In Memoriam: Yuri Fedorovich Orlov, 1924-2020

This resolution of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Court reverses the ruling of the Moscow City Court and the subsequent ruling on appeal of its own Collegium on criminal cases of May and July 1978, which convicted Yuri Orlov under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and sentenced him to 7 years of labor camps followed by 5 years of exile. The document goes through the incriminating evidence cited in the original Court decisions and finds that Orlov's actions do not constitute a crime under Article 70 because there was no criminal intent on his part to "undermine or weaken the Soviet state."

In 1956, Yuri Orlov is a junior scientist at a very prestigious lab in Moscow-the future Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics of the Academy of Sciences. A genuine believer in democratic socialism, he takes the results of the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) to heart and welcomes Nikita Khrushchev's speech denouncing Joseph Stalin's cult of personality and political repressions. He thinks that there should be wide discussion of the speech. Along with several other researchers, he challenges Party members to reflect on Stalinism and the way Soviet society reacted to it. Orlov's presentation at the meeting is stunningly direct and fearless. He condemns the Stalin period as "a shameful page in the history or our country" and questions the democratic nature of the Soviet regime. Here a rising nuclear scientist comes out as a human right activist at heart. This statement would soon cost him his Moscow career.

The head of the Political Department of the lab immediately grasps the importance and sensitivity of what happened at the Party meeting and sends a report all the way to the Central Committee of the CPSU. He summarizes statements by several outspoken Communists who shared Orlov's views and calls Orlov the main instigator, the "leader of the choir." In the report, Shmelev presents himself as the voice of reason at the Party meeting trying to rein in Orlov and his supporters. Shmelev suggests that the perpetrators be punished by expulsion from the Party and from the lab, and proposes to disband the primary Party organization and conduct educational ideological work among the scientists. The report provides a marvelous vignette of the life of a Moscow Party organization in the early post-Stalin years, where mass fear still reigned and destalinization efforts were only superficial.

This draft resolution condemns the statements by Orlov and his supporters at the Party meeting and suggests strong measures to punish the perpetrators. The significance of this draft is that it was prepared at a very high level-among the authors are the Ekaterina Furtseva, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Bureau, the first woman member of the Politburo and future Minister of Culture of the Soviet Union; Mikhail Suslov, full member of Politburo in charge of ideology; and Dmitry Shepilov, member of the Presidium and future Foreign Minister. The draft outlines punitive measures against Orlov and his supporters and organizational measures against the Party group of the lab. The authors also suggest that the author of the report published above-Shmelev, the head of the political department of Orlov's lab-be fired for failing his responsibilities. His diligence in writing the report did not help him, nor did contributing to this draft resolution.

The importance of the incident at the Heat Engineering Lab is underscored once again by the fact that a resolution was passed by the highest ruling party body, the CC CPSU Presidium, condemning the "outbursts" and ordering the expulsion of Orlov, Avalov, Nesterov and Schedrin from the Party and from the lab. The resolution approved the draft and measures to disband and re-subordinate the primary Party cell to root out the emerging dissent. The resolution actually reaffirms the correctness of the general Party line and the impermissibility of deviations from it, which shows the limits of Khrushchev's destalinization.

Yuri Andropov gives the Politburo an alarming report on dissent in the USSR in connection with criticisms of Soviet human rights abuses by the French and Italian Communist parties. The main thrust of Andropov' report is how to keep the internal opposition in check in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki agreement and the following increase of international pressure on the USSR. He gives the number of political prisoners as 860; the number of people who received "prophylactic treatment" in 1971-74 as 63,108; and states that there are many more "hostile elements" in the country, and that "these people number in the hundreds of thousands." Andropov concludes that the authorities will have to continue to persecute and jail dissidents notwithstanding the foreign attention. This document sets the stage and provides a good preview of what would happen after the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) was founded in May 1976.

The KGB informs the Politburo about the activities of the MHG for the first time six months after its founding. The report gives a brief history of the human rights movement in the USSR as seen from the KGB. Andropov names each founding member of the group and charges it with efforts to place in doubt Soviet sincerity in implementing the Helsinki Accords. The document also alleges MHG efforts to receive official recognition from the United States and reports on its connections with the American embassy.

