Virtual Reading Room

Page 455 of 67413476 document(s) found

Apr 1973

ASIS, Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister Whitlam and ASIS Director William T. Robertson, “Review of the MO9 Station in Santiago,” April 1973, Top Secret

Source

National Archives of Australia (FOIA request)

Apr 1973

ASIS, Telegram, [Director-General Robertson’s Report to the Santiago Station officers on Prime Minister Whitlam’s Decision to Close Down their Operations], April 1973

Source

National Archives of Australia (FOIA request)

Apr 1973

ASIS, Memorandum, [Instructions to Coordinate Closing of ASIS Station in Santiago], circa April 1973

Source

National Archives of Australia (FOIA request)

Mar 27, 1973

President Nixon and Julie Nixon
Executive Office Building
Telephone call
March 27, 1973 (“a new bowling alley”)

Source

White House Tape 044-028

Mar 24, 1973

James W. McCord Note (naming Dean and Magruder as part of the cover-up)

Source

McCord Security File, Senate Select Committee Records, Record Group 46, National Archives

Document-09-State-Department-telegram-051747-to

Mar 21, 1973

State Department telegram 051747 to U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, "ROC Nuclear Research," 21 March 1973, Secret

Source

RG 59, previously withdrawn telegram from Access to Archival Databases [AAD]

Mar 20, 1973

White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Richard Nixon and Vadim Trapeznikov, Secret, March 20, 1973

Source

Richard Nixon Presidential Library

Mar 6, 1973

Henry A. Kissinger to the President, “U.S. Support for British Submarine Missile,” 6 March 1973, Top Secret, excised copy

Source

RNPL, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, box 63, Exchange with the UK ‐ SLBMs [2 of 2]

Mar 6, 1973

Side-by-sides of the Kissinger memorandum and the version published in the FRUS

Mar 1, 1973

National Security Agency, Dragon Seeds Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1973. Top Secret.

Source

National Security Archive Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR)

Feb 28, 1973

CIA, Summary, "El Mercurio," February 28, 1973

Feb 13, 1973

White House Memorandum For H.R. Haldeman, From Stephen Bull, RE: Bebe Rebozo’s Driving

Source

Richard Nixon Library, Higby Chron, Staff Member and Office Files-Haldeman

Document-09-Untitled-Dissent-Message-on-The

Feb 7, 1973

Untitled Dissent Message on "The Somali Threat to Ethiopia," from Addis Ababa, February 7, 1973, Secret.

Source

FOIA lawsuit, National Security Archive v. Department of State (17-cv-0770)

Feb 3, 1973

The President’s Daily Brief, Top Secret, 3 February 1973

Source

CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room

Feb 1, 1973

Memorandum for the Files, from Henry A. Kissinger, “Meeting with Prime Minister, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sir Burke Trend, Thursday, February 1, 1973, 4:00 to 4:45 p.m., The Oval Office,” Top Secret

Source

NPL, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, box 62, U.K. MemCons 1973 Jan.-April

Jan 31, 1973

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council [NSC] staff, to Kissinger, “Burke Trend,” 31 January 1973, Secret

Source

NPL, NSC Files, Henry Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Exchange with the UK-SLBMs

Jan 30, 1973

PM – Ronald I. Spiers to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (U. Alexis Johnson), “Forthcoming Visit of Prime Minister Heath: Possible Request for POSEIDON,” 30 January 1973, Top Secret, with attached memos and letters to Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant to the President Kissinger

Source

DNSA; from RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73, Top Secret Files, box 11, POL U.K. Word having reached the State Department about Kissinger’s back-channel discussions with the British, Department officials weighed in on the major options under consideration. Johnson recommended to Kissinger against giving “either an affirmative or a negative decision on the sale of POSEIDON to the UK.” Whether to proceed with Super Antelope or to acquire Poseidon RVs was still being debated in London and the debate needed to run its course. Moreover, Washington needed to “weigh the substantial contribution to our own Balance of Payments position which the sale of POSEIDON would represent against the undesirable effects of the release of this sophisticated weapons technology.” Yet the sale could have adverse implications for the SALT process, e.g., no-transfer concerns. Finally, if the U.S. said “no” it would raise the question whether the U.S. was terminating the “special relationship.” The State Department recommended a “warm, sympathetic but noncommittal response to a Heath request for POSEIDON” as the best way to “advance US interests at this point.”