Putin’s First Election, March 2000

This cable from Ambassador James Collins analyzes the state of the presidential campaign in Russia two weeks before the election on March 26. The cable describes the campaign as being on “cruise control” and “somnolent,” but not without intrigue. Most expect Putin’s victory and that he will reach the 50% turnout necessary to avoid a runoff election. One of the interesting dynamics is the position of the regional governors, who are trying to figure out “what a Putin victory would mean for them.” Most of the governors want to ally themselves with a strong central power and be rewarded for delivering the vote for Putin under the pressure from the Kremlin.

According to the cable, Putin has high support in all demographics despite his choice not to participate in debates or advertising. He feels that they are “not necessary,” especially since he is constantly traveling around Russia as acting president, getting media coverage at every stop. The only uncertain factors that remain are undecided voters and the “against all” option that allowed voters to refrain from voting for any of the presidential candidates on the ballot. (This option no longer exists in Russia today.)

Ambassador Collins ends his comment by quoting a redacted source’s perceptive comparison between the 1996 and 2000 elections: “in the 1996 elections people came to the polls to vote against something—either Yeltsin or the communists. In 2000 people are going to vote for” a candidate.

The cable summarizes the results of a March 10 luncheon discussion hosted by U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) John Ordway about the presidential campaign in Russia. Leading Russian pollsters had been invited to share their perceptions on Putin’s popularity and their prognosis for the election. Although the specific names of the pollsters are redacted on privacy grounds, the consensus is that Putin owes his popularity to an energetic, strong image that put him in stark contrast to Yeltsin. A subsection of the cable is titled, “Q - Why Putin? A – Chechnya.” Putin’s tough response to terrorist attacks in Dagestan and apartment bombings in Moscow, and his harsh handling of the war in Chechnya, won overwhelming approval from the Russian public.

One participant noted that for five weeks after Putin was appointed Prime Minister last August, his approval rating was only 2 percent. The Dagestan incursion and the apartment bombings gave Putin the opportunity to show leadership and demonstrate his toughness and competence to the Russian public. The cable notes that although “voters have no specific hopes for a Putin administration,” they appreciate his vitality and energy, “unlike Yeltsin, who was considered to be ill and weak during much of his second term.” More than anything, voters believe that Putin offers stability and a future with an engaged leader “who wants to make Russia strong again.”

This cable, classified and likely authored by minister-councilor George Krol, frames the 2000 Russian presidential election as a referendum on Vladimir Putin. Putin’s victory is expected by both his supporters and his detractors. The cable describes Putin’s main opponents as “potentially low voter turnout and a potentially high ‘against all’ vote,” rather than any of the other presidential candidates. The Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov is expected to be the runner-up, but most believe he will not have as strong of a showing as he did in the 1996 election, when he won 40% against the incumbent Boris Yeltsin.

A key development in the campaign was the March 13 decision to endorse Putin by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and his party “Otechestvo,” which had been leading rivals to Putin’s “Unity” bloc during the December Duma elections. On March 14, the same decision was made by the SPS (Union of Right Forces) after a bitter debate that split Russian liberals and ultimately undermined them as a Russian political force. Leading liberal Grigory Yavlinsky of the Yabloko party remained on the presidential ballot (he would ultimately win less than 6%), but other liberals such as Boris Nemtsov actually campaigned for Putin.

The cable reports that Putin’s campaign, as such, had not been covered extensively in the media because his travel and activities as acting president were already being covered. The notable exception was a Segodnya article published on March 4 that alleged Putin’s campaign had issued press releases prior to the permitted start of campaigns. Segodnya was owned by one of Putin’s chief detractors, the oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky, and the Putin campaign responded to the article by threatening an “asymmetric” response. Gusinsky would become the first media tycoon to have his empire crushed by the state in the summer of 2000 and was later incarcerated and then exiled.

This prescient cable outlines Putin’s “extremely ambitious” economic agenda based on the statements he made in various media and public appearances during the 2000 presidential campaign. While obviously appealing to different groups of potential voters, the campaign promises still offer an interesting retrospective of what Putin’s presidency promised versus what has actually happened to the Russian economy. In 2000, Putin wanted Russia to be seen as a stable place for foreign investors, while also increasing the economic self-reliance of the country. In meetings with investors and businessmen, Putin “has repeatedly stressed liberal economic themes,” promised to relax the tax burden and bureaucratic limits on small business, and generally presented himself as a committed reformer who intends to continue the economic program and the legal reforms started under Yeltsin.

But Putin’s economic pledges mix both liberal and statist ideas, presenting him “as all things to all people” and on all issues. Poverty and crime were major concerns of the population, and Putin promised to address them by raising pensions and combating crime and corruption. He did not promise as much as Zyuganov (to raise pensions 100% or more) and the percentages he proposed seemed more realistic (12% and then 20%). Putin also promised to be independent of the Russian oligarchs, who were seen as running the country under the late Yeltsin and his “family.” The cable notes that Putin defined oligarchs as “those who seek to mesh the state and capital” and, in an interview with Radio Mayak, he said they would “no longer exist as a class.”

