New Evidence on Clinton Administration Negotiations with North Korea

The background to this conversation was a tense summit meeting that President Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young Sam held in Washington on November 23rd. The lead-up to the summit had been marked by intense and at times acrimonious discussions between the U.S. and South Korea over the strategy to adopt in seeking to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table in Geneva, where talks on Pyongyang’s nuclear program had broken down. While the U.S. was trying to develop a comprehensive package deal that combined the desired actions by North Korea in conjunction with addressing Pyongyang’s concerns and demands, Kim Young Sam’s government was persistently suspicious of any agreement that did not call on North Korea to take the first significant steps to rein in its nuclear program, and was paranoid over the possibility that the U.S. and North Korea might reach a settlement that ignored the critical goal of North/South dialogue and left out South Korea. At the summit, President Kim was adamant in pressing his criticisms of the proposed U.S. approach. In the end, the two leaders agreed to a slight change in terminology, calling the approach “thorough and broad,” instead of comprehensive, a term Kim said confused the Korean media, and to consider cancelling the Team Spirit military exercises – a constant target of North Korean attacks – only after North Korea’s special envoy came to Seoul for serious talks.[2]

The first part of this telephone conversation between President Clinton and the South Korean president was devoted to working out differences over an agreement to govern South Korean imports of rice, an issue with serious domestic political ramifications for the South Korean leader. After agreeing to discuss this with his trade negotiators, Clinton turned the conversation to North Korea’s response to the proposal he and the South Korean leader worked out during the latter’s visit to Washington two weeks earlier, as noted above. As described in Going Critical, Pyongyang’s counter-proposal was for North Korea to be more flexible on IAEA issues, , allowing inspections at all the sites requested, with some limitations. However, North Korea insisted that the U.S. announce the suspension of the Team Spirit exercises when planning discussions resumed for the exchange of envoys between the two Koreas.[3] Clinton wanted to go back to Pyongyang with a reply to their proposal that national security advisor Tony Lake would soon discuss with Kim’s national security advisor. [4] Clinton also reaffirmed the U.S. goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and commitment to the security relationship with South Korea, as well as promising to consult closely with Seoul on negotiations that would affect its national security and the future of the peninsula.

These reassurances made, Clinton told President Kim that the U.S. wanted his agreement to go back to North Korea with their reaction to Pyongyang’s response to the proposal he and Kim had agreed to in their earlier meeting, in an effort to use every possible chance to make progress. If they could not get North Korea to agree to resume the IAEA inspections very soon, the next step would be returning to the U.N. Security Council to discuss sanctions, with all the risks that involved. While Kim fully understood Clinton’s suggestion, he clearly wanted to proceed on the basis of what they had agreed to in their earlier summit, an agreement that he called “fundamentally still alive.” They should continue discussion of the nuclear issue by maintaining the principles agreed to in their earlier meeting. On this basis, their security advisors should continue to discuss next steps – speed, modalities and procedures – while the critical thing was that Washington and Seoul maintain their close cooperation.

This brief telephone conversation, made at Clinton’s request, focused on the day’s positive developments with North Korea. First, Clinton welcomed the agreement between President Kim and North Korea to pursue a summit meeting with Kim Il Sung, and expressed his hope the planned talks on June 28 would go well in laying the basis for the two Korean leaders meeting soon. Clinton then turned to information Washington had received that afternoon that North Korea was willing to freeze major elements of its nuclear weapons program while a new round of U.S.-North Korea talks proceeded. Pyongyang also assured the U.S. that while these talks were underway, it would not reload its five-megawatt reactor or reprocess spent nuclear fuel. North Korea also gave assurances that the IAEA would be allowed to keep its inspectors and monitoring equipment in place at the Yongbyon facility to confirm these steps were being taken. The U.S. was now ready to respond to these very positive steps by moving ahead with the new round of talks. Clinton made it clear he knew they had not solved the North Korea nuclear problem, but these developments created the opportunity to do so, which made it “absolutely critical that we stay together on this, stay in touch and pursue the same course.” President Kim agreed with Clinton that all these developments were very positive, and noted the role former President Jimmy Carter had played in persuading the North Korean leader to pursue a summit meeting. Both leaders agreed on the need to be willing to discuss matters by telephone, with Clinton telling President Kim he could call “any time of day or night.”

