R£PR0ouc eoATTHE ' 'TIONAl ARCHIVES ' L · -- SECRET TO EUR WE - Mr Meloy J'kOM GTI - John ✓ W 5 fL _ DAT January 18 1963 ' Bowling ✓ SUBJECT J iter Negotiations - Ankara Reference Ankara's telegra No 792 January 18 1963 --· ···- l have the action copy of this telegram but we assume that any reply of course will be prepared and approved through the group I'-7 • ' _ l must admit that I agree with Ambassador Hare and his description of the Turkish position as grotesque It was just possible that the Turks are being super-clever but l believe they are utterly confused suspicious and worried about domestic political repercussions I I _ would suggest that the fo wf o ints be covered in a ri eply 1' O ' ·Iv · 1 As has been repeateal and publiclY indicated th us looks I · r-- ' forward to a true multilater y-manned i%ontrolled NA nuclear 1 l force The substitution of olaris for ¾pi rs however does not i - represent the establishment of the force we envisage but is rather o n - ' a small step in that direction There can therefore at this stage be no possibility of placing U S Polaris submarines under the command of foreign nationals Following a long period of future negotiations _ _ on the nature of a multilateral NATO force we look forward to NATO 1 ' agreement on manning controls comma ieand financing of such a force I Attempts at this time to make ad hoc ilateral agreements would I ' distort and prejudice the ul timate success of the complicated NATO negotiating process which Under Secretary Ball recently initiated in i Paris · I h ·1 2 In view of the above the Turks should understand that the training of full Turkish crews is neither timely or practical We do contemplate the presence of Turkish observers on the Mediterranean· force Polaris vessels from time to time and we also contemplate a carefully phased program of training in the US beginning with general familiarizati on training on the Polaris weapons system · J J --J P _J 3 From information presently available to me I would think we l -- · should inform the Turks that the advancement of delivery dates on - F-l04gs to the time now indicated has been the result of an all-out expediting action and that it is l i terally impossible to increase the number of SECRET 11 1 TJ 3 iv U V ' 3 · - · · ·- l - o · ' _ _ r• • • DECLASSIRED · µI LJ _ Aulllorit' JJNi 1 3 $ T _ I 'f- J S 1 By llf -NARA 03te 9s SECRET - 2 - l l l ' I number of F-104g's in the first squadron This is not a question of lolill or of priorities on the part of the US It is a question of physical esources available 4 I don't know anything about a training program for F-104g pilots but I imagine that the OOD can provide us with an outline of the training program they contemplate and that it may satisfy the Turks 5 I believe we should tell the Turks that there are too ma n y changeable factors for us to guarantee second squadron F-104g delivery at any one time We can sey that we are quite certain that it will occur during 1964 Any specific date set at the present moment might very well have to be revised forwar d or backward in view of unforeseeable developments in the world military and political situation 6 I think -Jricroup should push bard on OOD ISA to see what they can come up with in the way of a little icing for the Turkish Navy in the form of materiel 7 I believe the key to the negotiations in Turkey at the present moment is the exact situation with regard to our negotiations 4 Italy If these are going satisfactorily I would suggest that Hai e be given a summary of the situation and ti e 1 uthorized to conyey it to the Turks in his discretion - l f l i J I am not pessimistic and I think it quite possibl e we could end up lolith a satisfactory solution in ten days or so I stand ready to cooperate in any way that I can cc G PM - Mr Kitchen NEA GTI JWBowling bmh SECRET