The Discovery of South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Test Site, August 1977

A few months before the Kalahari incident, a New York Times article on a possible South African nuclear weapons program piqued official interest as to whether U.S. intelligence sources could corroborate it.[9] A report to Vice President Walter Mondale’s office by the State Department intelligence bureau confirmed the article’s reference to “weapons grade” fissile material. The report found that the unsafeguarded enrichment plant at Valandiba could produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel a weapon in a few years’ time. Moreover, according to a clandestine services report, the South Africans were conducting weapons-related “criticality” experiments in a facility adjacent to the enrichment plant. While allowing for the possibility that these developments amounted to “contingency planning,” the report found that due to a “siege mentality” the South African leadership “may be considering the development of nuclear weapons.” In fact, Pretoria was already on the road to a military nuclear explosives program.

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, Trip Files, box 3, President - Plains, 8/5-10/77 - TOPLAINS

The Soviets picked up the scent first. On 6 August 1977, the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., delivered an oral message from Brezhnev to Carter (with parallel messages to the British, French, and West Germans) that Pretoria was “completing work on the creation of a nuclear weapon” and preparing for “the first experimental nuclear test” in the Kalahari Desert. The South Africans had “built a testing area which is practically ready for the carrying out of such experiments underground,” according to the Soviet information. Brezhnev appealed for “energetic efforts toward the goals of preventing the emergence of new nuclear states and barring the proliferation of nuclear dangers.” As Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported in this memorandum on recent developments, the Soviets had just gone public with a TASS news service statement that South Africa was about to test the bomb. As Christopher reported, the U.S. had no evidence yet of a test site or that the South Africans had reached the point where a test was possible. He also mentioned the weapons-related “criticality” experiments (discussed in Document 1) and the potential for the Valindaba plant to produce enough HEU for a test.

Following up on the Soviet tip, on 10 August the Department sent a message to the U.S. Embassy in South Africa asking the Ambassador to notify South African Foreign Secretary Brand Fourie about U.S. concerns and to indicate that if there was any truth to the Soviet charge that the U.S. would see it as a “matter of the gravest concern.” The Foreign Ministry responded that South Africa’s nuclear program was for peaceful uses only. Nevertheless, by 12 August, U.S. intelligence had photographs of the Kalahari site. Thus, the Department informed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, then in London, that on the “basis of preliminary intelligence we have tentatively concluded that South Africa is probably preparing a nuclear test site in the desert and … that their nuclear weapons program may be somewhat further along than previously realized.” An “urgent” effort was underway to “update these assessments.”

The CIA excised the words “on the basis of preliminary intelligence” from the telegram recently released from the Smith records—a phrase that was declassified years ago when the National Archives published thousands of declassified telegrams from 1977 on its website. The CIA also excised from this and other telegrams the distribution category “Cherokee,” a designation applied to sensitive messages to and from the Secretary, ambassadors, and other top diplomats. Perhaps the CIA mistakenly believed that “Cherokee” is a reference to special intelligence. (The Cherokee control category began in the 1960s under Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was born in Cherokee County, Georgia.)

Seeing a risk that South Africa might test a weapon in the near future, believing that the Soviet Union and other states were “looking to us for early action,” and worried that the situation could become “uncontrollable” if other governments took action, Farley recommended that messages be sent to the South Africans, the Soviets and the French. Farley proposed a hardline approach to Pretoria.

The draft message to the Soviets was not attached to the file copy, but the message for the South Africans would notify Pretoria that a South African nuclear test “would have the most serious consequences for all aspects of our relations and would be considered ... as a serious threat to the peace.” For whatever reason, the rest of the telegram is excised in this release, but in the message that was sent a few days later, the U.S. asked South Africa “to prove, in a publicly persuasive way, that you are not developing the Kalahari facility as a nuclear test site, and that your pilot enrichment plant is not and will not be used to produce enriched uranium for any explosive purpose.”