This cable reports on Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci’s meeting with Russian embassy chargé Vladimir Chkhikvishvili to brief him on the U.S. approach to the third round of talks with North Korea about its nuclear weapons program. Gallucci summarized the U.S. approach to the talks as focusing on: 1) restating the need for North Korea to accept its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, including special inspections; 2) pressing North Korea to carry out the January 1992 North-South Korean denuclearization declaration; 3) stressing U.S. near-term concerns about the spent nuclear fuel currently in cooling ponds, estimated to hold 20 to 30 kilograms of plutonium; and 4) pressing North Korea to move expeditiously to transfer the spent fuel to another country if it was serious about giving up its graphite reactors for light water reactors ( a step which when taken would require further consultation with Russia and other nations). The condition of the spent fuel rods was a pressing concern, rooted in part in the deterioration of the cladding on the rods, and the U.S. wanted to secure access by technical experts to adjust the water in the cooling ponds to retard this deterioration. If North Korea made positive steps to address these issues, Gallucci said the U.S. was ready to improve bilateral relations with Pyongyang in a “broad and thorough manner, including offering security assurances, and to provide details about U.S. willingness to promote (but not supply or finance) North Korea’s acquisition of a light water reactor (another step requiring further consultations with Moscow if North Korea was interested in Russian technology). On a broader scope, the U.S. wanted to contribute to a lessening of tensions between the two Koreas, which would call for discussion of North Korea’s deployment of military forces and its weapons of mass destruction policies.

Gallucci told Chkhikvishvili that the U.S. wanted to present North Korea an attractive vision of what would happen if Pyongyang took the needed steps on nuclear issues. Washington was ready to be “quite flexible” if North Korea was willing to address the spent fuel issue up front, but would view steps to reprocess the fuel as a serious obstacle to future progress. Gallucci also said that the U.S, believed one reason the North Koreans had returned to the bilateral talks was the real prospect of sanctions, a step Gallucci was confident Washington and Moscow were in agreement on regarding a U.N. Security Council resolution. Responding to questions from the Russians, Gallucci said the U.S. was calling the renewed talks the first session of the Third Round. Since North Korea had pledged to freeze its nuclear program while this round was underway, the U.S. wanted to sustain it as long as possible.

Looking at the wider diplomatic context of the talks, Gallucci said the “single most important element is the North’s posture,” which meant that the lack of understanding about Pyongyang’s decision-making processes was lamentable. For example, it was possible that former President Jimmy Carter’s meeting with Kim Il Sung had moved the North Korean leader into “tactical” involvement to put relations with the U.S. and South Korea on positive tracks before again delegating management of this engagement. If this was the case, then Kim wanted to avoid sanctions and it was possible for North Korea to take the steps the U.S. wanted, as summarized above. But Gallucci admitted there was another school of thought that held Pyongyang was just stalling. As a negotiator, Gallucci had to test the optimistic assumption. Regarding South Korea’s role in these negotiations, Gallucci described U.S consultations with Seoul as “uniquely intimate.” The U.S. recognized South Korea’s worry that the U.S.-DPRK talks might derail plans for a North-South summit, but felt the “natural division of labor” between the U.S. and South Korea was to have Seoul focus on implementation of the North-South non-nuclear declaration while the U.S. dealt with the international element, such as securing the full scope of safeguards under the NPT. On this front, Gallucci was also satisfied with U.S. consultations with the IAEA and its director, Hans Blix, who was willing to listen to the U.S. and maintain the independence essential to IAEA credibility.

President Clinton made this call to touch base with President Kim about the latter’s thinking regarding North Korea in the wake of the unexpected death of Kim Il Sung on July 8. Both leaders were exercising caution and watching carefully to learn more about the situation in North Korea and how it would affect the engagement and resumption of nuclear talks with Pyongyang. For Clinton, a key issue was preparing for the next round of bilateral talks with North Korea. Resuming these talks soon was important for two reasons. First, it wouldn’t be long before something would have to be done to the spent fuel for safety reasons. Second, since they did not know what would happen in North Korea, it was in their interest to try as soon as possible to secure a “broad and thorough” agreement that would make their nuclear freeze permanent and pull them back into compliance with the Communist nation’s nonproliferation commitments. Clinton finished by stressing that in the brief third round session of bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks held before Kim Il Sung’s death, the North Koreans had made it very clear that they attached great value to acquiring a light water reactor, so the resumed talks needed to address this issue.

President Kim agreed there was great uncertainty surrounding the situation in North Korea. Still, it seemed clear to the South Korean president that Kim Jong Il was going to succeed this father. Also, though North Korea had to postpone the planned North-South summit in the wake of Kim Il Sung, President Kim believed Pyongyang remained interested in having a summit. The significance of this was underlined by Kim, who said he thought the North-South dialogue was as important as the U.S.-North Korea talks. Though unstated, this importance was rooted in Seoul’s continued emphasis on maintaining its key role in engaging with North Korea. President Kim also stressed to Clinton his sense that with the passing of Kim Il Sung, one generation had passed in North Korea. Nothing was normal in the country now; though the military was maintaining its position, factories and virtually everything else were at a standstill. In dealing with this situation, Kim argued they should not be impatient, but should be prudent in dealing with U.S.-North Korean talks and the summit in a mature manner.