This notice, one of a series by the MHG publicizing official Soviet misconduct, testifies to the increasing harassment of members of the group by the KGB. This time it is the son of co-founding member Malva Landa who has been warned that he might lose his job. The document is signed by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Orlov and other leading MHG members.

After the two informational reports above, the KGB started to get serious about terminating the activities of the MHG. This report charges that the group is capable of inflicting serious damage to Soviet interests, that in recent months group members have stepped up their subversive activities, especially through the dissemination of samizdat documents (and particularly the MHG reports), undermining Soviet claims to be implementing the Helsinki Final Act. The Procuracy would later develop criminal charges to put an end to these activities.

Following the recommendations of the KGB report above, and another report submitted by Andropov on January 20, the CC CPSU Secretariat decides to "intercept and curtail the activities" of Orlov, Ginzburg, Rudenko and Ventslov of the MHG, and the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki groups. All four would be arrested soon after the resolution.

In this memo for the President, Secretary Vance reveals the increasing problems Soviet Jews are facing when attempting to emigrate. There have been increased difficulties in receiving invitations to immigrate from abroad through the Soviet mail and no prominent Jewish emigration cases have been resolved in the past month. Additionally, one disturbing development is the showing of an "anti-Zionist" movie on Soviet national television and the appearance of several articles in the national press that discourage potential emigrants from applying to emigrate.

After Orlov and Alexander Ginzburg are arrested and Lyudmila Alexeyeva goes into exile, and anticipating the visit of Secretary of State Vance to Moscow in March, the Politburo discusses a rebuff to the Carter administration on human rights issues. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is instructed to meet with Vance and inform him of Soviet "bewilderment" regarding Carter administration attempts to raise the issue of Ginzburg's arrest. Dobrynin should explain to administration officials that human rights is not an issue of inter-state relations but an internal matter in which the United States should not interfere.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell advises President Carter that he should reach out to the Soviets informally, either in a phone call with Dobrynin or through National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, prior to his upcoming meeting with Vladimir Bukovsky in order to prevent a public reaction on their part and forcing the President into a position of having to avoid the appearance of backing down. The President must convey to the Soviets that it is necessary for him to build domestic political support for arms control and détente more generally. Additionally, Powell argues, the American people will not "support a policy that abandons our position in support of basic human rights." The Soviets, he says, "are sophisticated enough to understand that the domestic political flexibility we need to make progress in other areas is enhanced by your position on human rights."

This cable details the actions taken by the U.S. government in order to fight for human rights in the Soviet Union. They consist of a balanced implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, discussion at the Belgrade CSCE Review Meeting of human rights violations by the Soviets, the dispatch of diplomatic observers to the trials of activists, U.S. assistance to private groups promoting human rights in the USSR, support for the right of emigration, and efforts to secure the release and emigration of imprisoned activists.

In this memo, Vance states the flow of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union has remained constant, despite the fact the Soviets have stepped up their harassment of Jewish activists. Recently, prominent Soviet Jews have had their apartments searched, been called in for questioning by the KGB, and been named in the press as being "anti-Soviet." At the same time, several Jewish "refuseniks" have been allowed to emigrate. The Soviets have employed this mix of tactics in order to allow Jews to continue to emigrate so that they will not be called out for cutting off emigration opportunities, while still ensuring that emigration is risky and discouraged.

This report to their boss by the staff of the Global Issues directorate of the National Security Council on their daily activities includes a remarkable initial paragraph describing internal U.S. government discussions of the Moscow Helsinki Group (called here "the Orlov Committee"). Staffer Jessica Tuchman says a State Department-hosted group of experts agree that "the hidden bombshell in the whole human rights debate with the USSR" is the fact that the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union all see human rights activism as just the "first step" to autonomy-thus the real threat to the Soviet government.

This memorandum discusses a letter from Congressman Lester Wolff that condemns the Soviets for the arrest of Anatoly Shcharansky and the persecution of Orlov, and urges the White House to push for closer monitoring of government compliance with the provisions of Helsinki. The memo warns that taking too harsh a stance against the Soviets at this point could create complications.

