Sung would mislead Carter, but Kim told U.S. Ambassador James Laney that a Carter visit would not fail, and that Kim Il Sung would not have invited Carter if he planned to send the former president back empty-handed. In the event, Carter's trip served to facilitate a resolution of the crisis. Perry at one point noted that he had been secretary of defense in 1994, and that the U.S had planned for war at the time. Regarding these plans, Perry told the South Korean leader that "Of course, with the combined forces of the ROK and U.S., we can undoubtedly win the war. But war involves many casualties in the process." Perry assured Kim that he was well aware of the negative aspects of war and would do his best to avoid it.

This paper, which seems to have been prepared for U.S consultations with an unidentified country, summarizes and provides talking points on U.S. policy goals and the state of play in talks with North Korea about its missile program. In pursuit of the U.S. high priority on restraining North Korea's "irresponsible" missile program, the U.S. had used three rounds of missile talks in 1996-1998 to make clear its strong opposition to the DPRK's destabilizing missile development and export activities. Washington had issued a strong warning to North Korea that it viewed further launches of long-range missiles (No Dong or Taepo Dong) and transfers of missile technology as direct threats to U.S. allies and the U.S. itself, and that if North Korea continued with such activities, there would be "serious, negative consequences" for U.S.-DPRK relations.

Paired with these sticks was the carrot that if North Korea ceased these activities, there could be an improvement in relations. Despite a U.S. offer in 1997 of a limited easing of sanctions in return for North Korea's restraint in both indigenous missile development and deployment as well as missile exports, Pyongyang had continued to resist any such limits. This was the state of play as both sides worked to arrange a fourth round of missile talks.

Beyond this, the U.S. had asked its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, China and others to exercise "extreme vigilance" over exports of missile-related technology to keep North Korea from securing materials for its missile program. Securing restraints on both indigenous development and exports was essential, as they were mutually reinforcing: missile exports provided cash for developing more capable missiles, and North Korea was under pressure to sell its more capable missiles to recoup its investment in the program.

Though redacted, this cable provides insight into the importance the U.S. gave to securing Beijing's cooperation as the Clinton administration pursued its North Korea policies, in the context of providing important details about U.S.-North Korea meetings. The backdrop was the recent visit of North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Presidential Envoy William Perry to Pyongyang. Perry had sent the State Department's East Asia and Pacific Affairs Korean Affairs office director, Evans Revere, to brief the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asia Department deputy director, Ning Fukui, about his visit to North Korea as a sign of the importance the U.S. placed on the strategic dialogue with China on Korean issues. The cable itself is a draft reporting cable on their meeting sent for Revere's review and editing. After noting the meetings Perry had held with North Korean officials, including a visit with "significant symbolic value" to Kim Il Song's birthplace, Revere told the Chinese MFA official that Perry's delegation had been impressed by the friendly, polite and sincere treatment given by their DPRK host, which had extended to the official North Korean media reporting on the visit, which was, by North Korean standards, very high profile, and neutral or positive in tone.

Perry's goals for the visit were to establish a meaningful relationship with senior DPRK officials in as many North Korean official organs as possible; to reaffirm the existing dialogue and agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework; and to convey to senior DPRK leadership the U.S. interest in "fundamentally changing" the bilateral relationship. To this end, the Clinton administration had asked Perry to carry out a review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, and the trip served to present U.S. ideas and to explore North Korean views before Perry submitted his final recommendations to Clinton.

Perry sought to explain to the DPRK officials the U.S. strategic view of East Asia and how U.S.-DPRK relations fit into that view: the U.S. saw itself as a Pacific power with legitimate security interests in the region; it had adopted new approaches to the region in light of the Cold War ending; the U.S. military presence in the region was no longer directed at any one country and its approach to military and security issues respected all countries' sovereignty. The U.S. saw no reason why normal U.S.-DPRK relations could not coexist with the security alliances Washington intended to maintain in the area. The U.S. saw the potential for North Korea to play "an active and positive role in preserving peace and stability" in Northeast Asia, and recognized that the DPRK had its own strategic views and "legitimate" defense concerns. Perry asked the North Koreans to view U.S. security concerns in the region, including its alliances, as legitimate, and stressed Washington's willingness to respect the "sovereignty and national dignity" of North Korea, and that the U.S. had no intention of interfering in North Korea's "national system."