In a follow-up briefing on July 27, 1994, to the briefing recorded in Document 3 above, Assistant Secretary Gallucci updated Russian diplomats on the last US/DPRK meeting in Geneva, his discussions in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo, and the U.S. strategy and objectives for the next session of talks with North Korea. Joining Gallucci were Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Gary Samore, deputy director of State’s Office of Regional Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister for East Asia and the Pacific Aleksander Panov, Mikhail Beliy, director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs First Asia administration, and Valentin Moiseyev, MFA Korea division chief, made up the Russian side. This meeting took place against the backdrop of a flurry of diplomatic activity in July that was complicated by the unexpected death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. Touching on concerns from his earlier briefing, Gallucci stressed that the U.S. timetable for the negotiations with North Korea was driven in large part by concerns over the deterioration of the spent fuel rods in the Yongbyon cooling pond and the need to pursue North Korea’s agreement to transfer these to a third country. Russia could play a role in resolving this issue, and in the pressing need to find a way to guarantee that North Korea would obtain a light water reactor in exchange for meeting the U.S. requirements for nonproliferation agreements. Panov argued that a South Korean reactor was politically unacceptable to Pyongyang, so in Russia’s view the only remaining issue was securing financing for provision of a Russian reactor. The meeting ended with speculation about the state of play in North Korea regarding Kim Jong Il’s assumption of power, including possible power struggles and how long he might remain in power, with Panov saying he was not sure Kim would last five years.

The context for this telephone call by Clinton to the South Korean leader was to discuss the recent joint declaration issued by the U.S. and North Korea at the conclusion of the third round of bilateral talks in Geneva. The declaration announced that the U.S. had agreed to arrange for the provision of light water reactors to North Korea, as well as interim energy resources, in exchange for which Pyongyang would freeze construction of its nuclear reactors, halt reprocessing of its spent fuel, and seal its nuclear facilities, all of which would be monitored by the IAEA. In addition, the two governments were ready to improve diplomatic relations, the U.S. would provide the Communist nation assurances against the threat of nuclear attack, and North Korea would affirm its commitments under the NPT.

The conversation makes very clear the deep reservations President Kim Young Sam had about the agreement. Clinton began by asserting his belief that the agreed statement provided a good framework for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, and included important nonproliferation commitments by Pyongyang that Washington and Seoul had agreed had to be part of any solution. Working together, the U.S. and South Korea had the opportunity to end the most threatening elements of North Korea’s nuclear program and lead that nation to more normal international relations. The two allies’ coordinated provision of light water reactors to replace North Korea’s graphite reactors was the key to progress, and they needed to work together to develop a detailed plan as part of continued close coordination and consultation.

Though President Kim assured Clinton that South Korea valued the U.S. efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, this was more than countered by serious misgivings about the agreed statement. Noting Seoul’s many years of dealing with Pyongyang, Kim bluntly warned that “Any commitment they make can’t be relied on We can’t really trust them ...” The South Korean leader further made it clear that his government’s, and the South Korean public’s, support for the agreement, including economic assistance and financing for the provision of light water reactors, could only be secured if there was no ambiguity about North Korea’s nuclear freeze, which in turn required nuclear transparency for North Korea’s nuclear facilities, including the suspect nuclear sites at Yongbyon. Moreover, the LWRs provided must be the Korean model.

Kim’s concerns were not limited to the nuclear agreement. He also took Clinton to task for the absence of any mention of North-South dialogue in the statement. Some (which likely included Kim) felt Clinton had not pressed this point strongly enough, allowing the talks to turn out as North Korea wanted, including excluding South Korea from the negotiations. Moving forward, Kim stressed that the U.S. and South Korea must work closely to avoid being deceived by North Korea. This was all the more essential given what Kim saw as the continued uncertainty and absence of clear signs of stability in the country following the death of Kim Il Sung. President Kim stressed that it remained a very unpredictable regime, and he was concerned that Kim Jong Il had not appeared in public for over a month. Given these unknowns, the South Korean leader stressed the need for caution and not to rush into any agreements with North Korea; if the U.S. and South Korea really have a chance, they can come back to it, he argued.

Responding to these concerns, Clinton pushed back, telling Kim the U.S. was not “relying on North Korean good faith.” The IAEA would verify Pyongyang’s commitments, providing the essential transparency, and the U.S. had made it very clear in Geneva that North Korea must accept special inspections before it would get the light water reactors. The U.S. had worked very hard to secure North Korea’s agreement to accept a South Korean LWR, and it now seemed ready to accept this if the U.S. remained deeply involved. Finally, the U.S. negotiators in Geneva had strongly supported and urged North Korea to reiterate its willingness to implement the North-South Denuclearization Agreement signed in January 1992 and, as Kim knew, it had done so in the Agreed Statement. Clinton said he agreed with Kim on the need for caution in monitoring Kim Jong Il’s assumption of power. The U.S. and South Korea must continue to work closely and assess North Korea by how it carried out its commitments; the key would be what they do, not what they say.

