5 55p NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 3476K -- WASHINGTON D C 20506 WTIVE XGDS MINUTES NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING DATE Monday December 22 1975 TIME 9 30 to 11 30 a m PLACE Cabinet Room The White House SUBJECT SALT and Angola Principals The President 735 Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 353% Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S Brown Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr Fred Ikle Egg Director of Central Intelligence William Colby Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft in 1 a 0 Other Attendees White House Mr Richard Cheney Assistant to the President -- Mr William G Hyland Deputy Assistant to the 'President for National Security Affairs State Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt Defense Deputy Secretary William Clements ICIA Mr Carl Duckett NSC Staff Colonel Richard T Boverie -- President Ford Before we get into the basic part of the meeting I want to take a minute to talk about Angola The vote in the Senate on Angola was to say the least mildly deplorable I cannot believe it represents a good policy for the U S and it is not fundamentally the way the American people think I made a short but tough statement on television and I reiterated my position in an informal press conference Saturday I find this the right thing for the U S to do We should spend every dime legally affix XGDS B 3 Wish Former-s tress-inst 35 Classified by Brent Scowc roft 50- 12953 93441395 NSC Lotte 31104 959 u brary Gerald R Ford swim - Secretary Kissinger Who-- is their top Pentagon'official Laughter President Ford a to have a- position for Henry to take to Moscow in'January The I Secretary Kissinger Bill Colby do you have a briefing for us Dire ctOr Colby WRSECMW runs 2 that we decided upon We should Spend every nickel and do everything we can Hopefully -- and Secretary Kissinger recommended this option -- it will lead to some kind of negotiated settlement If we become chicken because of the Senate vote prospects will be bad Every department should spend all it can legally -- do all we can in that area - Director 00153 i I Secretary Kissinger If we keep going and Soviets do not think there is anterminal date on our efforts and we threaten them with the loss of detente we can have an effect Director Colby There has been some fluttering among the Soviets Theyhave some trouble in their Foreign Ministry La ught r President Ford _Let s exploit this Let s e plore the issues -- We want Verification Pane-l paper-gives _ us some alternatives to look at Yes II wi__11 start Note The charts used in the briefing are attached at Tab A As you know Mr President the Intelligence VHCOmmunity has recently completed a new estimate on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-19805 I would like tonernphasize some of the key conclusions of that estimate -- particularly as they relate to a prOSpective SALT TWO agreement - XGDS x - n2 2 9 4 mm 19R swam I mbu m - Aunts 3 a First of all I would remind you that the Estimate concluded that in regard to strategic offensive forces the Soviets are continuing their broad program of major improvements -- The trends are about as we had forecast in last year's Estimate but the diversity of the ballistic missile submarine program and the potential hard-target capabilities of the new Soviet ICBM systems are somewhat greater than we anticipated This chart shows our projections of the combined size of Soviet ICBM SLBM and heavy bomber forces in 1980 and 1985 under different assumptions It compares our Best Estimate'of total delivery vehicles and missile launchers under the Vladivostok limits with alternative forces the Soviets might build in the absence of such limits The chart illustrates some potential benefits to the U S of the ceilings agreed at Vladivostok a a small reduction in Soviet forces to get down to the 2 4 00 ceiling limitation of the Sbviet buildup in both total vehicles and launchers which would likely occur without SALT TWO Glarald Ford Library a Secretary Kissinger You show a substantial reduction in MIRVs -- 400 MIRV vehicles which is about 2 000- 3 000 fewer warheads Director Colby The'Soviet forces projected on this chart do not include the Backfire bomber -- which we believe could be used for strategic attack on the United States -- As this map shows if staged rom Arctic bases the BaCkfire -- with one aerial refueling -- could reach part of the continental United States on a two-way mission -- Were the Backfire to fly on to Cuba it could reach all of the United States without staging or refueling fit it rth SE 1 - XGDS - AlGerald R Ford Library friars a i i itting i 433 iL-s l as in za i a a M- a l ' ia'ii f'ir 4 Despite these capabilities however we believe it is likely that Backfires will be used for missions in Europe and Asia and for naval missions over the open seas With the exception of BIA the Army and the Air Force we think it is correspondingly unlikely that Backfires will be specifically assigned to intercontinental missions - Secretary Ki851nger to General Brown u-uw-v-ral Brown PIESide t Ford GeneralBrown Dire ctor Colby GeneralBrOWn but not now - - - Secretag KiSSinger I I'll-o o c-J-c-cod'o'-uoo'u'cocc I I I Mr DuckettGeneral BrdWIlbirector Colby This board shows our best estMate of Back re production and deployment It assnmes that the soviets continue to produce Backfire at a