Prime minister Putin meets with President Clinton, Auckland, New Zealand, September 12, 1999.
Highest-level memcons and cables document Putin’s rise to power
Clinton Library declassifications plus Archive lawsuit open verbatim Clinton-Putin and Clinton-Yeltsin conversations
U.S. emphasis on importance of transfer of power by ballot box gives way to merely endorsing peaceful transition as Yeltsin resigns and anoints Putin in 1999
Washington, D.C., November 2, 2020 – Declassified highest-level transcripts and diplomatic cables provide new granular detail on the rise to power of Russian President Vladimir Putin 20 years ago, much of it in his own words (as captured by American notetakers) and those of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, according to the documentary publication today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
The documents demonstrate how American rhetoric about the importance of elections as the essential means for transfer of power gradually subsided during the fall of 1999 into a least-worst-case acceptance of Yeltsin’s unconventional maneuvers for continuity that anointed Putin as his successor and protector.
The documents include Russian President Yeltsin’s telephone explanation to U.S. president Bill Clinton in September 1999 (see Document 1) about the unexpected pick of the previously obscure Putin as prime minister and potential successor, “a solid man who is kept well abreast of various subjects under his purview” such as the intelligence services and the Kremlin security council.
Yeltsin had fired four prime ministers in the previous 17 months, a process he described in his memoirs as “Prime Ministerial Poker,” so the test for Putin after his August 1999 selection was whether he would catch on with the public enough to defend Yeltsin from his critics in the parliamentary elections in December 1999, and then ascend to the presidency, presumably through the presidential elections scheduled for July 2000.[1]
Instead, Putin became acting president when Yeltsin resigned unexpectedly on New Year’s Eve 1999. The documents published today include the transcripts of Clinton’s call to Yeltsin that evening, and to the new president Putin the next morning. Yeltsin explains to Clinton in their phone call (see Document 8) “now I’ve given him [Putin] three months, three months according to the constitution, to work as [acting] president, and people will get used to him for these three months. I am sure that he will be elected….”
By resigning, Yeltsin had effectively short-circuited the presidential elections scheduled for July 2000 because the constitution required elections within 90 days if there was an acting president, who now enjoyed the advantages of incumbency.[2]
Declassified State Department cables obtained through a National Security Archive lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act help explain how Yeltsin could be so sure of Putin’s future electoral success. U.S. ambassador to Moscow James Collins reported back (see Document 4) that Yeltsin’s confidant (and future son-in-law), Valentin Yumashev, had bragged about the administration’s personnel across the country working for the Putin-supported “Unity” bloc during the December parliamentary elections: “Furthermore [emergencies minister Sergei] Shoigou can use his staff located in every region to assist his bloc’s electoral efforts – of course, in full compliance with Russian law, Yumashev quickly added.”
Most important was Putin’s growing popularity as the result of his tough reaction in September 1999 to the Chechen invasion of Dagestan and the terrorist apartment bombings in Moscow. President Clinton remarked at his second meeting with Prime Minister Putin (at Oslo in November, see Document 5) that the Russian military crackdown on Chechnya was “playing well for you at home, but not internationally” because of the losses of civilian lives. According to Matthew Evangelista, “Putin’s personal approval rating soared, from 35 percent when Yeltsin appointed him in August to 65 percent in October, as he escalated the war.”[3]
Putin’s deployment of his Chechnya-related popularity, together with his announced increases in pensions made possible by higher oil prices, combined to undercut the presumed frontrunners in the Duma elections on December 19.[4] Foreign observers had assumed that former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, a nationalist Yeltsin critic and veteran Soviet-era diplomat, would be the leading candidate in the presidential elections scheduled for July 2000; but Yeltsin aides like Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told their American partners (see Document 3) Primakov did not have much of a political future.
Ultimately, the anti-Yeltsin coalition amassed by Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov drew only 12 per cent of the vote for parliament in December, while the “Unity” coalition endorsed by Putin and organized by Shoigu won twice as much. Through cooperation with the Communists (still the largest single party), Putin was even able to achieve a working majority in the Duma, which Yeltsin never had. This electoral success likely provided the final incentive for Yeltsin to decide on his New Year’s Eve resignation.[5]
In Clinton’s first face-to-face with Prime Minister Putin (see Document 2), during the September Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in New Zealand, the American leader does not foresee the Yeltsin resignation gambit, and instead emphasizes the ballot box and elections as the key: “These elections and how they’re conducted are extremely important. I’ve told Boris this. He’s the first elected leader of Russia, but also will be the first leader to peacefully transfer power through an election. That’s a great thing. It’s a great thing for a country. You’ve never done it before. I know it won’t be the easiest thing. But it’s extremely important.”