This cable reports on another briefing that Robert Gallucci – now Ambassador -at -Large for the negotiations with North Korea – provided the Russian government, this time given to Russian Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov in Washington, D.C. on September 20. Most of the discussion focused on the still-live question of how to provide light water reactors to North Korea, and the issues associated with South Korean and Russian reactor models. Gallucci began by providing an overview of his efforts to date in Geneva and recent trips to the Far East and Russia. He noted that while North Korea had initially requested Russian reactors, this had proven impossible because of a lack of financing. “Only South Korean reactors, financed largely by Seoul with some help from Tokyo, passed the test ... that any light water reactor package had to be politically, technically and financially viable.” Gallucci had devoted his recent trips to Asia to nailing down support for the South Korean option. The “task at hand” was to persuade North Korea that there was no alternative to South Korean reactors, a task that Vorontsov agreed could pose the most serious problem. Doing this meant easing Pyongyang’s suspicion that Seoul would use this decision to gain political leverage over North Korea. Gallucci said the U.S. had developed the idea to manage the reactor deliveries through a U.S.-led consortium, to be known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), in part to address this problem by insulating the two Koreas and help keep politics out of the process. To avoid giving North Korea the idea that options other than South Korea were available, Gallucci said the U.S. was calling on governments to discourage their nuclear power companies (in Moscow’s case, Minatom) from making sales pitches to Pyongyang.

While Gallucci believed the last meeting in Geneva had laid the foundation for an eventual agreement with North Korea, the reactor issue could still cause problems, as was seen in the recent experts meeting in Berlin, where the North Korean negotiators, led by a “particularly uncooperative” vice economics minister, had rejected South Korean reactors and added new demands. Gallucci said he planned to “ignore” Berlin and try to pick the talks up where he last left them in Geneva with Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju. As Vorontsov would later comment, Gallucci had “terrific patience.” Still, a number of key issues remained unresolved, including reactor architecture, disposition of the spent fuel rods, and special inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. While the U.S. did not want Russia muddying the waters about reactors, Gallucci was ready to state that Moscow should take part in a conference of countries that could participate in KEDO, and could win reprocessing contracts and enrichment services contracts with North Korea after the light water reactors came on line.

The backdrop to this conversation was an interview the South Korean president had given the New York Times. In this interview, headlined “South Korean President Lashes out at U.S.,” and published on October 7, Kim Young Sam had given vent to what Going Critical described as “his views on the ignorance, naiveté, and penchant for concessions” that he believed characterized the U.S. approach to North Korea, and to repeat the concerns he had expressed to Clinton in their telephone conversations documented above.[5] As Robert Gallucci and his co-authors recount, the interview drew Clinton’s anger, followed by blunt discussions between his national security advisor, Anthony Lake, and Kim’s national security advisor, Chung Chong Wook, about what Lake called Kim’s “naïve and half-baked” attack on Clinton.

In the week following Kim’s New York Times interview and the urgent behind-the-scenes efforts to get Seoul back on track, the Geneva negotiations had proceeded as Ambassador Gallucci sought to chart a course that followed the U.S. strategy and took into account the often countervailing pressures from Seoul and Pyongyang. With the October 14 telephone conversation, Clinton, after expressing his relief that the interview issue was behind them and his expectation that in the future any differences between them would be resolved in private, outlined for Kim the agreement taking shape in Geneva. Stressing that the U.S. had made every effort to reflect Seoul’s position in the talks, Clinton said they were close to a draft agreement, consistent with the agreed U.S./South Korea principles and goals. While exact details were still being worked out, Clinton could tell Kim the agreement would commit North Korea to:

1. Return to the NPT
2. Fully comply with IAEA safeguards, including access to additional sites
3. Not reprocess plutonium
4. Dismantle its existing nuclear facilities
5. Allow its spent fuel to be monitored and shipped out of the country
6. Accept South Korea-model light water reactors

This memorandum of conversation records a brief discussion on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Jakarta, in which President Clinton discussed with South Korean President Kim Young Sam and Japanese Prime Minister Murayama how to underline publicly to the press their joint commitment to see through the Agreed Framework with North Korea. As part of this public statement, the three governments had to send a clear message to Kim Jong Il that North-South dialogue was important, since some issues had to be resolved between Seoul and Pyongyang. As Clinton put it, they needed to make sure “there is no daylight between” them. Kim and Murayama both stressed the need for continued tripartite consultation to make sure North Korea carried out its commitments under the agreement, with Kim again underlining they must never let the country miscalculate or underestimate their resolve. While agreeing with his two counterparts, Clinton wanted to emphasize the other side of the coin. If the Framework Agreement was carried out, it would resolve the world’s greatest nuclear proliferation threat. This meant that carrying out the agreement was very important. Even as they pushed Kim Jong Il to keep his side of the agreement and to resume soon the North-South dialogue, they must also work in good faith to carry out the obligations of the other parties to the agreement, a reference to the light fuel oil and LWR commitments to follow on North Korea’s dismantling of its nuclear weapons program. Presciently, Clinton warned that “We don’t want to give North Korea an excuse not to keep its word.”