single facility with somewhat increased production rates Orr-this assumption we wouldexpect seine 450 to be in operational service by 1985 total production of some 550 aircraft President Ford What is I -- - XGDS $5 was 33 913 33 -- 5 Director Colby Long range air force their SAC President Ford What is Director Colby Soviet naval aviation Secretary Kissinger All peripheral missions are conducted by the LRA This is not like SAC Maybe the LRA has no strategic mission Director Colby Basically they use their missiles for the strategic mission General Brown No one makes the case that their aircraft are assigned missions against the U S They are designed and intended for peripheral attack The only question is their range they have the capability to attack the U S Director Colby I found it interesting to learn that our B-SZs are planned for one-way missions 1- Q Mr Duckett The Badger is the largest weapon program ever undertaken by the Soviets It is part of the LRA in President Ford What is its range is - it - Mr Duckett It has a 1500 nm radius It is for use against Eur0pe and China Director Colby cruise missiles vvere also excluded from the force projections I just shovved There is no firm evidence that the Soviets are developing long range strategic cruise missiles They have the design and development experience to do so hoWever and could begin by modifying present air and sea-launched cruise missile systems to give them longer ranges and increased accuracy Such modifications could be ready for deployment a year or two after ight testing began -- By about 1980 the Soviets could have a new generation of large long-range cruise missiles based on current technology Small highly accurate strategic cuirse missiles for either air or sea launching would require technology that we do not believe the Soviets could attain until the 19805about five years ahead of the Soviets in cruise missiles -- l' u 3 - XGDS Mrs 3 33 7 Want wine'er - AUJJS 6 Secretary Clements I think we are more like 8 - 10 years ahead General Brown Right We have had the Hound Dog in the inventory a long time Director Colby These next boards reproduced from the Estimate illustrate that Soviet offensive strategic capabilities will grow significantly between now and 1985 The first chart shows that Soviet offensive forces will exceed those programmed by the U S in numbers of missile RVs The second chart indicates considerable gain relative to U S forces even when our bombers are added-to the equation though the U S remains ahead in all but the most extreme alternative SALT TWO limits will not prevent these trends In our best SALT-limited estimate for example we expect Soviet missile RVs to exceed those of the U S by the early 19805 You will note however that on both figures our SALT-limited estimates are considerably below the more extreme Soviet growth that would be possible if there were no SALT TWO There is also the question of the effectiveness of'the Soviet strategic forces against hardened targets in the U S Soviet progress in this area will depend on the quality of their missiles and will be largely independent of SALT TWO a raid Library - -- The figure on the left of this chart shows our estimate of the number of S silos that would survive hypothetical attacks by the various alternative Soviet ICBM forces we have projected Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force developments over the next ten years even under SALT TWO limitations is that Soviet ICBM forces will probably pose a major threat to U S Minuteman silos in the early 19805 as suming that the Soviets can perfect techniques forprecisely timed two-RV attacks on a single target Such calculations are affected more by our large range of uncertainty about the accuracies and yields of Soviet than they are by the size of the alternative forces The figure on the right of the board depicts the effect of these qualitative uncertainties The EBNE cang - XGDS Gerald 7 black line represents calculations using our best estimates of accuracy and yield whereas the blue area shows the possible spread of uncertainty -- This next chart shows on the left our estimate of the number of 11 8 warheads -- both ICBMs and -- that would survive a hypothetical Soviet surprise attack on our silos and on the right the number of Soviet warheads that would be left over for other uses after such an attack The Secretary Kissinger You must be thinking of defecting knows how to do this Laughter Director Colby The figure on the right shows the quality Secretary Kissinger What accuracy are you assuming Mr Duckett The accuracy is fromcretary Kis singe r Mr Du'ckett Director Colby Under SALT conditions Yes That is the high figure the most they could Mr - Secretary Kissinger do under SALT The Soviets have large warheads and therefore they have less uncertainty resulting from accuracy Accuracy is more important for us How many Americans would they kill if they just attack mnuteman General Brown That would be a'tough attack on the U S if they tried to dig out Minuteman It would be dirty Mr Duckett The winds favor the Soviets The winds in the U S would take the fallout to the population Secretary Kissinger How many would they kill Director Colby We don t know gamma XGDS -- j r 8 r General Brown We are looking at this now in a red-on blue war game based upon discussions at the SIOP briefing on Saturday This should be interesting and you may wish to see the results