Farley recommended a message to the French because both the U.S. and France were nuclear suppliers to South Africa, and both bore “an important measure of responsibility for nuclear developments in that country.” Unless the South Africans could convince the U.S. that there was no cause for concern, the U.S. would ask the South Africans for an on-site inspection. The U.S. would ask France, and possibly the IAEA or Canada, to join with it in the inspection request. If the French did not agree, the U.S. would make the request on its own. If the South Africans denied it, that “would offer the US no choice but to discontinue all nuclear cooperation with the SAG [South African Government] and to consider other appropriate measures.” If inspection proved that the site was for a nuclear weapons test, the U.S. would “insist that the SAG dismantle the facility; declare its intention never to test any nuclear device; place all nuclear facilities under immediate international safeguards, and initiate steps to ratify the NPT.”

Among other steps, the U.S. would convey its concerns to the Israelis and ask that it “take no action to associate themselves with the SAG on this matter.”

Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a draft of the telegram to the U.S. Embassy in South Africa to Vance in London. Believing that time was of the essence, the Department would instruct the Embassy to warn Foreign Minister Roelof Frederik “Pik” Botha in “unambiguous terms of the grave consequences of a nuclear test.” The U.S. should request that South Africa demonstrate that the Kalahari site was not for nuclear tests and that the enrichment plant was not designed to produce nuclear weapons fuel. As consultations with allies were expected, Christopher asked Vance for his comments and recommendations.

The telegram recommended by Farley went out the next day and was basically the same text that he had proposed to Warren Christopher. The CIA excised phrases from the first few lines, along with another several other words, but in a 2018 declassification the State Department released these words: “U.S. technical intelligence information confirms,” and “in the Kalahari desert.” [See Document 6B]. Curiously, the State Department excised several lines approved for release by the CIA in this version.

See description of Document 6A

In a report on recent developments, Vance reviewed Gerard C. Smith’s plans to meet with the French to brief them on U.S. plans to ask the South Africans for “assurances” on nuclear weapons and to encourage the French to make a “parallel approach” to Pretoria. U.S. Ambassador Bowdler would soon meet with South African Foreign Minister Botha to discuss the nuclear problem but also to make the point that a summit meeting with Prime Minister Vorster would depend on Pretoria’s “willingness” to be forthcoming on the nuclear and the Rhodesian problems. President Carter wrote “OK” next to the paragraph.

With this telegram, the State Department informed Ambassador Bowdler of the latest intelligence findings and included a demarche to the South African government. The diplomatic note informed Pretoria what Washington was learning, explained that a nuclear test would be a “serious threat to the peace,” and insisted that the South Africans demonstrate that the Kalahari site was not for nuclear testing and that the enrichment plant did not have a military purpose. The version published in the State Department’s Foreign Relations series has the first 11 lines excised from the telegram’s first paragraph; this recent release includes more text on the discovery of the Kalahari site and its likely purpose, but possibly withholds a reference to photographic intelligence.

After meeting with Jean-Marie Soutou, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, Gerard C. Smith sent an exclusive “Cherokee” message to Secretary of State Vance. Soutou had told Smith that the Foreign Ministry supported the idea of an “urgent approach,” as the U.S. had suggested, but that the idea a request for a “joint inspection” would require a decision by President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing. Soutou also recommended an approach to West Germany in light of the importance of its “supply” to the South African nuclear program. French assistance, by comparison, was “modest.” Soutou said his experts were doubtful that the South Africans intended to test; they believed that Pretoria wanted “the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons without the political cost of actually exploding a device.” Disagreeing, Smith said that U.S “intelligence sources thought the South Africans were likely to carry through their program.” They also discussed Soviet motives, the Berlin problem, and the Pakistani nuclear program.

A separate cable describes how Smith and presumably a CIA officer later showed President d’Estaing the “evidence on which American concern was based.” Consistent with his supportive approach on non-proliferation policy, d’Estaing agreed that a French demarche was appropriate, but wanted to think more about a request to inspect the nuclear site, concerned that it might serve as a precedent elsewhere (such as with Arab demands to inspect Israel’s nuclear facilities). Moreover, he wondered whether a demand for inspection would cause “feelings of violation of [South African] sovereignty.” The French soon made their demarche, leaving out the question of inspections. [See Document 10].[10]

As West Germany was an important nuclear supplier and also the recipient of Brezhnev’s message on South Africa, the State Department wanted Bonn in the loop, so it asked Ambassador Walter Stoessel to brief the West German Foreign Minister on the South African test site. Stoessel would inform the Germans that the Soviet allegations must be taken with “utmost seriousness” and that Washington is making an approach to the South African government to “forestall an actual test and to inhibit a … weapons program.” Worried that the Soviets might exploit nuclear supplier relationships with South Africa for propaganda purposes, Germany and other suppliers should disassociate themselves from any questionable nuclear activities. Moreover, the suppliers “have an important responsibility to do everything possible to avoid a nuclear explosive program in South Africa.”