This document traces the Soviet government's response to dissident activity especially in light of their agreement to the human rights provisions outlined in Basket III of the Helsinki accords. The authors note that the Soviet Union signed the accords assuming it would not result in an increase in internal opposition, but that instead the Basket III provisions have provided a rallying point for dissent. The analysis also suggests that internal protests sparked by food shortages and the open criticism of the Eurocommunists, including the French and Spanish Communist parties, are further causes of the current Soviet crackdown on internal opposition. The document mentions political unrest in Eastern Europe as well as the new human rights campaign by the United States government-which has prompted dissidents to make their appeals directly to the U.S.-as reasons for Soviet anxiety. Next, it outlines the Soviet government's much harsher measures against dissidents in the wake of the Helsinki accords. These include the arrests of members of the Helsinki Watch Group, the cutting off of access to the West, and accusations of espionage leveled at dissidents. Further, it concludes that the Soviet government's increased anxiety over dissent is the result of a variety of factors, including the approach of the Belgrade conference and their general fears of increased Western contact leading to popular discontent and a variety of alleged social vices.

In this meeting, Vance's chief Soviet affairs adviser Marshal Shulman opens by exploring the dichotomy in Soviet actions. On the one hand, SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations are going well and the Soviet attitude is positive, and it is clear that they want an agreement. However at the same time, the Soviet Union is guilty of many individual cases of regressive and repressive behavior, including the cases of Orlov, Shcharansky, and Ginzburg. The tone of U.S.-Soviet relations, he notes, may be affected by these circumstances. However, for the most part, current negotiations are moving forward reasonably well.

This memorandum contains a list of facts about the Shcharansky trial and the imprisonment of Edward Kuznetsov, communicated to Arthur Goldberg (U.S. Ambassador to the Belgrade Conference on Human Rights) from White House staffer Joyce Starr's meetings with Avital Shcharansky and Sylva Zalmanson, Kuznetsov's wife. Starr writes that despite the claims of the Moscow court, Shcharansky's mother has not been allowed to see him, and that she has been told by the court and by the KGB that it is a closed trial and that she will not have permission to see him until after the sentencing. She continues, writing that the Moscow court has refused to show the decree that extended Shcharansky's trial for six months and that the Soviets are acting in conflict with their own laws on criminal procedure. According to Soviet law, Shcharansky ought to be consulted regarding the selection of a lawyer, but instead his mother has been given this task. Starr adds that over 100 people have been questioned about the Shcharansky case, including a prisoner blackmailed to testify against him. Finally, Starr notes that the only lawyer in the Soviet Union who agreed to take the case was subsequently exiled. She adds a note on Kuznetsov, who was force-fed as a result of his hunger strike, indicating that his relatives' requests to see him have been repeatedly denied.

In the "Human Rights Review for May 5-11, 1978," the Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center states that Orlov may go on trial within a week and will most likely be charged with the same general offense as Ginzburg. Both dissidents were arrested in February of the previous year, but few details into the investigation of Orlov have been publicly released.

This public statement from the State Department's noon press briefing, sent by cable to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Consulate in Leningrad, uses the strongest language to date on the Orlov case, no doubt informed by Alexeyeva and other Orlov colleagues in exile. Here, the U.S. "strongly deplores" Orlov's conviction and calls it a "gross distortion of internationally accepted standards," since the activities for which he is being punished are simply the monitoring of Soviet performance under the Helsinki Final Act.

The National Foreign Assessment Center states that Orlov was convicted on May 18 for engaging in "anti-Soviet activity." The court has passed down the maximum sentence of seven years in a Soviet labor camp, plus five years of internal exile. "His conviction was to be expected, but the proceedings were a travesty," the report notes, "as access to the courtroom was limited and Orlov was not allowed to call defense witnesses and was continually interrupted by the presiding judge. The prosecution claimed that Orlov disseminated fabricated and slanderous information about the Soviet Union to foreign sources, but made no mention of his leadership of the 'Helsinki Group'."

