Date

Dec 22, 1975

Description

During a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence William Colby on Soviet forces, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, JCS Chairman George Brown, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (in his first incarnation in that role), and their colleagues discussed the possibility and problems of launch-on-warning (see pages 8-9). Looking at a worst-case scenario--a Soviet ICBM attack on U.S. Minuteman silos--Kissinger argued that it would be highly difficult for Soviet leaders to accomplish such an attack. Not only could the United States respond by launching SLBMs and bombers, it could also launch ICBMs on warning with the Minuteman force alone producing 80 million Soviet casualties. When ACDA Director Fred Ikle mentioned the dangers of a launch-on-warning posture--"accident prone" and "dangerous"-Kissinger suggested that it was already an available option by noting that command-and-control arrangements could be fixed to ensure that missiles were never launched without "presidential authority." Ikle remained a critic of launch-on-warning.[24]

Kissinger and top Pentagon officials were more interested in preserving the ambiguity of the U.S. posture so that the Soviets could not know with any certainty whether the United States had a "launch on warning policy." To complicate Soviet planning, US policymakers wanted to keep Moscow guessing. Further, as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft suggested, it was "not to our disadvantage if we appear irrational to the Soviets in this regard." The implication was that U.S. ambiguity or even irrationality could encourage Soviet diplomatic caution.[25]

Source

Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Council Meetings Files, Box 2 1975-12-22; also published in DNSA, Nuclear History II, 1969-1976.

Document published in following posting(s):

The “Launch on Warning” Nuclear Strategy and Its Insider Critics

Jun 11, 2019

Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, "SALT (and Angola)", 22 December 1975, Top Secret, excised copy, published in edited form, without the launch on warning discussion, in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIII SALT 1972-1980