Having made this argument for the potential alignment of U.S. and North Korean security interests, Perry turned to U.S. views on the continued threats North Korean activities presented to the region. The two main threats were North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs, and it was essential that the DPRK address these issues in a "robust" fashion. Perry stressed that their nuclear program was incompatible with the positive goals outlined above, and that the U.S. goal was North Korean agreement to negotiate a "mechanism to give the United States complete and verifiable assurances that North Korea had no nuclear weapons program."

Similarly, Perry told the DPRK officials that their missile program posed an "unacceptable" threat to the U.S and its allies. North Korea's longer-range missiles could already reach U.S. territory and threatened South Korea and Japan. Beyond this threat, the DPRK missile program created problems in carrying out the Agreed Framework, while its missile exports posed a threat to other regions. Perry acknowledged that it was North Korea's decision whether to pursue these programs, but warned that the U.S. saw them as "inimical" to North Korea's national interest. Lack of progress on these issues, Perry warned, could lead to a "future deterioration" of the situation on the peninsula.

Perry laid out two paths for U.S.-DPRK relations to the North Koreans: either dramatic improvement or dramatic deterioration of the relationship. To secure the positive route, Perry said that the U.S. hoped to begin talks on both programs, leading to verifiable agreements to halt them, including North Korea's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) standards. As an incentive for Pyongyang to agree to talks, the U.S. was ready to take steps to create a "positive environment."

Revere told the Chinese officials that the ideas and concepts in Perry's proposal were the result of six months of intensive coordination within the U.S. government and with other countries. While the Perry mission had seen signs of strong interest on North Korea's side in improving bilateral relations, the window of opportunity to achieve this was a narrow one that would close soon. One potential obstacle was the mood in the U.S. which was leading many powerful members of Congress to argue in favor of shifting U.S. policy toward North Korea in a "different direction," implying a more confrontational approach.

For the moment, the Clinton administration believed North Korea was sincere in its desire for improved relations. The question was whether they were "willing to pay the price to do so," i.e., by addressing the nuclear and missile concerns. In an effort to allay North Korea's concerns, President Clinton had sent Kim Jong Il a letter expressing a desire for better relations, and the Perry trip had sought to engage the DPRK in high-level discussions to this end.

Despite redactions, this cable sheds light on the Clinton administration's efforts to coordinate its North Korea policy goals with key players, in this case through trilateral talks with Japan and South Korea. The cable reports on a briefing that Perry and members of his delegation had given to Japanese and South Korean officials about William Perry's trip to Pyongyang. The account given to the Japanese and South Koreans tracks rather closely to that given the Chinese Foreign Ministry (see Document 10 above), though with some interesting new details, likely because it was Perry and his colleagues who provided the briefing. Perry outlined the three main goals of his trip, as noted in the document above: creating a positive atmosphere for the talks; building on and reinforcing programs and negotiations already under way with North Korea; and exploring North Korea's interest in "expanding relations in a dramatic new way." While Perry could report real success on the first two goals, the third had met a "far less positive response."Among the North Korean officials Perry met were Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, General Li Yong Chol, the director general of external affairs for the National Defense Commission who advised Kim Jong Il, and Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. On the critical issue of implementing the 1994 Framework Agreement, Perry said the North Koreans reaffirmed their commitment to the agreement, though they did complain about the failure of KEDO to fulfill the terms of the accord, likely a reference to problems with the provision of heavy fuel oil and financing of the light water reactors to be provided through KEDO. There was also some concern on the North Korean side that the Clinton administration's statements that the Perry mission would propose a "fundamental shift" in U.S,-DPRK relations might presage a decision to scrap the 1994 agreement. The two sides had spent the most time discussing the third goal of expanding bilateral relations.