Clinton at Auckland gives Putin a lecture on elections and gets a lesson in return. Clinton tells him, “One thing that you have going for you is that you can try to show that there is no credible alternative to the path that you’re on. If the opposition doesn’t have a credible set of proposals, that will help you.” Putin demurs: “Unfortunately, that’s not the case. Russia does not have an established political system. People don’t read programs. They look at the faces of the leaders, regardless of what party they belong to, regardless of whether they have a program or not.”
In Clinton’s last presidential meeting with Yeltsin, however, (see Document 6) the American’s emphasis on elections is practically absent. The White House memcon of the Istanbul session from November 19, 1999 shows Yeltsin veering wildly from bluster (“just give Europe to Russia”) to embrace (“I’ve not yet ceased to believe in you”) and ends with Clinton asking, “Who will win the election?” Yeltsin responds, “Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin.” Clinton does not reiterate the importance of elections.
The State Department’s summary of the conversation, in stark contrast (see Document 7), claims that Clinton raised the issue of elections as “key to Russia's transformation” and got a commitment from Yeltsin for the scheduled presidential elections. No such language is in the memcon.
By the time Putin becomes acting president, Clinton’s emphasis on elections subsides into more general appreciation of a peaceful transition. In Clinton’s congratulatory phone call to Putin on the latter’s first day as acting president (see Document 9), the American leader simply remarks that Yeltsin’s resignation and Putin’s response “are very encouraging for the future of Russian democracy.” And when Putin wins the March 2000 presidential elections in the first round, without a runoff, Clinton’s phone call of congratulations (see Document 10) calls the moment “a really historic milestone for Russia.”
It is worth noting that memcons and telcons like these may not exist for more recent head-of-state conversations. President Trump reportedly did not allow the creation of memcons for at least five of his conversations with Putin between 2017 and 2020.[6] The National Security Archive, together with the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, is currently in federal court seeking to enforce the records laws against the White House and the State Department on this issue.
Document 01
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Yeltsin initiates this phone call to Clinton to review the key issues of U.S.-Russian relations and to tell the U.S. president his reasons for the August selection of former FSB chief Vladimir Putin as new prime minister and his likely successor. Clinton was about to meet Putin for the first time at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Auckland, New Zealand. The Russian president complains that U.S.-Russian relations suffer from the electoral campaigns underway in both the United States and Russia. He asks his counterpart to try to protect the relationship from electoral pressures: "I believe it is our task, yours and mine, to try our best to protect and limit interference in our relationship from attempts to play out political domestic cards and intrigues."
Yeltsin informs the U.S. president that he "took a lot of time to think who might be the next Russian president in the year 2000." After much searching, Yeltsin tells Clinton, "I came across him, that is, Putin, and I explored his bio, his interests, his acquaintances, and so on and so forth." Yeltsin came to the conclusion that Putin was "highly qualified." The Russian president makes it very clear to his counterpart that "[Putin] will be supported as a candidate in the year 2000. We are working on it accordingly." Clinton replies that he is looking forward to the meeting in Auckland and that "we will stay in very close touch" with Putin.
Document 02
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
At the beginning of this bilateral meeting during the annual APEC summit, both leaders reference the Clinton-Yeltsin telephone conversation four days ago as preparation for this discussion. Putin goes over all the issues mentioned in the Clinton-Yeltsin conversation and shows his grasp of detail and understanding of the main issues in U.S.-Russian relations. The Russian prime minister even mentions Clinton's work as a college student with U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright as likely the source of his "very open-minded and constructive attitude" towards Russia. Putin also reminds Clinton that they have already met face-to-face in St. Petersburg when Putin worked for the liberal Mayor Anatoly Sobchak.
An important part of the conversation deals with the upcoming Russian elections. Clinton emphasizes the importance of elections and the peaceful transfer of power from Yeltsin to his elected successor-for the first time in Russian history. Putin asks Clinton not to pay attention to what some politicians, even Yeltsin himself, might say about the United States during the electoral campaign. The Russian prime minister assures the U.S. president: "leaving aside any statements that have concerned you, please bear in mind that we have certain plans and are acting according to them." He notes the personalistic nature of the Russian elections: "Russia does not have an established political system. People don't read programs. They look at the faces of the leaders, regardless of what party they belong to, regardless of whether they have a program or not."