While South Africa’s potential to produce HEU remained a mystery, concern about South Africa’s weapons potential put renewed focus on what could be learned about its known nuclear facilities. Oak Ridge’s study of the Safari “swimming pool” reactor found no evidence that it had been used to produce plutonium. Its potential to do so was “small”—less than one kilogram per year. “Assuming that the minimum quantity of plutonium required for one nuclear device is of the order of 10 kilograms, then ten to twenty years would be required to produce plutonium for one device in the Safari. Surely absurd.” As for the Safari fuel supply, which was highly enriched uranium, “we have no concern about the fuel inventory as a potential source of fissile uranium-235 for nuclear device fabrication.”

Soutou shared with U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman the text of the demarche to South Africa, which stated that France would “condemn” any steps to acquire a nuclear explosive capability and that it was “indispensable” that South Africa provide unambiguous “proof” that it is “does not seek to acquire the means to proceed with nuclear explosives.”

Discussing the West German relationship to South Africa, Soutou explained that he was “satisfied” that Bonn had made its position clear to Pretoria but said they “must recognize that German efforts, whether officially sanctioned or not, have been greatest in the sensitive area of South African activity,” including similarities between the German “Becker-Nozzle process and the one used in South Africa” and other apparent connections.[11] Thus, “every means must be taken to remind the Germans to exercise some care.” Soutou’s “own personal view [was] that the worst part of France's arrangement with Pakistan was the terrible precedent this sets for the Germans.”

Soutou observed that “some Frenchmen see the Germans as a non-nuclear power with a great capacity ... for nuclear research and development and that this country needs help and sympathetic guidance in developing its potential in a way which does not endanger non-proliferation objectives.” He was also “pleased to learn” that the British would also be making an approach, notwithstanding their “special problems” (their complex historical and commercial ties with South Africa); it was “important that they not appear less concerned than the rest of us.”

Meeting with Foreign Minister Botha, Ambassador Bowdler delivered the demarche on the nuclear program. Botha’s “initial reaction was one of outrage” over the “arrogance of the message.” Arguing that the U.S was trying to “strangle” South Africa, he asked why South Africa should sign the NPT and what evidence the U.S. had showing that Pretoria was on the “threshold of exploding a nuclear device.” A “calmer mood” followed, with Botha declaring that he knew nothing of the Kalahari site or nuclear test plans, again asking what evidence the U.S. had. Bowdler reported that what Botha authorized him to convey to the Department was a “denial that the SAG is preparing to explode a nuclear device.”

In response to the U.S. message, West German Secretary of State Günther van Well met several times with Ambassador Stoessel. In light of a Soviet inquiry about the TASS report, the West Germans had asked Pretoria about its nuclear plans, receiving the same answer given to the U.S.: that the plans were peaceful. In their earlier discussion, on 19 August, van Well said there was no German-South African nuclear cooperation, although South Africa had purchased uranium and a German company, STEAG, had been involved in talks about uranium enrichment before South Africa developed its own technology. Later, van Well discussed contacts with the British and the French and Bonn’s plans to send a demarche to Pretoria to express concerns about the Kalahari site, ask whether South Africa planned to carry out a nuclear test, “peaceful” or otherwise, and request that South Africa sign the NPT. Van Well asked Stoessel to keep him informed about South African reactions because, if Pretoria accepted the proposal for inspection, West Germany could “call off” its demarche—which it did (temporarily) when it learned of South Africa’s assurances a few days later.

Henry Richardson, who was in charge of African and UN affairs on the NSC staff, commented on the latest interactions with the South Africans. On 19 August, the State Department sent a telegram to the Embassy in Pretoria that included a letter from Vance to Botha detailing the location of the test site and requesting an inspection, which Ambassador Bowdler presented to Fourie. When Bowdler emphasized the “urgency” of a U.S. inspection of the Kalahari site, Fourie replied that, with the Prime Minister out of town, “he doubted whether a response would be forthcoming until early next week.” Believing that the South Africans were either “stonewalling” or “stringing us along,” Richardson proposed an “immediate stronger request” for acceptance of a U.S. inspection and emphasis on the “pressures on us to go public,” and that failure to respond could trigger a letter from President Carter to Vorster.