This cable reports on a meeting between U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Stephen Bosworth and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to discuss key issues between the two countries in advance of President Clinton’s trip to Seoul on November 20-22. Two overarching sets of issues provided the backdrop for the meeting: South Korea’s continuing efforts to address the economic crisis that began nearly a year earlier, and the ongoing challenges of engaging with North Korea despite repeated provocations by Pyongyang. On the economic front, Kim was making progress with reforms and in resolving automobile trade issues with the U.S., though the nation still faced unemployment and continuing economic contraction. Regarding coordination of policies towards North Korea, Bosworth noted that the two nations continued to have a common view of the long-term goals and were working closely to reinforce each nation’s short term approach to Pyongyang, though with some differing points of emphasis.

For example, while Bosworth agreed that North Korea’s investment in Hyundai seemed to be a significant result of his engagement policy, this had to be set against North Korea’s firing of a Taepodong missile and the reports that Pyongyang had established an underground nuclear site to secretly circumvent its commitments under the 1994 Framework Agreement. (Though text regarding the underground site has been redacted, this is clearly in reference to accusations the U.S. had recently made about the existence of such a site.) Bosworth stressed that these issues must be addressed if the Clinton administration was going to be able to maintain Congressional support for its North Korea policy, which was especially important with regard to meeting the conditions Congress had placed on funding for KEDO and the light water reactor promised to North Korea under the agreement. Kim repeated his oft-stated need for patience in dealing with North Korea. While Kim suggested that this Congressional pressure might be useful in dealing with Pyongyang, Bosworth in his comments to the State Department was unsure Kim appreciated how hard it would be to meet “the hurdles erected by Congress.” Also, while he cautioned against drawing hasty conclusions, the South Korean leader saw some hints that North Korea might be preparing to move toward a more market-oriented economy on the lines of China, and perhaps was coming to accept that “cooperation with South Korea is the only way out of their economic difficulties.” In fact, Kim personally believed there was a chance of real change in North Korea within the next few years, arguing that “if they don’t change, they simply have no future.” Finally, though, in one area Bosworth clearly felt Kim was an improvement upon his predecessor, Kim Young Sam. Kim Dae Jung stressed the essential need for tripartite coordination between the U.S., South Korea and Japan in dealing with North Korea. Bosworth found this a “refreshing change from his predecessor whose neuralgia toward Japan . . . made tripartite thinking so hard for him.”

This cable describes the situation in South Korea before William Perry’s visit in the wake of President Clinton’s trip to Seoul the previous month. As the cable subject line sums it up, he could expect to find expectation and trepidation. The Kim Dae Jung government was looking forward to using Perry’s visit to make a strong case for the U.S. and South Korea to press ahead with a closely coordinated policy that combined deterrence with engagement. Seoul’s senior leaders believed that by working with the U.S. they could manage North Korean threats, including nuclear ones, and that the Agreed Framework, despite its flaws, was still a key element to managing these threats. These leaders were also aware that Washington, Seoul and Tokyo remained hostage to North Korean provocations, both nuclear and missile related, and worried that threats in these areas could strengthen sentiment against engaging with North Korea in these countries, putting at risk future coordination on North Korea policies.

Against these concerns, the South Korean government felt that the recent meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Bill Clinton was valuable, given Clinton’s endorsement of Kim’s two-track policy of deterring North Korean threats and engaging Pyongyang to “slowly induce change.” The two leaders had agreed on the vital need to determine the true nature of the suspicious underground construction in North Korea and to curb its missile development, testing, deployment and exports. Both also supported the benefits of a “sustained, hardheaded” engagement with North Korea and the value of the Framework Agreement for the combined engagement/deterrence strategy. The South Korean senior officials were also very pleased that Perry’s North Korea policy review aimed at strengthening shared U.S. and South Korean policies, while they were also aware of the domestic political concerns over Clinton’s North Korea policy in Congress that the review would also seek to address.

The U.S. embassy summarized Kim Dae Jung’s North Korea policies as based on principle and pragmatism. The principle was that conditional engagement was the most effective strategy to achieve a “soft landing” of the North Korean regime that would avoid war and minimize more suffering by the North Korean people. It was pragmatic given that South Korea was presently awash in economic problems and South Korean worries that tensions on the Korean peninsula would scare away investors or increase credit risks. Overarching both policy approaches was the Kim government’s argument that North Korea was in irreversible decline unless it carried out fundamental changes that involved ending Pyongyang’s antagonism toward South Korea. But such changes also presented Kim Jong Il with a dilemma: preserve the self-reliance juche ideology of his father and face economic self-destruction, or abandon the ideology and risk losing his legitimacy and authority. While senior South Korean officials felt North Korea had already taken some steps to legalize parts of the informal economy that had arisen in response to widespread economic breakdown, Kim Jong Il had also adopted a strategy of regime survival in which Pyongyang’s greatest assets were the threats it posed to its neighbors, in which the chief trump card was the nuclear threat that it had learned was useful to seize U.S. attention and “extort” benefits.