Mr President President Ford I would like to see what you come up with Secretary Kissinger Your figures are based on no launch on-warning by the U S Most of our and bombers would survive plus any missiles launched on warning Brezhnev must keep that in mind This would be the case unless U S forces ride out the attack If he is wrong they would be in trouble In any event we would have 150 Minuteman missiles which is not a negligible force - He would be foolhardy in the extreme General Brown And we would have bombers that survive General Dougherty can put bombers on airborne alert if he thinks they might be threatened They are secure and can be used SecretarLKissinger When peeple Speak of the vulnerability of Minuteman they are speaking of a worst-case situation for us They do not take into account our and bombers The Soviets must ask themselves where they would be if they do all these things - Gerald Ford Lih General Brown These sorts of things give us confidence that we have a deterrent force today - Director Colby The figures show that in all cases the Soviet residual force will grow and will come to exceed that of the U but the number of surviving U S RVs largely on at sea -- will remain quite large that is some 3 000 weapons not counting bomber weapons and importantly the right hand figure shows that the more extreme possible Soviet advantage would be held in check by SALT TWO limitations'15 Lia ge lift-l s I President Ford The right side is the residual Soviet missile capability Secretary Kissinger The chart does not count our forward-based systems If they hit our FBS first it would provide adequate warning to launch Minuteman If they attack Minuteman first then some of our FBS would survive - - XGDS - 1 I 1 I Gerald Fort rary Dr Ikle 9 xons 9 A launch-on-warning posture could be an accident prone posture and be more dangerous Secretary Kissinger There should be no public statements saying we should have no launch on warning plans We can fix our command and control systems to guard against launch on-warning if we like but there should be no public statements to this effect General Brown We have had a policy for years of giving them the Soviets no assurances on this Secretary Kissinger We should take no pain to give the Soviets an impression that we have a launch on-warning policy Brent scowcroft It is not to our disadvantage if we appear irrational to the soviets in this regard 9 Director Colby It cohld be a problem Secretary Kissinger There are two factors to be considered First we would never launch without Presidential authority we can fix our command and control systems for this Second the Soviets must never be able to calculate that you plan to rule out such an attack Seeretary Rumsfeld That ambiguity must never be eliminated Secretary Kissinger There would be 80 million Soviet casualties if Mr Duckett they attack Minuteman Therefore our submarines are a deterrent The flat part of the curve on the projected number of surviving U S warheads does not say we don't need SALT The chart is insensitive in this area Secretary Kissinger There is no strategic need for extra surviving warheads but there is a perceived need-ma political benefit Director Colby There is a perceived need We have 4 000 Mr Duckett left on our side but 600 - 800 can kill their population Therefore 3 000 4 000 can certainly destroy their population The perception is important Director Colby In assessing Soviet strategic capabilities over XGDS s25 that lull gin Weary 2S um and development programs We have paid particular attention to prospects for major advances in strategic defense such as lasers and submarine detection that might seriously erode U S deterrent capabilities In general we concluded that the chances are small that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance through technological advance in the next ten years although by 1985 the Soviets will probably have made the task of penetrating their air'defenses by bombers much more difficult than it is today President Ford serious threat You are discounting their lasers as a Director Colbyi the strategic balance The chances are small that they would alter To sum up Mr President the most important judgments in this year s Estimate are During the next ten years the Soviets almost certainly will not have a first strike capability to prevent devastating retaliation by the United States Short of this however Soviet strategic programs present what we believe are real and more proximate dangers to the United States with or without a SALT TWO agreement We think there will probably be a-continuation of rough strategic equality between the U S and USSR but in the qualitativecompetition the U S technological lead will come under increasing challenge Assuming that theujudgments of the Estimate are reasonably correct I believe that fore seeable Soviet strategic forces would not eliminate the USSR's vulnerability to retaliation Consequently acrisis resolution probably would not reston the strategic weapons balance but rather would depend on other factors such as the comparative and dispositions of U S and Soviet conventional forces It is relevant in this connection to note the steady increases occurring in Warsaw Pact forces Opposite NATO and in the Soviet Navy Let me now turn to the future of Soviet politics which could affect - - the Sovret strategic posture fully as much as force progections or grg'tv ies progress in