Concerned that pressing Vorster and Botha for an immediate inspection would lead to an “intransigent” position, the State Department took a less demanding approach. In a message overseen and co-written by veteran diplomat Philip Habib, the Department informed Bowdler that the U.S. would instead ask for “certain assurances”: that “South Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise”; that Kalahari is not a nuclear test site; and that “there will be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.”

That same day, Bowdler met with Brand Fourie and made a request for assurances. Fourie thought that would be possible, but first he had to check with higher-level officials. Concurrently, the State Department was preparing a statement for UN representative Andrew Young to deliver to the UN-sponsored World Conference for Action Against Apartheid meeting in Lagos, Nigeria. According to the draft statement, “South Africa now has a serious choice”: whether to defy the world community and “[refuse to] resolve questions abouts its peaceful nuclear intentions” or “to take the far more promising path” to provide the “urgent assurances we have requested” and to follow up with “prompt adherence to the nonproliferation treaty,” “rapid progress” in the negotiations over Namibia and Rhodesia, and an end to the system of apartheid. The statement includes no reference to intelligence findings but, with the Secretary’s approval, it could mention that national technical means indicate that “certain recent South African activities” in the Kalahari Desert “bear some of the earmarks of preparation for a nuclear explosive test.” Just after this statement was drafted, Bowdler telephoned to say that Fourie had made a “cryptic call ... to the effect there was no problem” with the “three requested affirmations.”

Prompted in part by Soviet concerns, the British told U.S. diplomats that they were working on a message to South Africa that would not refer to information about Kalahari provided by the United States. According to the Foreign Office, the “UK does not itself possess evidence.” The State Department instructed the Embassy to remind the British that they “have received the interpretation of raw data through normal intelligence interchange, which in our judgement constitutes evidence which the UK possesses.” The Department had no objection if the British message to South Africa mentioned “evidence supplied by the United States.”

The British gave the U.S. Embassy the text of their demarche to the South African government. The British would indicate awareness of Botha’s denial to Bowdler [See Document 9] without discussing the “details of the evidence” available to them. They should also state that if South Africa tested or produced a nuclear device it would be “disastrous” for the effort to bring peace to the region and that Pretoria should give “immediate and convincing” proof to dispel “widespread and genuine international anxiety” about its nuclear plans. The British also urged South Africa to “accede to the NPT.”

Bowdler reported that Fourie had told him that Prime Minister Vorster and Foreign Minister Botha were willing to go public with the assurances on nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives but did not want to publicize the assurance that Kalahari was not a nuclear test site. The South African public would view public references to the site as “concrete evidence of USG spying on South Africa and open up a “hornets’ nest.” Bowdler asked whether the Soviets had made any reference to the Kalahari site.

After the Department reported that it had identified no references to the Kalahari site in the U.S. press, Bowdler notified Washington of a TASS statement that the White House was closely following information on “preparations for a SA nuclear test in Kalahari.” In light of that, Bowdler thought it worthwhile to bring this to Fourie’s attention and to ask that the “embargo” on the assurance about no nuclear testing at the site be lifted.

According to Andrew Young and Richard Moose, U.S. delegates to the Lagos conference on South Africa, to avoid risk to the U.S. position in South Africa and the Middle East it was essential to receive “prompt affirmation from Pretoria on the three points put to them ... plus SAG adherence to the NPT.” Nevertheless, the U.S. needed to be “careful about appearing to accept South Africa’s word on these points or give the impression that such assurances are sufficient.” Thus, it was “necessary to demonstrate an active determination to deter further nuclear weapons development in South Africa.” That could not be done “absent insistence upon an inspection of the presumptive test site.”

The British reported on the delivery of their demarche to Fourie, who told Ambassador David Aubrey Scott that the reports were “false” and that the Kalahari site “had nothing to do with nuclear testing.” The British also relayed Prime Minister James Callaghan’s response to Brezhnev’s 8 August message, which paralleled Brezhnev’s message to President Carter. Callaghan agreed with Brezhnev on the “grave implications” of South African nuclear activities and informed him that he had instructed the British ambassador to inform Pretoria of the “grave view” that London would take if a nuclear device was tested or produced.