The National Foreign Assessment Center reports that, while international attention is focused on the trials of Orlov and Georgian dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Soviet Union is taking other anti-dissident steps as well. For example, the leader of the psychiatric abuse monitoring committee, Aleksandr Podrabinek, was arrested, supposedly for failing to report a crime against the state. Additionally, Jewish "refusenik" Iosif Begun was arrested for illegally residing in Moscow, and one of the leaders of the dissident workers' "free trade union," Paplavskiy, was tried and sentenced to one year in a labor camp for vagrancy. Finally, several dissidents protesting outside the Orlov trial were detained for questioning. The Party organ Pravda has printed articles that suggest Orlov and Shcharanskiy both were working for U.S. intelligence services.

The "Background Memorandum" reports that the investigation period of the Shcharansky case is over, but charges still have not been made public. Soviet "evidence" of his illegal activities include his connections to physician Sanya Lipavskiy and Los Angeles Times correspondent Robert Toth and other alleged acts against Soviet interests. The "Statement by Department Spokesman" expresses great concern for Shcharansky, given how long he has been held without trial and that he was denied legal counsel. This raises doubts in the minds of State Department officials about the fairness of Shcharansky's trial and the protection of his human rights. The U.S. will stand up to protect his rights, the document notes, especially after Soviet press accusations of engaging in espionage on behalf of the United States.

In this edition of "Human Rights Review," the National Foreign Assessment Center states that Soviet authorities are maintaining pressure on dissidents in the wake of the Orlov and Gamsakhurdia trials. Orlov's wife has not been allowed to see him and, the daughters of imprisoned Ukrainian Baptist leader Georgiy Vins have been refused permission to immigrate to Canada. Many Jewish refuseniks and other dissidents have carried out acts of individual protest, including hanging protest banners from apartments and even threatening public self-immolation.

In "Human Rights Policy and Coordination," Starr critiques the U.S. for failing to consolidate control and coordination of its human rights policy within the White House. She proposes that the solution to this problem is to have a high visibility person in the White House assume responsibility. In "CSCE: Failure of U.S. Diplomacy," Starr states that the U.S. embassies in Eastern Europe have failed to convey CSCE priorities, including human rights, to their host governments. Even though both the U.S. and Soviet governments have signed onto the Helsinki Protocol, the U.S. has not given specific explanations of precise expectations to the Soviet Union. She urges that this be done immediately. Finally, in "Ambassador Arthur Goldberg," Starr conveys that the Ambassador has accepted the President's request for him to serve as a member of the World Court.

The National Foreign Assessment Center states that in Poland, the dissident Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (RUCH) is adopting a more combative stance. Recently-elected members to Opinia, RUCH's publication, have stated that they would favor taking more aggressive actions, but no specific steps have been indicated. For the past two years, the dissidents have won concessions from the regime, but a more aggressive approach by them may lead to the regime taking stronger countermeasures as well. Additionally, the recent sentencing of Orlov has led to protests from much of the European scientific community. These Soviet human rights violations may jeopardize future European-Soviet scientific exchanges, but they also further increase the sensitivity of European scientists to the plight of their Soviet counterparts.

In a July 8, 1978, statement on the Shcharansky and Ginzberg cases, Secretary Vance condemns the trials for their lack of justice and due process. He says that to petition and criticize one's own government is a fundamental human right as acknowledged by international law and the Soviet government itself. Vance says he will continue to negotiate a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union because it is vital for world peace, but notes that he has requested several other members of the U.S. government to cancel trips to the Soviet Union in light of these trials. Vance concludes that this struggle to win basic human freedoms will be a long-term one for the administration.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reports to the Politburo on his talks in Washington and informs the Soviet leadership about Reagan's decision to accept Mikhail Gorbachev's invitation to meet in Reykjavik on the condition that American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, accused of spying against Moscow, is released, and some "positive action" is taken on the U.S. list of 25 leading Soviet dissidents, including Orlov. Gorbachev accepts the conditions and sets forth his main ideas for the summit. It is decided that Orlov will be released within a month to make the Reykjavik summit possible and that other dissidents will be released later. Daniloff will be exchanged for Soviet spy Gennadi Zakharov. This shows that Orlov was released in direct connection with the Reykjavik summit, not as part of the exchange for Daniloff, as reported at the time.