These future developments are best looked at three stages if rTer snoring NEW XGDS l' El n Forduljibrai-y TGP XGDS -- At the present in the two months before the Party Congress Brezhnev still is the dominant Soviet leader I-Iis authority seems to be in a slow decline along with his physical vigor He is still interested in a SALT agreement but is clearly prepared to go into the Congress without one if necessary doubtless recognizes that both sides have to change their existing formal positions to reach a deal and he has some room for maneuver -- though not we believe to the extent of agreeing to include Backfire in a 2 400 aggregate In the months after the Congress we will probably have roughly the same Soviet leadership and no major change in SALT policy But the gradual erosion of Brezhnev s position will continue as his colleagues begin to cast their minds forward to the post-Brezhnev period The further this process goes the more the individual Politburo members will be inclined to avoid risky decisions that might lay them Open to attack at a later more intense phase of the succession competition a More important in this period however will be Soviet concern about the uncertainties of the U S political process They will be cautious about such hazards as negotiating during an election year when the whole Soviet wAInerican relations could be pushed into the forefront of partisan debate We do not believe they will out-and out refuse to continue discussions but they seem prepared to wait until 1977 if necessary -4 In the third phase over the next several years the-- Politburo will get deeply into what we expect to be a prolonged succession process Real factional struggles might develop with none of the aspirants for power wanting to antagonize the military Thus the preferences of the marshals will probably be given greater weight in strategic and arms control matters Finally what can we say about the prospects for Soviet-U S relations if there is no SALT We believe Moscow sees this as primarily up to the Americans The Soviets find detente too useful to want to repudiate it and would hope to continue on a pragmatic course governed by the opportunities and risks of specific situations and' still call it detente if r xens WEI Gerald R Lib an LQRv ng ws XGDS Tue chief consequences for Soviet foreign policy therefore of no SALT agreement would lie more in the area of underlying attitudes than in Specific behavior on the international scene Soviet uncertainty about the future strategic balance would encourage darker interpretations of U S intentions If the strategic dialogue ended the beginnings of confidence building would be interrupted In the absence of treaty limitations the Soviet military would be relieved of the healthy necessity to dismantle older systems and to divulge strategic facts to their chief opponents All this would clearly be damaging to the prospects for positive long-run change in the Soviet system These effects would be magnified if the U S reaction to a SALT failure was to discredit detente altogether frond the Western side President Ford Thank you Bill Any comments Secretary Kissinger I would like to comment Looking back at the seven years I have been here we have never had to manage a crisis under the current difficult conditions In 1973 Admiral Zumwalt did not tell us our Navy was vulnerable We conducted ourselves on the basis of naval superiority The Soviets had no MIRVS at all only the single warhead 85-11 and 55 9 In one crisis we had a 10-1 warhead superiority on the U S side -- and the Soviets caved In 1962 we had a 100 1 advantage Never were the Soviets conscious of parity In every confrontation under circumstances of U S superiority the Soviets caved inordinately rapidly 'We will not be in that position in the future and we will have a' crisis management problem Therefore we have to look at the Soviet threat and capability over the next ten years SALT may give us no strategic benefits but it would give us political benefits Our most glaring deficiency will be in dealing with regional conflicts No President has had to manage a crisis in such a situation where we were not overwhelmingly superior in strategic forces During the Berlin crisis the Soviets had no strategic capability In 1962 they had 70 long- range missiles which took seven hours to fuel The situation is changed and this will present a real strategic problem not only in a crisis but in the way the Soviets throw their weight around This is one reason why Angola is so iInportant we 155g don t want to whet'the Soviet appetite 33 mncne gamma - XGDS Ida - '1 3 in 3 j I 2 1 President Ford and R Ford Lib rary I a Secretary Kissinger They _could be 700 miles away and the Soviets would still see them Ge ne ral Brown 2 st 13 Director Colby The Soviets may send a guided missile destroys to Angola President Ford Are we sending any ships General Brown None - Should we President Ford - General Brown Not now based on projected military scenarios We must also think about the will of Congress President Ford That doesn't necessarily follow They were focusing on only one aspect There was no indication we cannot deploy naval vessels in the Atlantic which would affect Soviet perceptions The vote would not constrain that Secretary Rumsfeld There is no military basis for deploying ships I agree but perceptions are sometimes more important Ge ne ral rown signal our intent 'One beauty of