The U.S. also put Japan, a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in the loop on the South African issue. The Department provided the Embassy with background on the issue, including the Soviet demarche, U.S. consultations with allies, U.S. efforts to raise the nuclear issue with South Africa on an urgent basis, and the assurances made by Pretoria. With the Lagos conference beginning on 22 August, the Department hoped that Pretoria would make public its assurances because failure to do so “will greatly intensify pressures for anti-South African actions and measures of most extreme sort.” That would limit the U.S. ability “to forestall or moderate expected demands for international action.” The State Department provided talking points to present to the Japanese reviewing developments since the Soviet demarche. The talking points concluded with these general themes: As part of its efforts to consult with close allies, the U.S. believed it “necessary to establish and maintain close contact with major allies and potential nuclear suppliers as joint efforts on this serious matter go forward.” The U.S. wanted the Government of Japan to be “aware of this issue and our perceptions of it.”

The version released at the National Archives included CIA-mandated excisions, including a “Cherokee” reference and the first page of the message. A previous release of the same message by the State Department [See Document 24B, below] included the first page of the message but excised passages that the CIA released in full.

See description of Document 24A

On 18 August, intelligence community representatives signed off on an assessment of the South African nuclear program that was summarized in this memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter. According to the assessment, the South African government “plans to proceed through the various stages of a nuclear weapons program including the eventual testing of a weapon.” Yet, there was no pressure in South Africa “to rush to test a weapon in the immediate future.” In any event, the government was unlikely to terminate the program and “no foreseeable credible threat from the west … would be sufficient to deter [them] from carrying out a test once they had made up their mind to do so.” Shaping the general conclusions were “uncertainties regarding the state of South Africa’s test readiness and the availability of South-African processed material for a test.”

On 22 August, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher presented Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin with an “oral message” on the South African assurances. As the U.S. had not received Pretoria’s clearance on the Kalahari test site pledge, Dobrynin received only the two assurances on nuclear explosives and explosive testing. Dobrynin commented that they were “a first step in the right direction.”

In a meeting with Ambassador Hartman, Soutou reviewed the South African response to the French demarche: the South African nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only, but the government wanted to know how it could “assure the world” that it was not developing nuclear explosives. The South Africans never made a “flat statement,” as they had to the U.S., that they were not creating a “test facility” for nuclear explosives. Soutou acknowledged that Foreign Minister Guiringuad had “slipped and appeared to confirm that France had been told that South Africa was proceeding with preparations for a nuclear test” for peaceful purposes but said that it was “not at all an accurate statement of what the South Africans said.”

After Fourie discussed possible reasons for Guiringaud’s slip-up, he told Bowdler that, now that the Kalahari site was “out in the open, he assumed we would want to make use of all three assurances.” The U.S. Ambassador agreed. Fourie further said that Prime Minister Vorster would refer to the assurances in a public speech and further state that the South African government would like to discuss the NPT with the U.S., the U.K., and France.

The State Department revised a U.S. statement on the South African nuclear issue that was to be made at the Lagos conference in light of President Carter’s press conference comments on 23 August 1977 where he cited the three South African assurances and further stated that “we appreciate this commitment from South Africa” and “will ... continue to monitor the situation there very closely.” The U.S. will “renew [its] effort” to place South African nuclear facilities under international safeguards and inspection and to “encourage them” to sign the NPT.[12] The statement to the Lagos conference expressed concern about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and the grave concern with which the U.S. would view the “introduction of nuclear explosive into the already tense situation in Southern Africa.”

Gerard Smith wrote on the margins of this telegram that the new statement “reflects in part [unspecified] objections we raised to previous version.”

State Department officials prepared a memorandum on South African nuclear issues for Deputy Secretary Christopher to send to President Carter. Whether Carter received it in this form, or at all, is not known. The report discussed the state of play concerning Pretoria’s assurances, the possibility that the U.S. could be charged with “complicity” by privately accepting the assurances, the Kalahari site’s negative implications for non-proliferation, and what needed to be done to “make our progress to date more effective and credible.” The latter would include “early NPT ratification,” “dismantlement (or international inspection) of the Kalahari site,” and “rapid imposition of safeguards” on the enrichment plant at Valandiba. The Department was developing “detailed diplomatic options” for working with allies and approaching the South African government.

