Date

Jan 18, 1963

Description

Compared to the negotiations in Italy, the talks with Turkish officials were complicated and slow moving.[18] One problem was Foreign Minister Erkin’s “mistaken impression” that Turkey would have a role in “manning” Polaris submarines. As desk officer John Bowling observed in this memo, Ambassador Hare saw that as a “grotesque” misunderstanding of the U.S. negotiating position, and the State Department’s reply rejected proposals for any Turkish role in commanding and staffing the submarines. All the same, Bowling saw the need for some Turkish involvement, including Turkish observers on the Polaris submarines “from time to time” and a “carefully phased” program of instruction in the U.S., beginning with “familiarization training” in the Polaris weapon system.

Other complications involved the provision of F-104Gs, including Turkey’s request to increase the number of fighter-bombers in the first squadron—which Bowling wrote was “literally impossible”—and the U.S. inability to provide a delivery date for the second squadron. He suggested that the U.S. encourage more progress with Ankara by providing information on the state of the negotiations with Italy. Optimistically, Bowling thought it “possible” to reach a “satisfactory solution in ten days or so.”

Source

Digital National Security Archive

Document published in following posting(s):

The Jupiter Missiles and the Endgame of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 60 Years Ago

Feb 16, 2023

GTI – [Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs] John Bowling to EUR/W- E [Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Francis E.] Meloy, “Jupiter Missiles - Ankara,” 18 January 1963, Secret