Other members of the Perry delegation provided more detailed briefings regarding the three goals of the talks. Ambassador Wendy Sherman expanded on the great hospitality and positive tone of the talks, which in large part was the result of the respect which the U.S. officials had shown toward North Korea and the stress it had placed on making it clear they had come to Pyongyang to learn as well as to explain. EAP special advisor Phil Yun summarized the discussions regarding the second goal, noting the strong point the DPRK officials made of expressing support and commitment to existing talks, specifically mentioning the missile talks and the need to keep the talks going between Ambassador Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, which the North Korans described as "unique."

Overall, Perry said there was a clear division in the structure of the talks. The U.S. side laid out its ideas on the first day, while Kang replied on the second, followed by discussion on the third. Perry and his colleagues then outlined what they saw as the substance of the talks. Ashton Carter described the U.S. presentation, which, as discussed in the cable above, focused on three parts: the U.S. strategic view of the East Asia region and the prospect the U.S. would change the threat perceived by North Korea in a dramatic way, accepting the status and regime of North Korea; U.S. goals in the nuclear and missile talks; and what the U.S. was willing to do in return for "satisfaction" on the nuclear and missile issues. Much of this discussion is redacted in the present cable, but available in the earlier cable. This latter dialogue culminated in a two-on-two session attended by Perry and Sherman on the U.S. side, and vice ministers Kang and Kim Gye Gwan for the DPRK. The point of this session apparently was to address the lack of a positive DPRK response to the third goal of working for a dramatic improvement in bilateral relations. While details on this meeting are redacted, Perry's final statement to his counterparts provides a clear idea of his assessment: "sometimes people are not ready for a bold new approach to resolving problems."

This document lays out the conclusions reached by a meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on North Korea, and summarizes the key points for next steps in dealing with North Korea with respect to carrying out the 1994 Framework Agreement and talks about Pyongyang's military missile program. Among the key points: Ambassador Charles Kartman, the special envoy for the Korean Peace Talks, was authorized to use his discretion in "deploying a package of economic sanction relief" steps in negotiations with Pyongyang, and to accelerate already committed humanitarian food deliveries. The lifting of sanctions was specifically linked to progress in Ambassador Kartman's push for North Korea to agree to a missile test moratorium. Though parts of the document are redacted, the summary suggests that North Korean missile tests could threaten the 1994 Framework Agreement, as well as compel the U.S. to keep Perry's proposal for improved U.S.-DPRK relations on the table but not actively pursued. The Perry proposal was likely part of the North Korea policy review the former secretary of defense was preparing, and which would be released later that year.

This paper lays out the state of play in U.S.-DPRK talks regarding North Korea's missile program, and the larger context of that country's development of weapons of mass destruction. Overall, the paper indicates cautious optimism, based on recent North Korean actions. For example, Pyongyang publicly announced on September 24, 1999, that it would suspend missile launches while talks with the U.S. were ongoing, which reinforced "the sense that the North understands the significant price it would have to pay" for a missile launch. This price had been brought home by the prospect of punitive steps not just by the U.S., but also by South Korea and Japan, actions that the DPRK would face at a time when "its dependence on the outside world is growing." Continued deterrence of such a launch would depend on Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, along with other allies in the region, remaining unified in their determination to impose "a stiff political and economic penalty" on North Korea if should carry out a missile test.

Future high-level diplomatic meetings with North Korea would provide the U.S. with opportunities to spell out clearly the specific areas of progress on security issues that must occur to permit better bilateral relations, in particular that North Korea must deal with Washington's "comprehensive security concerns in the arena of weapons of mass destruction, which extend far beyond" the missile issue.

The paper closes on a cautionary note, warning that the nature of the North Korean regime will make it difficult to improve bilateral relations, as well as its relations with its East Asia neighbors, and that setbacks should be expected.