naval forces is that they can Our ships- would not have to be right off Angola 5' Dire cto'r Colby I 3 W's-have ships in the Mediterranean but none in the South Atlantic Mr Byland The Soviet ships won't arrive until the sixth probably if they go to Luanda Assume the worst if they go directly President Ford General-Brown -- If we send a ship peOple will point__to this and recall the Gulf of Tonkin affair which led to the Senate resolution to deploy forces 'Some will argue that we cannot get so involved There 18 no reason mllitarily for us to deploy ships 33 -- 33' - XGDS - -- Director Colby '3on amps OOICOOCOOICIOIQIUOQOIOO Secretary Kissinger I They can't do anything with a guided missile ship However our concern is that if the Soviets make substantial military efforts and taste a local advantage it would be a dangerous situation They must have had internal debate This is an argument for following them and observing them There is no military need but there is a benefit We can send them a message by doing this They will think about this and say Why are we there This is an argument for observing them within range of their communications Seeretary Rumsfeld The reason I said what said before was that the point was not a military question You the President were asking General Brown aboutthe matter and I was pointing out it was not a military recommendation Secretary Kissinger You are making me the villain Laughter Brent Scowcroft - If we send a ship in we 'could announce it and GeraldrR Ford Librar'y avoid the Tonkin Secretary Kissingeri It would be best to say nothing This would have the most effect In the Jordanian crisis owe shut off all communications We shut down the State Department answered no questions We put our foroes into the Mediterranean and the Soviets collapsed re 'This is similar to _President Fordzn a Se cretary Kis singe r This was similar to Cienfuegos We could move into the South Atlantic on a routine mission We could say we are watching the Soviets which is better than saying We are watching Angola If asked we could say our ships are on routine patrol L J m President Ford Let s look into this but I do not want to a decision this morning - X Gns a un- Gerald R Ford Library midi - XGDS 15 Secretary Kissinger The best way is this We will call in Dobrynin tomorrow and tell him that if he thinks he can keep detente on track he is crazy The more signals back to Moscow the better President Ford Let's don t ignore this Let s think about it Secretary Kissinger They have a game going in Angola But it is not the ultimate test yet They might want it if they can pick it up at a low price Even if they don t pick it up they will want to run around Africa and EurOpe and say The Americans can't out the mustard Director Colby Vietnam is in the back of the thought process of the Soviets Secretary Clements Cuban participation is highly vulnerable for the Soviets and Cuba This is a plus for our public side You the President should keep this in mind President Ford I mentioned the combat forces in my press conference Saturday I did not neglect this Secretary Kis singer The Soviets will get many messages We have notes all over Africa All our protests will be rejected but they will go to Moscow Secretary Clements We could watch the ships -- monitor the Cubans Secretary Kissinger They are going by air But we can monitor the Soviets We should have an estimate from DOD and the Chiefs We should not be hysterical but it should be geared to the Soviets so that they would pick up our signals Now let's move into the SALT discussion Mr President we are not here to ask you for a decision We simply want to put the issues before you to give you a chance to think about them when you are in Vail When you come back we will have a more detailed discussion of the issues At Vladivostok we agreedro n the total number of Vehicles and We said that missiles with greater than 600 km range on bombers would be counted There is an ambiguity here as to Whether these - 3 VI - y - j and 4h XGDS Gerald use Sagas 3W XGDS XGDS is include cruise missiles or only ballistic missiles We said they were ballistic missiles the Soviets said that all air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers should be counted Nothing was said about -- submarine-launched or ship launched The Soviets would perceive it as a concession on their part if we end up counting anything less than all the cruise missiles Nothing was said at Vladivostok about the Backfire This issue emerged afterwards Therefore we have two hang-ups one the Backfire and the other the cruise missile situation Our position had been that we should count the Backfire Their position has been that we should count cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 km on heavy bombers and ban all other cruise missiles Gromyko told me that with a range greater than 600 km were not negotiable Since Vladivostok it is fair to say that the Soviets have made one major concession that is they are using our counting rules for MIRVs The practical effect of this is to limit them to less than 1300 MIRVs unless they MIRV all So far however all of their have only single warheads They apparently are planning no more than 180 83-1535 with MIRVS This would give them a total of 1 180 MIRV launchers rather than l 316 At 12 RVs each this gives us around 2 200 warheads free However they have linked the MIRV counting 33rule to the cruise missile is sue