This cable, misdated as 270356Z Mar 00, was actually written on March 24, two days before the Russian election. Putin is still expected to win the election on the first round, but the battle for second place is in full swing. The Communist Party’s Zyuganov has a strong voting block that poses a challenge for the liberal Yavlinsky to overcome, despite the concerted effort of his supporters, who are “working frantically” to get him into the second place. Although the cable notes a recent surge in Yavlinsky’s numbers, it also notes deep divisions among Russian liberals after the Union of Right Forces (SPS) endorsed Putin. An embassy source is quoted as saying that SPS leader “[Irina] Khakamada and the others retreated because they want to protect their job prospects in an eventual Putin administration.”

Amazingly, some polls still show that Putin might have a problem achieving the 50% of the vote that he needed to avoid a runoff. According to U.S. Embassy experts, “turnout could be key to whether Putin will be forced into a second round.” As a sign of concern about a possible second round, “Putin has started to say publicly that the cost of conducting the second round would be enough to pay all the pensioners in Moscow.” The Embassy also notes some supposed Putin missteps in the campaign, like “playing up to the voter who appreciates a strong military image” and neglecting to foster support from liberals.

This is the seventh of the Embassy’s “situation report” (Sitrep) cables from election day as the votes as the preliminary results are coming in; the first Sitrep was sent to Washington at 1 p.m. Moscow time. As of 3:00 a.m. Moscow time on March 27 (still March 26 in Washington), Putin’s victory is clear. The Sitrep reports that Putin reached the necessary 50% needed to avoid a runoff election at around 1:45 a.m. The electoral commission tallies at 2:00 a.m. showed Putin with 50.01% of the vote. Embassy officials think it is possible that that percentage could change slightly as votes continue to be tallied, but report that a runoff election seems unlikely. Zyuganov’s better-than-expected performance seems to indicate that he will remain the Communist Party (KPRF) leader for the foreseeable future. Yavlinsky’s showing was not as strong as expected even though the Embassy was aware of the deep splits among Russian liberals. Rather than passing Zyuganov for second place, by the end of the day, he is way down with 5.58% of the vote counted. The regional governor Tuleyev performed stronger than expected, and the nationalist Zhirinovsky performed as many expected he would, that is, poorly.

Russia’s presidential election has been judged to be free and fair by American and international observers, according to this summary cable. The Embassy reports that more than two thirds of Russian voters participated in the election. The cable calls the result “the first ever democratic transfer of power in this country.” That determination is doubtful, however, especially given the fact that Putin did not represent a different party; power was transferred “by hand” directly from Yeltsin and not in a democratic fashion, allowing Putin to use the resources of the presidential administration to win the election. Though some irregularities, such as unequal access to the media for candidates, are noted in the cable, the election was judged to be “consistent with Russia’s election law and with international standards and democratic principles.” The Embassy believes that the noted irregularities did not affect the outcome of the election.

The cable reports that Communist candidate Zyuganov, who came in second to Putin, made many claims both before and after the election about ballot stuffing and other violations, but that he did not file any formal complaints. The cable also notes that KPRF observers were often not present or left early from polling stations on the day of the election, leading Embassy officials to suggest that Zyuganov made these claims because he stood to gain politically, not because he genuinely thought the fairness of the election was in question.

For their part, the U.S. Embassy had dispatched nearly 70 observers to 19 districts of the Russian Federation, who concluded that this election had fewer irregularities than the December 1999 Duma election. However, Embassy officials point out that “the rule of law” infrastructure was still “weak and open to abuse.” They especially note the state control over televised media in Russia, adding that, although their effort to observe the election was substantial, there were likely errors and violations that they had not seen. The Embassy observers expect that complaints will surface but not change the end result of the election.

This compilation of Embassy officials’ observations and anecdotes from election day in Russia describes an older voting population and a general expectation among the voters that Putin would win. More than 60 embassy officers were sent out all across Russia with the aim of not just observing the election on March 26, but also “to take the pulse” of Russian political life leading up to the election. Despite the feeling that Putin’s win was inevitable, the voter turnout for the 2000 election was high, with some regions seeing over 60% of registered voters participate in the election. Voters felt confident that Putin would be more of the same, and stability was an appealing promise for Russians in 2000.

In Novosibirsk, a major academic center, the Embassy observers report that turnout reached 65% and that Yavlinsky received almost 8% of the vote. Still, the voters were content that there would be no second round, and “seemed to have low expectations of the new president.” In Irkutsk, turnout was also high, despite reported lack of interest (Embassy officers received more questions about the U.S. elections), and election day was orderly, with observers present at all voting sites.