This cable, which reports on a wide-ranging discussion between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, includes a briefing Pickering gave Yang on the Perry Report, plans for a high-level DPRK visit to Washington, and the Four Power talks (pages 5-7). Stressing that reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula was in the interests of the U.S. and China, Pickering reminded Yang that, as State Department Counselor Wendy Sherman had told the Chinese charge in Washington, the recently-released Perry Report recommended that U.S. policy toward North Korea should become "more comprehensive and integrated." To this end, the U.S. should work to normalize relations with North Korea at a faster rate as Pyongyang took steps to address Washington's concerns about its nuclear and missile programs.

For its part, North Korea had agreed to a missile test moratorium while discussions with the U.S. proceeded, while the U.S. had eased sanctions, though this step could be reversed. Whereas the U.S. hoped North Korea would work with it to reduce tensions on the peninsula, Washington had to be ready to pursue other options if the DPRK did not cooperate. The U.S. would also continue to carry out the Agreed Framework agreement at the same time as it sought verifiable assurances from North Korea that it was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

As all these processes unfolded, Pickering said that Washington would continue to consult with Beijing and appreciated China's efforts to "counsel Pyongyang to exercise restraint." Regarding next steps, Pickering told Yang that the Berlin talks between the U.S. and North Korea in September had laid the basis for a high-level DPRK visit to the U.S., a visit which the U.S. felt North Korea was taking very seriously. These bilateral developments in turn helped to improve the atmosphere for the Four Party Talks, which the U.S. hoped would resume by the end of the year. Pickering noted that a draft treaty tabled by China at the last round of talks would serve as a useful basis for future discussion, and expressed appreciation for the "depth and strength" of Beijing's participation in these talks.

Though marked by redactions, this cable still provides a useful window into how South Korean President Kim Dae Jung approached the historical North/South summit meeting to be held in June 2000. The cable reports on a briefing given by ROK national security advisor Hwang Won Tok to the U.S. charge. Hwang confirmed that the ROK Unification Ministry would contact North Korea through the communication link at Panmunjom on April 18 to propose the two sides hold their first round of summit preparatory talks on April 22. While President Kim saw the summit as "historic," he had limited goals for the meeting, which he had laid out in a public address the same day Hwang was briefing the U.S. embassy. The summit could serve as an important confidence-building step, but it was "not appropriate" to be "too greedy" and expect to solve all the long-lasting problems on the Korean peninsula in just one meeting. The U.S. embassy officer found most striking this effort to downplay expectations for the summit, as Hwang repeatedly made the point that Kim saw it as the first of a long series of high-level meetings through which his successors would achieve a gradual resolution of the long-standing tensions on the peninsula.

Instead, the hope was that the summit would create an opening for reconciliation, and possibly some initial positive steps in the areas of economic cooperation, family reunions, and intergovernmental dialogue between the two Koreas. South Korea's primary goal was to eliminate the "climate of fear that had permeated the peninsula for 50 years" by removing the mistrust and lack of confidence between the two sides. Key to this was creating a consistent, permanent government-to-government dialogue mechanism to build trust, based on the dialogue mechanisms foreseen by the 1992 Basic Accords between the two governments. South Korea felt that President Kim's March 9 Berlin declaration, which called for economic cooperation, peaceful co-existence, reuniting divided families and a permanent mechanism for North-South dialogue, along with the long-term consistency of his engagement policy had given Pyongyang the confidence to reach out to South Korea.

In the run-up to the summit, close coordination with the U.S, was a key priority, as were trilateral consultations including Japan possibly through the Trilateral Coordinating and Oversight Group (TCOG). The embassy officer seconded this, noting that since the start of the Perry process, U.S.-ROK consultation on DPRK policy was better than at any time in the past. On a related note, Kim's government had acted quickly to refute a South Korean news story suggesting that Seoul and Washington were at odds over preparations for the summit.