This leaves us now with the following issues First how do we deal with the Backfire in light of the forward based system problem and the fact that this is a big issue in the Soviet mind Second what do we do about cruise missiles with greater than 600 km range on heavy bombers Third how do we deal with with greater than 600 km range on submarines or ships And fourth what do we do about land-based cruise mis siles The Soviets wantto permit land based cruise missiles up to a 5 500 km range This is hard to understand we could cover the Soviet Union with deployments in EuroPe This would also be a disadvantage since the Soviets could use their land-based cruise mis sile program to test all conceivable modes Our view is that we should limit land-based cruise missiles to a 2 500 km range Six options were presented to the Verification Panel for consideration Don and I have narrowed these to three for purposes of simplification Rmit f it i' at - 'G' zl ald Ford Library an I via -- n - XGDS 17 The first Option is one which would be preferred by the Joint Chiefs It would defer any limitation on Backfire and cruise missiles at this time but these would be taken up in the next round Of SALT talks in 1977 The Chiefs would agree to a time limit on the negotiations for example two years to settle the Backfire and cruise missile issues This Option would consolidate the gains made at Vladivostok which would go into effect in October 1977 The follow-on agreement would take effect in 1979 or 1980 An advantage of this option is that it would use cruise missiles to offset Backfire therefore both would run free I haveusaid I have doubts about the negotiability Of this Option First the Soviets have rejected counting Backfire in SALT as a matter of principle The Soviets would also feel that it would be bad for them to let cruise missiles run free They would feel they would be losing in the process They think our Backfire position is a trick anyway From the domestic point Of view I wonder whether there is a danger in this Option because all arms controllers will scream fraud They will say this will leave more cruiSe missiles uncontrolled than ballistic missiles controlled Therefore the liberal Democrats will be against us on our cruise missile programs and our request for funds for cruise missiles I saw Muskie at the football game yesterday and Harriman at dinner last night They told me We will help you by cutting off funds for the cruise missile '3 We will be driven by our own debate to limiting cruisemissiles to the Backfire numbers Also we will have a massive FBS problem President Ford Vladivostok We would be giving up what We gained in Secretary Kissinger Once we accept a unilateral construction even if the Soviets break it we are going to have hellish ability to go ahead cannot believe the Soviets will give us both the MIRV counting rule plus a throw weight limitation on the 38 19 plus cruise missiles We could only go back to a crude version of Vladivostok if at all - XGDs 3 WW- 1'8 However the Option does have these advantages It is the least contentious option it would consolidate the Vladivostok gains and it would maintain momentum in SALT Secretary Rumsfeld There is an opposite argument to the one Henry made In the event we agree on this Option it may improve the position of the cruise missile in Congress We would have an argument similar to the one for MBFR troop levels in Europe the last thing we want to do is reduce unilaterally Therefore this may actually decrease Congressional leverage on the cruise missile Secretary Clements - I want to endorse what Don has said I talked to McIntyre about this and Don is right They've gone along with us on cruise missiles because it is part of our SALT negotiations They don't want us to constrain ourselves 3 5 President Ford In the House they knocked out the Air Force 1' cruise missile but kept the SLCM Secretary Clements Well the Congress did this but not to help our negotiations The Air Force cruise missile is built by Boeing but the SLCM is built by LTV Only one person George Mahon pa wanted to eliminate the Air Force cruise missile and he did this in my View to help LTV and- to eliminate the Air Force competition g However in conference both programs were put back in Mahon 2% D n- has been the only one who had been fighting the Air Force program President Ford He was taking care of- Dallas Secretary Clements And screwing Boeing Secretary Kissinger In my opinion there is only one chance in 20 that the Soviets would accept this Option They will not accept straight deferral in my judgment Secretary Rumsfeld The test is to find some language that does not prejudge the matter at all which could be the Soviet hang up We ought to be able to find a way to find the right kind of language President Ford Doesn t deferral give them a free hand to let them go ahead with their cruise-missile program Secretary Rumsfeld There is no question about it However this option is not really the preferred option It is useful only in that 11 I c if zz 53' XGDS I Rl I k R - Ford Library 19 would avoid not having any SALT agreement at all What it does is allow us to state that we have two problem areas which we have not yet resolved President Ford I can see it from our point of View but we must face the reality of whether they would do it Director Colby The Soviets see the cruise missile as an enormous problem to them They have an eno rmous investment