Document 03
U.S. Department of State. National Security Archive FOIA F-2017-13804
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the U.N. General Assembly session in New York, where they discuss the situation in the North Caucasus, the Russian economy, and the upcoming Russian elections. Ivanov believes the December parliamentary elections will produce "a more moderate, weaker Duma," and that the presidential elections in 2000 will feature two main candidates-Evgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin. Ivanov throws his full support behind Putin, saying that his former boss, Primakov, "has no answers to Russia's structural problems," and calls him "a man of the past." Putin, in contrast, is an "effective administrator," exactly the kind of person Russia needs now-to do practical work rather than implement new "revolutionary changes." Putin, in Ivanov's view, "will be able to count on the support of youth and of 'reformers.'" The Russian foreign minister notes that Putin is "getting more immersed in arms control" and needs to be in contact with more senior Americans.
Document 04
U.S. Department of State. National Security Archive FOIA F-2017-13804
Ambassador James Collins informs Washington about his lunch with the former head of presidential administration and current member of Yeltsin's inner circle, Valentin Yumashev. The upcoming Russian elections and rumors of Yeltsin's resignation are at the center of the conversation. Yumashev dismisses the rumors and says that "Yeltsin himself set great store by the need to effect peaceful hand-over to his successor through the ballot box." Yumashev does not even try to hide the fact that in his mind the outcome is predetermined: both elections will take place as scheduled because "any early elections would make it more difficult for Putin to achieve the presidency as he needed time to garner popularity and develop [a] track record." Yeltsin's future son-in-law clearly counts on the U.S. ambassador understanding. Collins notes that "Yumashev was very, very high on Putin." In his view, Putin is an effective administrator who will pursue a "stable economic policy," and enjoy support from business and the young generation of reformers. Collins advises Yumashev that the Russian presidential administration should be more transparent on Yeltsin's views and priorities in order to "help stamp down on rumor mongering that is becoming more and more the source of reporting by Western missions."
Document 05
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Putin and Clinton meet during the Middle East Peace Summit in Oslo while Russia is waging a cruel war in Chechnya. This time the U.S. president pushes his Russian counterpart hard on the war and urges that he find a political solution and prevent further losses of civilians. Putin agrees with the need for negotiations but presents his strategy as counterterrorism: "Our strategy has three parts. Knock out the terrorists, create viable local governments and hold elections." Clinton shows his understanding of how Chechnya contributes to Putin's electoral prospects and gives wise political advice: "This conflict may be playing well for you at home, but not internationally. Criticism keeps mounting. In my experience, politics and reality eventually become aligned, and you need to keep this in mind." Clinton also presses Putin to finalize negotiations with Moldova and Georgia on Russian troop withdrawal so that the United States and Russia can sign the modified CFE treaty at the OSCE Istanbul summit later in the month. Putin explains his problems with troop withdrawals by saying, "Georgia exists on paper as a unified state. In the north you have Abkhazia, in the south, Adjaria - neither of them listens to Shevardnadze."
Putin gives the U.S. president a letter from Yeltsin warning of "extremely dangerous" consequences if the United States withdraws from the ABM treaty. Just like Ronald Reagan in 1985, Clinton offers to share the ABM technology with the Russians: "If this technology becomes available, I don't want to keep it just for the United States; I will make it available to our friends and partners." Just like Gorbachev, the Russian counterparts cannot quite trust the offer. At the end of the conversation, Putin thanks Clinton for his advice on Chechnya, saying, "[y]ou have raised our consciousness," but adds his own advice: "Listen to what the CIA tells you, not what the bandits say."
Document 06
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
This amazing conversation is the last meeting Clinton has with Yeltsin as president of Russia. It was not clear up to the last moment whether, because of his health, Yeltsin was going to make it to the summit of OSCE in Istanbul, to sign the adapted Conventional Forces Treaty. In this memcon, Yeltsin is emotional and expansive, even somewhat unstable, taking turns blasting Clinton for his "support" for Chechen terrorist organizations and praising him as a friend and a partner. He tells Clinton to "just give Europe to Russia," because Russia is in Europe and the United States is not. The Russian president says, "You can take all the other states and provide security to them. I will take Europe and provide them security." He brags about his successes in routing terrorists in Dagestan and speaks the tough language that later comes to be associated with Putin, such as his intention to "put the bandits in the electric chair." Yeltsin is confused by what exactly he has signed and sent to Duma, but he promises to end the conflict in Chechnya and to sign the CFE treaty.
On the most important issue of the time-the upcoming election, the exchange is brief, and Yeltsin is very clear. At the very end of the conversation, Clinton asks, "Who will win the election?" The Russian president responds, "Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin. He's a democrat, and he knows the West." He praises Putin as tough and having "an internal ramrod." Yeltsin adds, "I will do everything possible for him to win - legally, of course. And he will win." The only reaction from the U.S. president is "He's very smart." The cover memo on this document, classified Secret, recommends "[t]hat the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record but not distributed."