At present, the Framework Agreement was successfully addressing the most imminent North Korean nuclear threat, as Pyongyang had stopped nuclear reprocessing and was canning the fuel rods at Yongbyon. The U.S., South Korea and Japan were carrying out, albeit imperfectly (likely a reference to the financial issues plaguing provision of light water reactors (LWR) to North Korea) the KEDO mission of supplying the DPRK with heavy fuel oil until the LWR could be built. However, this arrangement could be jeopardized if Congress failed to approve the second tranche of U.S. funding earmarked for heavy fuel oil to send to North Korea, as any limits on U.S participation in KEDO would make it difficult for Japan and South Korea to sustain their financial support for the project. The potential collapse of this project would lead to heightened tensions. Still, senior South Korean officials felt a North Korean nuclear threat arising from the suspected secret underground facility would not materialize for several years, This would give time for South Korea to establish a high stake in peace by the North Korean regime, leading it to accept Kim Dae Jung’s offer of peaceful coexistence. If this hope failed to materialize, Seoul felt there would be sufficient time to deal diplomatically and militarily with the threat “before it becomes lethal.” In seeking to move North Korea towards peaceful coexistence, Kim Dae Jung’s government would continue to pursue bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity, though this approach had produced modest success and had been criticized for providing an “overly generous flow of benefits” to Pyongyang with little meaningful change, given that North Korea continued to engage in provocative acts towards Seoul.

The description for this documentin the earlier posting on this topic provides details on this cable.[The fully-released version, provided here, contains new information about Kim Dae Jung’s views about engaging with North Korea. In paragraph one, Ambassador Bosworth references a protest he placed with the Blue House regarding release of the transcript. Also, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the cable, now fully declassified, provide some “more sensitive” comments the Blue House did not release. The first was President Kim’s statement that while Seoul had suspicions regarding possible underground nuclear sites in North Korea, it had no concrete evidence that Pyongyang had violated the Framework Agreement. Still, even if the sites were related to nuclear activities, Kim felt they had four to six years before they were operational, so now was not the time to drop engagement or move to sanctions. Kim did agree that if a violation of the agreement was found, it would be a “very grave situation” and that the U.S., South Korea and Japan would have to show military strength and bring “the greatest possible pressure” on North Korea. Regarding North Korea’s missile program, Kim felt it would be wise to offer Pyongyang money in return for a cap on exports of its missile technology, and said Israel would be involved in such an effort. Kim was worried that another missile test could make Japan unwilling to complete the KEDO project, so the U.S., Japan and China must prevent another test.

Secretary of State Albright here provides President Clinton with an update on the state of play in the ongoing negotiations with North Korea and the steps planned to secure Congressional support for the administration’s North Korea policy, as laid out in the Perry Report. Albright states that their efforts to achieve a break through with Pyongyang would be at a “critical juncture” in September, and asks for Clinton’s help in ensuring this progress by “preparing the way with Congress.” Though details about the expected sequence of steps have been redacted, Albright’s description of these steps likely reflected what actually occurred in September: in the Berlin talks North Korea agreed to a moratorium on testing any long-range missiles for the duration of talks with the United States, while the U.S. agreed to a partial lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea, and both sides agreed to continue high-level discussions, which would include negotiations on a comprehensive agreement to end North Korea’s missile exports to Pakistan and the Middle East. Following this agreement, Perry submitted his North Korea policy review to Clinton, which was closely followed by Clinton ordering a broad easing of economic sanctions against North Korea as the first step in a long-term plan to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons and missile programs.

This last step was a major change in policy, for which the way had to be prepared with Congress. One key step would be providing the Kerry Report, the final version of which Clinton should see in a few days, to Congress, which was impatient and had always been skeptical of the Framework Agreement. This skepticism was evidenced in problems securing appropriations in support of North Korea policy. In addition, based on criticism that the Perry policy review had not produced results, Republican House committee and subcommittee chairs had created a North Korea policy advisory group, which was seeking extensive intelligence briefings from DCI George Tenet. To meet this skepticism and anticipated push-back, Albright recommends that Clinton join her and other officials in calling the congressional leadership to brief them on the Berlin talks and their anticipated outcome, including the suspension of sanctions, and ease doubts about the Perry Report. These consultations would be followed by Clinton meeting with key congressional members to reinforce the message.

In closing, Albright reminded Clinton that “one can never know what to expect with the North Koreans,” and so they must prepared for the downside, if needed. Still, she was more hopeful than she had been in a long time, and so they must “put all our pieces in place so that our Congress and our allies provide us the space and support to pursue the upside.”