This cable, reporting on a meeting between U.S. ambassador Bosworth and ROK President Kim Dae Jung, again stresses the modest goals Kim held for the upcoming summit, and the need for continued close coordination between Seoul and Washington as preparations for the summit proceeded. (Parts of the discussion focused on bilateral U.S.-ROK issues related to the Status of Forces Agreement and the U.S push for economic reform in South Korea.) What is particularly interesting is the way in which Kim describes his idea of a possible future direction for North Korea and how engagement with Pyongyang could have a reinforcing effect. Kim felt that there was a synergy in the process over time, as the success of one country in engaging North Korea would contribute to the success of all others and facilitate the improvement of the regime's relations with other countries. Kim said South Korea's goal was to have North Korea become "another PRC or Vietnam," in terms of adopting free market principles and becoming more open to the outside world. While reunification was the long-term goal, the immediate goal for Kim was laying the basis for peaceful co-existence that could provide the foundation for pursuing the more distant objective.

This cable provides the U.S. embassy's read on public opinion leading up to the North-South summit and raises some interesting questions about the future course of U.S. relations with South Korea and its role in the region should the summit lead to an ongoing reduction of tensions on the peninsula. The Kim government had worked to counter "irrational exuberance" among the South Korean public about the possibility of any near-term "grand resolution" of Korean peninsula problems. Still, public expectations for the summit were likely higher than Kim's government would have preferred, possibly the result of the dramatic international "debut" Kim Jong Il had made during his meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing, during which the North Korean leader seemed confident of his ability to manage affairs of state, including the summit and Kim Dae Jung. While many, especially conservative, South Koreans continued to see Kim Jong Il as the "devil incarnate," the easy manner in which he engaged with Chinese leaders had persuaded many in the South that he was not, at least for the moment, "the dissipated, degenerate 'playboy madman' deliciously and maliciously painted for years" in South Korean media.

One result of this shift in public opinion was a sharp decline in South Koreans' perception of the DPRK threat, though there had been no major change in public views that U.S. forces in Korea played a critical role in preserving regional peace. The path of future North-South relations would also significantly influence the part the U.S. would play on the peninsula. There was no guarantee of success in the North-South dialogue, given the deep divisions between the two Koreas. A successful series of summits and ongoing inter-Korean dialogue, however, might fundamentally change the political and security environment on the peninsula, creating the best opportunity the U.S. had ever had to secure its vital security goals there. Success in the North-South dialogue could produce a "paradigm shift" in how the U.S., South Korea and Japan coordinated their North Korea policies, with South Korea assuming primary leadership of engagement with Pyongyang. Such outcomes, even on a modest scale, could accelerate and magnify other developments, including leading to an examination of the U.S. security role on the peninsula and in the region.

In this cable U.S. Ambassador Bosworth provides an overall favorable initial assessment of the summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, calling it a major success in establishing an "unprecedented" direct personal relationship between the two leaders, and in committing them to seek reconciliation between the two countries. Though the path to reconciliation would be long and difficult, and there would be points where progress stalled, further dramatic events and progress seemed likely in the coming months. Implementation of the agreements the two leaders made would be a key sign of how forthcoming Pyongyang planned to be. The first test would be the follow-on talks to translate these general agreements into practical steps. For Seoul, this would involve movement on reuniting divided families, where the DPRK had so far only agreed to limited meetings. For North Korea, one area of focus would be the pace of South Korea's economic assistance to the DPRK, which would be affected by North Korea's actions to reassure South Korean investors that their investments would not be confiscated and that profits could be expatriated to South Korea.

Bosworth felt that the personal triumphs enjoyed by both leaders would reinforce their personal inclination to pursue engagement and facilitate ensuring that lower-level officials from both governments approached their work in a "problem-solving mode." He characterized Kim Dae Jung's performance as "virtually flawless," mixing eloquent appeals to North Koreans while not conceding South Korean positions. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had been "liberated" from his image as a "recluse," as he jokingly remarked on camera. Bosworth agreed that the Korean leader's "relaxed, courteous, and humorous manner was in stark contrast" to the usual caricatures of him. The very favorable South Korean and world reaction to his participation in the summit would likely encourage him to pursue further such contact with Kim Dae Jung and other world leaders.