The Department provided the embassies in Bonn, London, and Paris with talking points on the state of play with South Africa, including the recent assurances. Written before the South Africans had agreed to make public their assurance on the Kalahari test site, the Department was trying to determine whether information on the site existed in the public record. “Encouraged by the generally forthcoming attitude evinced by South African statements,” the Department declared that it would “pursue these issues urgently and vigorously” with Pretoria. The U.S. intended to “remain in close touch with our major allies and key nuclear suppliers” in dealing with the South African nuclear problem. For the Embassy’s background, the Department acknowledged “that we are concerned [that the assurances] will never defuse explosive nature of issue in Lagos context nor forestall African demands.” Moreover, “first very difficult step is to satisfy ourselves that South Africans are not proceeding and will not proceed” in developing nuclear weapons and to satisfy African opinion of the same.

The U.S. suggested that the Bonn embassy make the point that no “one nation can carry the ball alone on this issue, [and we] hope therefore that FRG demarche will go forward.” The sequence of events is not entirely clear, but in the following week, Bonn sent demarches to Pretoria while it sought more information on the U.S. reading of the Kalahari test site and the photographs that had been shared with the French.

In a report on current developments for President Carter, Brzezinski summarized what was probably a report by the State Department intelligence bureau (INR) on the “future South African nuclear program.” The analysts believed that the purpose of the Kalahari site was for testing nuclear explosives but allowed for the possibility that the South Africans had not yet “developed a testable device.” INR believed that international pressure would not induce Pretoria to abandon a weapons option. Moreover, the South Africans “fully intend to test as soon as they are ready” but would not go ahead without a “better sense of how strongly the U.S. and its allies feel about the matter.” In any event, the South Africans could secretly stockpile “existing or future devices” which would make it “difficult for South Africa’s friends—or enemies—to be certain whether or not South Africa is a nuclear power.” That estimate was quite accurate.

The day after Prime Minister Vorster’s speech denying plans to test a bomb[13]. the NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC) reviewed the nuclear issue to determine what steps needed to be taken “to defuse the situation and address our vital nonproliferation and African concerns.” A record of that meeting is not yet available, but influencing it were “doubts” about South African assurances. In light of the PRC discussion, State Department bureaus developed a “general plan of action” centering on two steps. One was immediate action demonstrating an “explicit South African intent to adhere to the NPT” through a “formal statement” to do so supported by “evidence that the SAG was indeed moving as rapidly as legal and constitutional constraints permitted.” Second, “[as] immediate interim measure, pending NPT adherence and implementation of comprehensive safeguards pursuant to the NPT, South Africa should unilaterally submit the Valindaba pilot enrichment plan to IAEA safeguards.” The U.S. should emphasize that “a firm and public commitment to NPT adherence” without an agreement to “permit immediate inspections” would be “insufficient for further U.S. nuclear cooperation” or for resolving “the international credibility problem regarding South Africa’s nuclear intentions.”

The U.S. had held up supplies of HEU for South Africa’s Safari reactor, but Washington could examine its position if the SAG insisted on the shipment of HEU “as a quid pro quo for SAG commitments to NPT adherence and immediate inspection.” The U.S. should seek French support for its tactics by asking them to indicate to the South African government “the difficulty of fulfilling the contract for [fuel] supply of the Koeburg reactors ... if South Africa fails to accept and implement all elements of [the U.S.] package.”

The White House approved the gist of the State Department action plan by endorsing a demarche to the South African government on “immediate commitment to the NPT” along with an “immediate interim measure”: the application of IAEA safeguards to the Valindaba enrichment plant. If those conditions were met, the U.S. would approve the French export of low-enriched uranium to supply the Koeberg reactors, but there would be no approval of HEU shipments without solid evidence of South African cooperation. A handwritten comment by Gerard Smith aide Robert Kelley indicated that, during the PRC meeting on 25 August, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Joseph Nye proposed that the U.S. “insist on dismantlement” of the Kalahari site. Brzezinski rejected that, however, as “too much to ask.” Instead, the U.S. would continue to monitor the test site.