While marked by the rhetoric expected from North Korean officials, this account of Secretary Albright’s meeting with DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun during her historic trip to Pyongyang in October 2000 is an interesting window into how Albright sought to engage the North Koreans in dialogue, always a difficult goal. The subjects that Albright identified as important for discussion during the course of normalizing relations included counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, nonproliferation, human rights, refugees, and humanitarian food assistance. While Albright and Paek both wanted to build on the recent positive steps, including U.S. food aid to North Korea, the first meeting between Albright and her North Korean counterpart in Bangkok in July, and the recent visit by Kim Jong Il’s personal envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, to Washington, bearing an invitation to Clinton to visit Pyongyang, they saw the path forward in different ways. Park repeatedly stressed the importance North Korea placed on a summit meeting with the U.S. as the essential step for reaching agreement on the issues Albright identified, such as the North Korea missile program and eventual normalization of relations. For the North Koreans, the recent summit between the two Korean leaders was a good example of what could occur. As Paek argued, a summit would build confidence and work to remove deeply rooted suspicions.

Against such lofty goals, Albright noted that improving relations was a step-by-step process and summarized the areas, listed above, that required attention. Paek’s responses reflected the persistent North Korean views on these subjects, as well as the need for Albright to pursue these issues with Kim Jong Il. Two examples, nonproliferation and human rights, illustrate this. On nonproliferation, Paek told Albright that with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty as well as North Korea’s missile program and the role of U.S. forces in Korea, these subjects should be discussed between her and Kim without any “interference” by Paek. He also repeated the oft-stated North Korean goal of global nuclear disarmament. When Albright raised the U.S. hope that Pyongyang would work with the U.S. in addressing human rights and religious freedom, Paek fell back on the argument that human rights must be seen in the context of the history and customs of each nation, and only promised to give some thought to what specific standards should be applied.

Following her meetings in Pyongyang, Secretary Albright next went to Seoul, where she briefed South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei. This cable discusses the report she provided Foreign Minister Kono. Accompanying Albright were the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Thomas Foley; Ambassador Wendy Sherman, State Department counselor; Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth; and Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs Charles Pritchard. This is a detailed account of the meeting and merits reading in full. The discussion touches on Albright’s assessment of Kim Jong Il and the prospects for reaching a deal with North Korea about missiles leading to a breakthrough in relations, while Kono spoke about the domestic political pressures to deal with the problems of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens and providing economic aid to Pyongyang.

The two diplomats began by remarking on how strange it was to travel to Communist nations, in particular the feeling of relief when leaving. Recalling her travels to Communist nations while a professor, Albright described the contrast between the Eastern Bloc and the West as “like the difference between black and white and Technicolor.” Turning to her meetings with Kim Jong Il, Albright was surprised at how much time she was able to spend with the North Korean leader and spoke of her astonishment over having a “rational discussion” with him. Based on these lengthy meetings, she realized that the U.S. had until now failed to understand what type of person he really was, which was in contrast to the accepted view of him as “strange, moody and hypersensitive.” Now, agreeing with Kim Dae Jung that their earlier assessment was wrong, Albright saw Kim Jong Il as “practical, pragmatic, decisive, and non-ideological.” She had found him well-informed from extensive reading, and, noting he had three computers in his office, said he had asked for the State Department’s e-mail address. Albright stressed that she now believed it best to follow Kim Dae Jung’s advice on how important it was to engage in dialogue with the North Korean leader in order to assess his thinking and secure results.

Regarding North Korea’s missile programs, Albright said she had engaged in extensive discussions which had occupied most of her time. Her worries that the North Koreans would want to distinguish between the Taepodong and Nodong missiles were eased when Kim Jong Il did not do so and stated clearly that he was willing to make a deal on all long-range missiles, which he knew were the cause of concern about threats to U.S. territory and to Japan. Albright also said that it had become clear to her while discussing Pyongyang’s missile programs and export of missile technology that North Korean views were strongly linked to its economic situation and need for foreign currency. It would be left to Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn to build on this discussion and work out the “details and modalities” when he resumed missile talks with North Korea in Kuala Lumpur the following week. Albright stressed that an agreement to rein in Pyongyang’s missile programs would be a breakthrough carrying great benefits for U.S. and Japanese security.

When the discussion turned to the broader prospects for fundamental changes in relations with North Korea, both diplomats noted the challenge of trying to truly understand the country and the problematic impact of public opinion about North Korea in the U.S. and Japan. Albright admitted that everyone was questioning themselves about what was happening in the country, but that the pace of developments was “surprisingly fast,” which put the U.S. and Japan in a position were “flexibility and creativity” were required. While they may question the motives behind Kim Jong Il’s moves, at the same time both governments needed to be ready to react; the challenge was to remain critical while ready to seize a tremendous opportunity to defuse a dangerous situation. Doing this required looking at the “bigger picture” as a potential missile breakthrough combined with progress between the two Koreas might provide the opportunity for all three Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) nations to “transform their relations” with North Korea.[6] As Albright put it, diplomacy with North Korea was a challenge both to intellectual reasoning and to fundamental national interests, as well as a “whole dimension” larger than issues usually discussed between Washington and Tokyo. Albright also felt that improving ties between the U.S. and North Korea was more complicated than with the former Soviet Union or between East and West Germany, as these latter situations “had not followed a war with a high death toll like Korea.” In response to American critics of the U.S. efforts to engage with North Korea, including the press, Albright had made it clear “she was not born yesterday, and that her glasses were not rose-tinted.”

As the subsequent conversation demonstrated, Japan faced its own issues in engaging North Korea, many rooted in public opinion, especially with regard to providing food aid, Pyongyang’s missile programs, and the abduction of Japanese citizens. While Tokyo was interested in normalizing what was an “abnormal” relationship, steps to advance this such as the provision of aid to North Korea had provoked strong criticism within Japan, while there were deep views that the kidnapping of Japanese citizens was a clear violation of Japanese sovereignty. Providing aid involved finding the proper amount and type, so as to avoid cash payments that North Korea could divert to military programs. While Kono was glad to learn that Kim Jong Il was ready to include both types of missiles in talks, Tokyo still needed to address the threat posed by the nearly 100 Nodongs already deployed. The abduction issue and Japan in general were also very sensitive for North Korea, as Japan had to deal with a contentious issue from the past: how to apologize for its colonization of Korea.

The meeting ended with a discussion of the U.S. taking the step of removing North Korea from the list of nations supporting terrorism. Albright was not sure why North Korean officials had not raised this issue during her visit to Pyongyang, though the U.S. remained committed to discussing with North Korea the steps it would need to take to be removed from the list. Ambassador Sherman stated that a six-month period of good behavior on North Korea’s part would be required after the Clinton administration notified Congress of its intent to remove North Korea from the list. Sherman also noted that the U.S. had been very careful not to discuss publicly the steps North Korea needed to take to be removed. Instead, it had chosen ambiguity for the sake of both the U.S. and Japan, stating only that North Korea understood what they must do.

This cable reports on Secretary Albright’s briefing of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung about her meetings in Pyongyang. The same U.S. officials that accompanied here in her meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Kono (see Document 15) also took part in the meeting, while President Kim was joined by Foreign Minister Lee Joung Binn, Kim Ha-Chung, Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Lee Soo-Hyuck, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security. The cable only covers the first part of the meeting, which adjourned for a smaller group discussion reported on separately in a cable not available.

The meeting was devoted to comparing notes on Albright’s and President Kim’s personal impressions of Kim Jong Il. Albright repeated many of the comments she had made to Japanese Foreign Minister Kono (Document 15), telling President Kim she had found Chairman Kim well-informed and comfortable discussing a wide range of topics, and noting again his interest in computers and e-mail. His avid interest in movies was also on display, with the chairman telling Albright that he regularly caught up on the latest films, usually agreed with the Oscar nominations, and noted that President Kim’s remarkable life, going from dissident to exile to president, would make a good movie. Albright had the impression that Kim Jong Il had given personal attention to the planning for her visit, had been very polite and a good listener, and had treated his subordinates well. In terms of temperament, Chairman Kim’s mood might swing, but he never showed any anger during their meetings, and while he might seem tense, he was never rude.

When Albright asked if the North Korean leader’s mood swings might also lead him to suddenly reverse course from his seeming policy of opening up to the U.S., President Kim replied that aside from such momentary shifts in temperament, Kim Jong Il was pragmatic and would only change course if confronted with some setback. Kim Dae Jung saw this pragmatic side in Kim Jong Il’s statement to him and to reporters that he was now open to allowing U.S. forces to remain on the peninsula after reunification. President Kim had sought to address this pragmatic side by telling Chairman Kim that for its survival, both in terms of security and economic development, North Korea must improve relations with the U.S. In the same vein, the South Korean leader had pointed out to Kim Jong Il that South Korea maintained a close relationship with the U.S. and Japan, as well as cooperated with Russia and China, so why shouldn’t North Korea get along with the U.S. and Japan? Secretary Albright had also possibly seen signs of this pragmatism in Chairman Kim’s offhand remark to her and to Ambassador Sherman during a massive cultural event at a stadium. Part of the performance was the depiction of a Taepodong missile taking off, after which Kim told the Americans that this portrayal would be the “first and last” North Korean satellite launch.

Albright did find the North Korean leader‘s understanding of western economics to be limited. Still, he did admit his country’s economy was in very bad shape, with critical energy shortages caused in part by a drought which had reduced hydropower. When the discussion had turned to economic reform, Kim Jong Il said he had asked Russian President Vladimir Putin what “opening up” really meant (an exchange now seen as somewhat ironic in light of subsequent Russian history). When Chairman Kim told Albright that he liked the Swedish model” of economic development, she had pointed out that that model was based on an already well-developed economy, which North Korea clearly did not possess.