in air defenses and they see the cruise missile as our way to get around their air defenses Secretary Clements They will have an interest in cruise missile programs but it will not be the same interest as ours They do not have the capability of air launching cruise missiles Secretary Kissinger They won't see them coming _Mr Duckett Director Colby We have no air defenses on our side The Soviets have no urgent reason to develop air-launched cruise missiles our last photography shows that the Soviets have a new cruise missile at the test site We have not determined its characteristics yet Secretary Kissing-er They have no requirement for a cruise missile Secretary Rumsfeld Therefore we can constrain their optimum size keeping good ones for us and bad for them We Can make great strides This is why we have some leverage with cruise missiles - Secretary Kissinger Why must they anewer cruise missiles with cruise missiles Maybe they would answer Our cruise missile programs with ballistic missiles President Ford l3ecause they may want to take advantage of their program Secretary Kissinger Let s discuss another option We could count Backfire in the 24 00 aggregate We could count within the 132 0 MIRV limit those heavy bombers with cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range We could ban above 600 km on submarines with a 2500 km range or 2000 km range on surface ships would free I ff fu gri 4 3 f ms EEWW XGDS vr i a9 u- nevenness sesame xens 20 '33 33 This would involve two significant concessions we would ban long-range cruise missiles on submarines and we would count heavy bombers with ALCMS as MIRVs General Brown If we want all our bombers to carry ALCMs we would have to knock off that many MlRVed missiles President Ford I Even if we pulled B-52s out of mothbal-ls we would not get up to the 2400 level Brent Scowcroft The applicable ceiling here is the 1320 MIRV limit Secretary Kissinger This is a most creative approach It will interest the Soviets However its chief difficulty is whether the Soviets would count Backfire I do not believe they will count the Backfire If they have to count 400 Backfire they will have to - 0 u I - hm-at alone Or if it carries an ALCM it would count both against the 2400 level and the 1320 ceiling dismantle some ICBMs It will also cause an FBS problem and a domestic political problem for the Soviets JD President Ford If the Backfire is counted as a strategic 3 weapon and if they had developed a cruise-missile they could put ALCMs on the Backfire a Secretary Kissinger Then it would count against the MIRV ceiling - Without an ALCM the Backfire would behcounted in the 2400 level General Brown I think there was only one reason why they would go to an ALCM for the Backfire If they get the accuracy with their ALCM it is better than a gravity bomb Director Colby _They could use a shorter range ALCM General Brown It goes back to the fact that we don t have any air defenses to speak of Secretary Kissinger This is worse than the October proposal which they have already rejected In this option we would be letting go free and counting their Backfire This is harder than the October proposal where and Backfires were outside the basic accords in some kind of grey area The October proposal was closer to deferral Their view of this Option would be that they would be losing Vt a handle on while having to count Backfire is - XGDS 3 3 V non Asch XGDS I 21 Mr President we are not asking for a decision at this time We just want to present this for your consideration The Verification Panel must do more work before we could confidently sell this in Moscow Secretary Ruinsfeld One advantage of this Option is that the Soviets are already counting a heavy bomber the Bison From a domestic standpoint this has assisted somewhat A second point is that we must consider the world perception as Secretary Kissinger has mentioned If the Backfire is not counted we must consider the perception here in Europe and elsewhere Statistically the Backfire has a substantial capability - H 51 343 r is The point I am making is that while we might lose at negotiability it would help us in selling it here and elsewhere Whatever we come up with must lend itself to public discussion Secretary Kissinger I am arguing not just for negotiability What we have must be both negotiable and equitable from a strategic vieWpoint Director Colby Could we reduce the land-based cruise missile range to 2500 km as a counter to No answer Secretary Kissinger If these Options are- not saleable and acceptable then we have two issues Negotiating tactics and a decision on where we go Gerald R Fo rd Lih rary With respect to negotiating tactics how d'o'we present an option if there is a 90 percent chance that it will be rejected Also what can we table that will have a chance of acceptance There are two schools of thought on negotiating tactics-g One is that we should take a tough stance The other is that we should make preemptive concessions as Don's predecessor phrased it My view is that this is the better negotiating tactic We goahead with some connessions but we then stick hard on'what we do have The other tactics may look tough but they lose credibility I think we should get to our concession point fast but then don t yield Of course we must build some air into our prOposal for retreat purposes at its With the Chinese we give them our best judgment and if they agree they say ok