Virtual Reading Room

Page 451 of 66713327 document(s) found

Feb 13, 1973

White House Memorandum For H.R. Haldeman, From Stephen Bull, RE: Bebe Rebozo’s Driving

Source

Richard Nixon Library, Higby Chron, Staff Member and Office Files-Haldeman

Document-09-Untitled-Dissent-Message-on-The

Feb 7, 1973

Untitled Dissent Message on "The Somali Threat to Ethiopia," from Addis Ababa, February 7, 1973, Secret.

Source

FOIA lawsuit, National Security Archive v. Department of State (17-cv-0770)

Feb 3, 1973

The President’s Daily Brief, Top Secret, 3 February 1973

Source

CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room

Feb 1, 1973

Memorandum for the Files, from Henry A. Kissinger, “Meeting with Prime Minister, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sir Burke Trend, Thursday, February 1, 1973, 4:00 to 4:45 p.m., The Oval Office,” Top Secret

Source

NPL, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, box 62, U.K. MemCons 1973 Jan.-April

Jan 31, 1973

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council [NSC] staff, to Kissinger, “Burke Trend,” 31 January 1973, Secret

Source

NPL, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Exchange with the UK-SLBMs

Jan 30, 1973

PM – Ronald I. Spiers to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (U. Alexis Johnson), “Forthcoming Visit of Prime Minister Heath: Possible Request for POSEIDON,” 30 January 1973, Top Secret, with attached memos and letters to Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant to the President Kissinger

Source

DNSA; from RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73, Top Secret Files, box 11, POL U.K. Word having reached the State Department about Kissinger’s back-channel discussions with the British, Department officials weighed in on the major options under consideration. Johnson recommended to Kissinger against giving “either an affirmative or a negative decision on the sale of POSEIDON to the UK.” Whether to proceed with Super Antelope or to acquire Poseidon RVs was still being debated in London and the debate needed to run its course. Moreover, Washington needed to “weigh the substantial contribution to our own Balance of Payments position which the sale of POSEIDON would represent against the undesirable effects of the release of this sophisticated weapons technology.” Yet the sale could have adverse implications for the SALT process, e.g., no-transfer concerns. Finally, if the U.S. said “no” it would raise the question whether the U.S. was terminating the “special relationship.” The State Department recommended a “warm, sympathetic but noncommittal response to a Heath request for POSEIDON” as the best way to “advance US interests at this point.”