In Khabarovsk Krai in the far east, Embassy officials met with the local government, representatives of the political parties, and OSCE election observers prior to the election. The meeting was tense, with members of various parties accusing Putin’s party of election law violations. The OSCE observers present dismissed these claims, saying they were no different than common minor infractions that occur in other countries. Members of the local government, including the head of the krai Duma, told the observers that they had made efforts to distance themselves from all parties to avoid violations. Observers also believed vote tampering in Khabarovsk was unlikely because Putin had barely won the 50% he needed there. All in all, the level of engagement and active interest of local politicians was impressive. Embassy officials also reported chauvinistic attitudes regarding the nearby Chinese.

Krasnoyarsk Krai’s election day did not go as smoothly as it did in other Russian regions. The Oktyabrskiy district had a blackout for thirty minutes and family voting was very common throughout the krai. Governor Alexander Lebed who had run against and then endorsed Yeltsin in 1996 was still seen as a promising politician. According to the Embassy reports, the KPRF did well in Krasnoyarsk mainly due to economic and social conditions, and notably well with the krai’s youth, likely because of the challenging job market at that time. There were also concerns for pensioners in Norilsk who were struggling. Representatives who spoke with Embassy officials shared their high expectations of Putin and “did not think that [he] would back away from the basic norms of democracy.”

The second report from Embassy observers about their various election day experiences, as compiled by Ordway, focuses on Central Russia. Though no violations major enough to call the election into question were reported, small irregularities were noted such as family voting and restricted access to media, especially the lack of access for candidates to television commercials.

In Samara, governor Titov did worse than expected and did not pose a serious challenge to Putin. The main complaint was about access to the national media. In Tyumen, Embassy officers saw many young people who were members of electoral commissions. Communication between the U.S. representatives and local officials was positive and collegial. In Kazan, the presidential election was combined with elections to the local Duma, which elicited higher interest among the voters. Local liberals surprisingly supported Putin in hope that, once elected, he could rein in the authoritarian president of Tatarstan, Shamiev, who himself had endorsed Putin.

In Nizhny Novgorod, Embassy officers noted that Putin’s campaign was run by veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars. The Communist candidate, Zyuganov, had preceded the Embassy officers by visiting Nizhny on March 22 to speak at a large rally at the Krasnaya Sorma military factory. No major violations were reported except for widespread family voting. The cable mentions an incident where the observer saw, during a home voting visit, that “a husband berated his wife demanding she vote for a particular candidate. She responded by shouting, cursing and hitting him, but voted for the candidate he indicated.” In Moscow oblast and in the city, Embassy officers observed people voting in the open, marking “Putin” or “against all,” a man filling the ballot for a drunken friend, and KPRF observers asking the Americans if they could observe a U.S. election.

One year into Putin’s tenure, this fascinating cable details the feelings of the Russian public about their new President, expressed both through opinion polls and anecdotes. According to the Embassy, “Putin remains king of his country’s public opinion charts.” No matter who does the polling, his ratings “would make any head of state proud.” One journalist captures the general mood and atmosphere with the phrase, “People are saying that everything is bad, but Putin is perfect.” Russians give Putin positive ratings on both job and personal approval, 71.8% and 72.2%, respectively. The high personal trust rating is especially noteworthy in light of the way that Boris Yeltsin’s ratings bottomed out in the late 1990s at the same time as he appointed Putin as prime minister, then acting president. As a cautionary note, the cable does assess that Putin’s high approval ratings are tied to rising oil prices and might fall if oil prices fall. (Unpredicted by the cable’s authors, and driven largely by growing Chinese demand, the price of oil went from around $30 USD per barrel in 2000 to over $100 in 2008. So Putin’s ratings stayed high, as did his capacity to improve the living standards of Russians.)

The Embassy reports to Washington that Russians’ love of Putin is at least partially explained by the field of weak contenders, making Putin being a “colossus in a land of midgets,” but the cable notes that the phenomenon is real, not a fluke. His popularity is “based largely on his rapport with average Russians.” Putin is seen by “simple people” living outside of major urban centers as being “just like us,” as more relatable than other politicians. His lowest support is among elites and tends to be “weakest in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major Russian urban centers,” but Putin’s camp seems largely uninterested in the approval of those groups.

Putin’s moves since the March 2000 election against the oligarchs Gusinsky and Berezovsky (which brought essentially all leading mass media under Kremlin control) are quite popular among Russians, even among the intelligentsia. Putin’s promises of political and economic stability are more alluring than any other campaign promises could have been following the difficult times many Russians experienced during the 1990s. Russians were ready for “a break after 15 years of turmoil under Gorbachev and Yeltsin.”

The cable does question how enduring Putin’s popularity is and whether tough structural economic reforms will undermine this popularity. The other important question the cable raises is “what place political freedom and economic reform have in this picture” of stability and economic security so desired by the electorate. With hindsight, political freedom and economic reform provided diminishing returns for Putin’s regime, to the point that, in 2024, they have largely vanished, repressed by the state.