The South Korean public was similarly encouraged, "deeply moved" by the summit in Bosworth's words, and now felt they could harbor some hope for movement towards reconciliation and eventual reunification, though this was tempered by a realistic appreciation that the process would be a long one. Bosworth also drew attention to the agreement between the two leaders that there should be an "autonomous" resolution of peninsular issues, echoing language found in a July 4, 1972, declaration by Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung. The ambassador felt this language had a certain "resonance" with South Koreans, reflecting their natural desire to be the leading player in determining "Korea's destiny."

Finally, Bosworth noted that Kim Dae Jung had publicly and privately attributed the success of his engagement policy so far in large measure to U.S. support. The general South Korean perception was that the U.S. was cooperating closely and well with South Korea on North Korea, and it was essential that the U.S. position continue to be one of complete support, in public and in private, for the sake of the bilateral relationship and for the success of Kim Dae Jung's policy, which offered the best hope that the issues of priority concern to Washington would be successfully resolved. Useful actions to reassure South Koreans of this ongoing support included the planned announcement of steps to ease sanctions against North Korea and the provision of another 50,000 tons of food to the country. Still, the U.S. would need to take care to rebut South Korean press reports that the U.S. was envious or dissatisfied with Seoul's North Korea policies. This meant the U.S. would need to continue to stress in all its statements that it saw the two Koreas as the central players on the peninsula.

Continuing with the U.S. embassy's reports on the North-South summit, this redacted cable relays the very positive assessment of the meetings that the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Ambassador Bosworth. Vice Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon hailed the results, pointing to the joint summit declaration, agreed to after three hours of discussion, as an "excellent foundation" for future cooperation, and a reaffirmation at the highest levels of the principles of the 1991 North-South Basic Accord. This declaration, an unofficial translation of which is provided at the end of the cable, laid out both sides' intention to resolve the reunification issue between themselves, to see common ground on their reunification proposals, to resolve the separated families and long-term prisoner issues, to pursue cooperation in economic and other sectors, and to hold further high-level talks, including a future visit by Kim Jong Il to Seoul. Ban seemed to share the South Korean elation over Kim Jong Il's unexpectedly "charming and personable demeanor," but also said that they would not let "their hearts run away with their heads."

This cable, though also redacted, provides important aspects of a discussion Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her colleagues held in Seoul with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Joung Binn and other South Korean officials about the results of the June North/South summit and the current situation on the peninsula following the summit. Foreign Minister Lee told the Americans that his government felt the summit had produced some tangible results so far. Among these, North Korea had stopped broadcasting propaganda along the demilitarized zone and its media had stopped denouncing South Korea. Pyongyang had also taken steps to defuse recurring problems involving fishing in the Yellow Sea, an issue that had led to a naval engagement the previous summer. The DPRK had also taken a positive attitude on the matter of visits for divided families. Looking ahead, Seoul fully supported the idea of a meeting at the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum between Secretary Albright and North Korean foreign minister Paek Nam Soon.

Following a redacted account by the South Korean foreign minister on the June North-south Summit (but see above documents for details on this), Albright praised the South Korean leadership's "outstanding success" at the summit, calling it one of the "remarkable events of our era" and a "spectacular achievement" towards resolving the situation on the peninsula. Stating that Seoul's engagement with North Korea was fully in line with the goals that the Perry Process laid out for Washington's North Korea policy, Albright said it would be useful for the U.S. to receive more information on implementation and future progress in four key areas: economic cooperation and reuniting divided families; North Korean attitudes toward the U.S. and its security presence on the peninsula; South Korea's efforts to raise nuclear and missile issues with the DPRK; and why the U.S. was still targeted by North Korean propaganda, given it had stopped targeting South Korea.