However with the Soviets if we hand their own proposal to them they must argue about it for nights and then take it to the Politburo - XGDS x Gerald R F0 rdliibrary Dr Ikle swam rem - runs 22 Let s now look at the third option category Basically this looks for a way of not counting the Backfire plus it includes elements of the second option counting heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVS There is a sh0pping list of elements in these packages To hang the Backfire on Soviet assurances would be dangerous Assurances are inherently soft For example if the Soviets staged their bombers 'through Arctic bases in a crisis would this result in an abrogation of What else could we do with the Backfire There are several pos sibilitie First we need not offer the Soviets the whole SLCM package We could go back to something like the October proposal We could say that all cruise missiles with the exception of ship-launched cruise missiles would be limited We could use the ship launched SLCM limit as an offset to the Backfire If they increase their Backfire deployments above a certain number then our other cruise missile limitations would be off As Fred Ikle has suggested we can put all offset systems into a separate Protocol addressing'hybrid systems -- the grey area We could balance Backfire against the ship-launched up to 1980 or 1981 in this Protocol Alternatively we could ask the Soviets to agree to reducing the aggregate to 2300 or even 2200 However I do not think it would be possible to get the Soviets to agree to a 2200 level The 2300 level would be a strain on the Soviets but not-on us This would have the effect of counting 100 Backfires No one recommends letting the Backfire run free on assurances alone Therefore this w0uld entail having some kind ofhtrade off such as reducing the total aggregate level or having a separate Protocol The theater balance is of concern to the Soviets If we use a separate Protocol it may be more negotiable since no Backfires would be in SALT It would also limit the upgrading of cruise missiles Secretary Kissinger This would be a compromise We could have a mixed option where some cruise missiles run free against their Backfire This hepefully avoids the FBS problem and gives the I I i i 9 is XGDS 13 if 13 La Ford XGDS 23 Soviets a way out However we wouldn't want an agreement'on a mixed option that takes Backfire out of the count that is not saleable or in the strategic interests of the United States The Chiefs and others are now working on developing some kind of updated mixed package Director Colby raising the FBS issue The Soviets will do nothing on Backfire without General Brown If they raise the F338 issue it automatically brings the Backfire into the picture Secretary Kissinger We can consider various mixed packages We can have a Protocol as Fred Ikle has suggested We can have a unilateral U S statement that says When the Soviets produce Backfire above a certain number the deployment restraints on are off We can have a mixed package where the Soviets agree to reducing to the 2 300 aggregate level and we set off the versus Backfire we can sell this as reducing the Backfire President Ford The perception associated with reducing the aggregate from 2490 to 2300 would be very saleable Dr Ikle As long as it is not considered a substitute for follownon reductions President Ford I want to compliment you all for taking a fresh look and expanding the alternatives There is some flexibility here _Between now and_the first week in January I-- would like youhto look at something beyond the first two options and give me the prospects Perhaps we can come up with something which is in the best interests of the United States and is saleable - In the next two weeks I would like you to finely tune your options and give Henry an Option in addition to the first two Maybe this won't work but at least we will have made our best possible effort Mr Duckett __ compliance issue Mr President I'd like to take one minute on a Sporetary Rumsfeld In developing a mixed package we must consider the acceptability in a strategic sense its negotiability and its saleability at home For any mixed package we must ask also abou iizjjigj 3 - XGDS If runs 24 its simplicity - We must ask whether it can be eJcplained sensibly Dr Ikle The verification problem of cruise missiles is hard to explain I believe we will be able to explain it only if we have a separate Protocol Otherwise the verification problem'is almost impossible to explain for cruise missiles Secretary Kissinger _We must recall the elements to consider We have to consider the relationshi of the FBS and Backfire issues We must understand the degree to which cruise missiles running free offset Backfire We must understand the degree to which not counting Backfire is offset for example by its inability to carry long- range cruise missiles a Secretary Ruinsfeld We must also remember the importance of not using soft assurances Secretary-Kissinger Assurances are only frosting on the cakePresident Ford The kind of trust that has been built negates the use of assurances They won't be'bought I a '5 - 33 I - Secretary Kissinger This is a good example of the need to put this kind of information in a temporary hold status -- Director Colby I agree 1 President Ford Thank you very much Have a good holidayXGDS in 3 34 twenwcm-- - -- -- - -- - - - - h D - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu