The “Liquidation” of Memorial

This document is a summary of a telephone report from Sergei Kovalev, the human rights commissioner of the Russian Federation, to Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Duma, as dictated to N. I. Semina, Kovalev's assistant. Kovalev is calling from Grozny, on a trip with a group of Duma deputies to investigate the situation and the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The parliamentary delegation traveled to the areas of Achkoy-Martan and Novy Sharoy in Chechnya. The group had conversations with Russian soldiers, who were reportedly "distinctly" aware that the "development of the conflict" would lead to "increasingly more serious casualties among the civilian population," about which the soldiers had an "obvious" negative attitude. Kovalev had witnessed the bombing of the building that housed the Chechen Republic's Department of State Security and noted that the central authorities failed to mention the fact that it was located in "the midst of the heavily populated central area of Grozny." Kovalev describes a "chasm of misunderstanding" between the Russian authorities and the Chechen side and believes that "a crime is being committed not only against the [Chechen] people, but also against Russian soldiers."

This letter from Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation Kovalev to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin addresses Chernomyrdin's January 16 speech on the conflict in Chechnya. Kovalev, who at the time was still in Grozny but about to fly back to Moscow, is writing to share his four key points for the negotiation process that he sees necessary to end the war. The first is the "de facto recognition of the administration of General Dudaev as one of the parties to the negotiations," since the administration "is still recognized by a large part of the Chechens." The second is the "gradual termination of military conflict, without setting preconditions at any given stage," as Kovalev believed that "even minimal success" would have "enormous public and international resonance," which would in turn "stimulate the continuation of the process."
His third thought concerns resolving "humanitarian issues," such as prisoner exchanges and assistance for civilians. His final point addresses the importance of "the quickest unveiling of the specific government plan," as well as the necessity of the "openness and transparency of the federal government's position in the negotiations." Kovalev indicates that he will be available for a personal meeting with Chernomyrdin when he arrives in Moscow.

This fiery letter fits all too closely today’s circumstances if one substitutes the name Putin for that of Yeltsin, and the territory of Ukraine for that of Chechnya. In January 1996, after 13 months of bitter confrontation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin over the war in Chechnya, Kovalev decided to resign his position as Russia’s first ombudsman. By this time, Yeltsin had already dissolved the President’s Human Rights Commission, but Kovalev kept it functioning. In this letter, the early supporter of democratization blames Yeltsin for abandoning the hope of Russian democracy. Kovalev does not absolve himself and admits that he supported Yeltsin in his use of force against the Parliament in October 1993, but points to signs of sliding toward authoritarianism due to Yeltsin’s power grab (via the 1993 Constitution) and demonization of the opposition. From 1993 on, Kovalev writes, instead of implementing democratic reforms, Yeltsin “revived the blunt and inhumane might of a state machine that stands above justice, law, and the individual.” Kovalev indicts the Russian president for abandoning transparency and reviving excessive secrecy, and for selecting government officials on the basis of personal loyalty. In Kovalev’s view, Yeltsin’s “policies compromised” even the words “democracy” and “democrats.”

Speaking about the upcoming 1996 elections, Kovalev says that Yeltsin is no better than his Communist (Gennady Zyuganov) and nationalist (Vladimir Zhirinovsky) opponents and that “if we have to choose among you, it will be like choosing which mafia organization to apply to for protection,” and so he tells the president he is not going to vote for him. Above all, he blames Yeltsin for unleashing the murderous war in Chechnya, which claimed thousands of civilian lives. As a former close supporter, Kovalev adds a very personal note; he tells Yeltsin that he has “lost [his] soul, that [he was] unable to evolve from a Communist Party secretary into a human being.” As the translation notes, the letter was first published in Izvestia and then in The New York Review of Books, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick.

This report from Memorial’s Internet homepage this week describes the organization’s arguments to the Russian Supreme Court on the appeal of the “liquidation” order. Memorial’s director, Elena Zhemkova, points to what she calls “the real reasons” for the prosecution – that Memorial “speaks of responsibility and preserves memory, including about crimes, and the liquidation of an organization that helps us not repeat the crimes of the past and not make mistakes today is harmful to all people living in Russia.” Memorial’s lawyers point out the flaws in the prosecution’s case and predict that the state could “slide into a second edition of the Soviet Union.” The report also includes links to the full texts of the appeal, of the December 2021 initial decision by the court, and of the original November 2021 prosecution complaint.