Document 07
U.S. Department of State. National Security Archive FOIA F-2017- 11834
This cable, intended to brief the North Atlantic Council on the meetings between Clinton and Yeltsin and between Albright and Ivanov on November 19, summarizes the content of the presidents' conversation on Chechnya, arms control, and the Russian upcoming elections. Regarding elections, the cable says the following: "President Clinton talked about the importance of a smooth democratic succession from one leader to another. He noted that elections are key to Russia's transformation, and reiterated the expectation that they will be held on schedule. Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to that schedule, and described the political process underway." The actual text of the memcon differs quite drastically from this summary.
Document 08
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
President Clinton calls his Russian counterpart and long-time partner late in the evening of New Year's Eve, when it is already morning in Moscow. Just hours before, on the last day of 1999, Yeltsin resigned his post handing power to Putin as acting president. The conversation is very brief, but warm and emotional. Clinton congratulates Yeltsin on a "courageous decision" to resign, adding pointedly that the U.S. "will work with Putin and the Russian people as they make their choice for the next democratically elected president." Yeltsin indicates that "this was not an easy decision for me" but that he had wanted to "support Putin 100 percent and now I've given him three months" for people to "get used to him" - in other words, the advantage of incumbency. Yeltsin emphasizes that "Putin is a strong person and he will be able to cope with the task he has." Clinton clearly wants to comfort Yeltsin, saying, "I believe that historians will say you were the father of Russian democracy." Yeltsin thanks Clinton warmly and nostalgically, "embrac[ing]" his great American friend "from the bottom of my heart."
Document 09
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
On the morning of January 1, Clinton makes his first phone call to Putin as acting president of Russia and Yeltsin's designated successor. Clinton says Yeltsin's resignation speech and Putin's response the day before "are very encouraging for the future of Russian democracy." The conversation is cordial and hopeful on both sides. Clinton reaffirms the U.S.-Russian partnership but also mentions "some differences in our relationship," and concerns about Chechnya and the Caucasus. Putin speaks about the electoral campaign and says that the next Russian president will be "a progressive person," being more modest than Yeltsin in predicting the outcome. He thanks the American president for his past support for Russian reform and expresses his hope that "on the core themes, we always will be together," notwithstanding the disagreements mentioned by Clinton.
Document 10
William J. Clinton Presidential Library
Clinton phones Putin the day after the Russian election to congratulate him on his victory, which he calls "a really historic milestone for Russia." Clinton calls his Russian counterpart by his first name, Vladimir, for the first time and expresses his interest in building their relationship. Putin is extremely grateful for this phone call and for Clinton's public statement about the election, saying, now "it is clear to the whole world that I am a person you can work with." Clinton immediately outlines three areas where he wants to work with Putin: Russian economic reform, Chechnya, Iran and arms control. Putin expresses his eagerness to cooperate on every issue mentioned by his counterpart. He even tells Clinton that he has appointed a representative to deal with human rights in Chechnya and would welcome the Council of Europe and the OSCE to work in the region - something that Yeltsin did not agree to in his conversations with Clinton. Putin also promises to intensify negotiations with the Duma on START II ratification and continue the Ivanov-Berger channel on Iran and ABM issues. In this conversation, Putin sounds just like the partner the United States wanted to continue Yeltsin's foreign policy and domestic reform. In that case, then, how the transition was manipulated becomes less important for the Americans.
[1] See the discussion of Yeltsin’s thinking about Putin’s selection, and the “poker” reference, in Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 430-435. For more background on Putin’s rise, see David Hoffman, “Putin’s Career Rooted in Russia’s KGB,” Washington Post, January 30, 2000, p. A1
[2] See Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 371, describing Yeltsin’s resignation speech: “While not actually admitting that he was stacking the deck in Putin’s favor, Yeltsin explained why he was doing so.”
[3] See the detailed discussion in Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 74-85. (Approval numbers are on page 78).
[4] See Timothy Colton, Yeltsin: A Life, pp. 434-435.
[5] See discussion in Roy Medvedev, Post-Soviet Russia: A Journey Through the Yeltsin Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, translated and edited by George Shriver), pp. 354-357. Medvedev says the electoral picture changed in the fall of 1999 because of “Putin’s decisive, even ruthless, prosecution of the Chechnya war.” Medvedev remarks that by providing a pardon and immunity from prosecution for Yeltsin, Putin served in effect as Gerald Ford to Yeltsin’s Nixon. (p. 350)
[6] See Peter Baker, “Trump and Putin Have Met Five Times. What Was Said Is a Mystery,” The New York Times, January 15, 2019.